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BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE 
Amici Curiae, The Utah Taxpayers Association and The Utah 
Manufacturers Association, appearing through their attorneys Kent 
W. Winterholler and Maxwell A. Miller of and for Parsons Behle & 
Latimer, respectfully submit their Brief in support of Newspaper 
Agency Corporation ("NAC"), that the decision of The Utah State Tax 
Commission (the "Commission"), wherein the Commission denied NAC a 
sales and use tax exemption under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-12-104(15) (Supp. 1994), should be reversed. The Utah 
Taxpayers Association is a statewide association of businesses and 
other taxpayers in Utah with approximately 2,000 members. The Utah 
Manufacturers Association is a statewide association of 
manufacturers and related businesses employing more than 84,000 
employees out of approximately 115,000 workers employed in 
manufacturing industries in Utah. 
STATEMENT OF COURT'S JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this Petition for 
Review of a final decision of the Commission under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-16 (1993) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3) (e) (ii) (Supp. 
1994) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The only issue presented for review which this brief will 
address is: Did the Commission err when it concluded that NAC's 
purchase of machinery and equipment for use in NAC's Regent Street 
131996 
printing facility, a manufacturing operation, did not qualify for 
exemption from sales and use tax under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
104(15) (Supp. 1994)? 
The language in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15), upon whose 
meaning a resolution of the above-stated issue turns is: What 
constitutes a "new or expanding operation" and what is a "normal 
operating replacement"? Amici Curiae submit that the Commission 
has not been granted discretion to define the term "normal 
operating replacement" and has abused its discretion in defining 
"new or expanding operations." Because the Commission does not 
have the discretion to define "normal operating replacements," the 
standard of review of the Commission's decision respecting this 
issue is correction of error under Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1) (b) 
(Supp. 1994) . 
Because Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) directs the Commission 
to define by rule "new or expanding operations," the standard of 
review is the reasonableness of the Commission's interpretation and 
application of those terms. The Commission's interpretation and 
application of law will be reversed if the court determines the 
Commission's action is unreasonable, constituting an abuse of 
discretion. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (h) (ii) (1993), Zissi v. 
State Tax Comm'n of Utah, 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992) and Albertsons. 
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Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 854 P.2d 570 (Utah App. 
1993) -1 
The Commission's interpretation of Rule R865-19-85S to require 
satisfaction of a "new products" test for exemption eligibility, 
when no such test is contemplated under the statute or required by 
the rule, raises an issue of law which should be reviewed for 
correctness. No deference should be granted the Commission by the 
court. Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(b) (Supp. 1994). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610 (Supp. 1994) . This statute is 
reproduced in full in Addendum I. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) (Supp. 1994). This 
statute is reproduced in full in Addendum I. 
3. Rule 865-19-85S of the Utah Administrative Code. This 
rule is reproduced in full in Addendum I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Amici Curiae believes the statement of the case contained in 
NAC's Brief adequately states the nature of the case, the course of 
proceedings and disposition of this case before the Commission. 
Amici Curiae also believes the Statement of Facts contained in 
NAC'S Brief is appropriate. Amici Curiae will not restate these 
matters in this brief, relying upon NAC's Statement of the Case. 
\A11 cases cited in this brief are reproduced, for the 
convenience of the court, in Addendum II. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Commission erred in its NAC decision and in Eaton-Kenway 
Inc. v. The Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, 
Utah Supreme Court Case No. 940126, by applying its definition of 
a "normal operating replacement," as contained in Rule 865-19-85S, 
to include all machinery and equipment which replaces existing 
machinery and equipment if the replacements produce one of the same 
products as the existing machinery. These holdings graft a test 
onto the Commission's rule which is not justified by the statute. 
This "new product" requirement is an incorrect and unreasonable 
action requiring reversal. 
The effect of the Commission's NAC decision is to favor new, 
i.e., not currently existing, manufacturing operations over now 
existing, but expanding, manufacturing operations. The policy this 
action advances is devastating to Amici Curiae's membership and is 
contrary to the legislature's intent in explicitly including 
"expanding [manufacturing] operations" in the exemption language. 
The Commission's exclusion of the entire set of expanding 
manufacturing operations to whom the statutory exemption is 
available should be reversed as a violation of legislative intent 
and an usurpation of legislative authority. 
The Commission has not been given discretion under Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-12-104(15), supra, the exemption statute, to define the 
term "normal operating replacements," but may only determine an 
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"increase [in] plant production or capacity." Therefore, 
Commission Rule R865-19-85S, which defines a "normal operating 
replacement" to include any "machinery or equipment which replaces 
existing machinery and equipment of a similar nature . . ." is 
beyond the Commission's authority and is erroneous. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COMMISSION'S ADOPTION OP A NEW PRODUCT REQUIREMENT IS NOT 
JUSTIFIED UNDER THE STATUTE AND RULE 85S. 
In this case, and in the Eaton-Kenway decision, supra. the 
Commission has interpreted its own rule and applied a new products 
test. In its NAC decision, the Commission held: 
NAC's new offset presses and auxiliary equipment were 
placed in a plant that had previously consisted of an 
offset press and two letter presses. While the new 
offset presses and supporting equipment offer superior 
quality and greater capacity than the old letter presses, 
the basic purpose and actual use of both types of presses 
is the same: they produce daily newspapers. The 
Commission therefore concludes that NAC's new machinery 
and equipment is similar in nature to its old equipment 
and fails to meet the third alternative test of Rule 
R85S.A.3. for "new or expanding operation." 
Commission Decision ("Decision" hereafter), [emphasis added] p. 14. 
The Commission has ruled that if new machinery and equipment 
produces any of the same products as replaced machinery and 
equipment, it is a "normal operating replacement" no matter what 
other products the new machinery produces and no matter what 
additional functions the replacement machinery performs. In this 
ruling the Commission has focused its attention on a single aspect 
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of a manufacturing operation, does the new machinery produce the 
same product as the old machinery and equipment? The Commission 
deliberately ignores any changes in the process, character or 
nature of the operation. The Commission also ignores any new 
product capability, and any increased capacity, productivity or 
cost savings which the new machinery generates. 
No new product test is contained in Rule 85S, or in Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-12-104(15) , supra. Requiring NAC and other manufacturers 
to produce an entirely different product line in order to qualify 
as a "new or expanding operation" rewrites the statutory exemption 
by adding a requirement which the legislature did not include in 
the statute. This is an usurpation of legislative authority and 
the Commission should be reversed.2 
The absurdity of this new, or different, product test is 
easily seen if the test is applied to a field other than printing. 
2
 The Utah Supreme Court in Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit 
Division of the Utah State Tax Comm'n. 846 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1993) 
overturned an earlier version of Rule 85S promulgated by the 
Commission which imposed a requirement that a business produce a 
new product in order to qualify as a manufacturer for purposes of 
the Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15), supra. exemption. In this 
case, the Commission has once again attempted to impose a new, or 
different, product requirement by interpreting Rule 85S to exclude 
those businesses which produce the same product with replacement 
machinery and equipment. Under this ruling the replacement 
machinery producing the same product is a "normal operating 
replacement" not qualifying for the "new or expanding 
[manufacturing] operation" exemption. The legislature never 
included, nor intended, this requirement as a part of the 
exemption. 
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Under this test if a telecommunications company replaces its copper 
electronic voice and data transmission land lines with an orbiting 
satellite electronic voice and data transmission system, the 
satellite, and the land-based receiving stations, would be "normal 
operating replacements" for the replaced copper wire transmission 
lines. The new system and the old both perform the same function, 
electronic voice and data transmission. Both systems produce the 
same end product, transmitted information. Even though the 
technology which the new equipment employs is radically different, 
has a capacity thousands of times greater than the replaced copper 
wire, and is hundreds of times cheaper to employ and operate, the 
Commission would view the new system as a "normal operating 
replacement." This cannot be what the legislature meant when it 
excluded from a "new or expanding [manufacturing] operation" 
"normal operating replacements." The Commission's decision is 
incorrect and unreasonable and should be overturned. 
II. THE COMMISSION'S RULE AND DECISION DISCRIMINATES AGAINST 
EXISTING UTAH MANUFACTURING OPERATIONS, THIS IS CONTRARY TO 
THE LEGISLATURE'S INTENT IN ENACTING THE EXEMPTION. 
Rule 85S enunciates three tests under which a manufacturing 
operation can qualify for the sales and use tax exemption of Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15), supra. The Commission's decision 
states: 
The Commission has specific statutory authority to define 
the term "new or expanding operation." The Commission's 
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definition is found in Rule R865-19-85S.A.3., which 
limits "new or expanding" operations to those which are: 
(1) substantially different in nature, character, or 
purpose from prior activities; 
(2) begun in a new physical plant location in Utah; or 
(3) increase production or capacity, subject to the 
Commission's definition of "normal operating 
replacements." If NAC satisfies any one of the foregoing 
conditions, it meets the requirement of a "new or 
expanding operation." 
Decision, pp. 10-11. 
The first two criteria, i.e. (1) "substantially different in 
nature, character or purpose from prior activities" and, (2) "begun 
in a new physical plant location in Utah," are the Commission's 
attempt to define a "new" manufacturing operation. The third 
criteria, (3) "increase production or capacity," is an effort to 
define what the statute means by an "expanding" manufacturing 
operation. 
In this case the Commission initially determined that NAC did 
not meet the first test for a "new" operation. The Commission 
held: 
Rule R85S.A.3.'s first criterion is that the machinery 
and equipment be used in activities that are 
substantially different in nature, character, or purpose 
from prior activities. NAC points to the improvement in 
newspaper quality that results from its new equipment. 
NAC also points to the equipment's ability to produce 
special advertising formats such as "gatefold" and 
"spadia." NAC further points to its ability, resulting 
from the new machinery and equipment, to compete for 
"preprint" and "contract" printing jobs. 
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In the Commission's view, the foregoing activities are 
not substantially different from NAC's prior activities. 
Rather, they represent the incremental movement of the 
newspaper industry into an era where newspapers are of 
higher quality. The Commission finds NAC's activities 
along these lines to be evolutionary in nature and not 
substantially different from prior activities. 
Decision, p. 11. 
Even though NAC's new offset printing facility gave it the 
ability to manufacture products it was unable to produce with its 
old letter press machinery, the Commission held that the new 
operation was not substantially different from NAC's old 
facilities, i.e. was not a "new" manufacturing operation.3 
3
 Amici Curiae do not agree with the Commission's conclusion 
on this point. NAC's new Regent Street facility is "substantially" 
different from its old plant. The new facility enables NAC to 
deliver products which could not be produced in the old plant, i.e. 
spadia and gatefolds. Furthermore, the new plant placed NAC in a 
new line of business it was unable to enter with the old 
manufacturing plant, i.e. contract printing. 
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The Commission also ruled that NAC was not a "new" operation 
because its new printing facility was located in the same building 
shell its old letter press printing plant occupied.4 The 
Commission then determined NAC did not qualify as an "expanding" 
operation because the end product of both the old and new 
facilities were the same, i.e. daily newspapers, even though the 
new offset printing facility differed from the old letter press 
printing plant in the following ways: 
(1) The new plant employed new, modernized technology. 
Decision, p. 4. 
(2) The new plant produced newspapers of much higher quality 
than were produced in the old facility. Decision, p. 14. 
(3) The new plant was at least 20%, and at times 66%, more 
productive than was the old plant. Decision, p. 4. 
4
 This holding is an excellent example of how the Commission 
has unreasonably limited the exemption for a "new [manufacturing] 
operation." NAC's Regent Street printing plant was completely 
redone, the only resemblance between the old and new plant was that 
a portion of the new plant was in the same building shell as was 
the old plant. To hold, as the Commission did, that this was not 
a "new [manufacturing] operation" because it utilized the same 
building shell as the old plant for a portion of the new activities 
is an unreasonably narrow and restrictive definition of what a "new 
[manufacturing] operation" is under the statute. Amici Curiae 
agree with NAC that the Commission's requirement that a new plant 
must be in a new physical location in order to qualify as a "new 
[manufacturing] operation" is contrary to the plain meaning of the 
statute. This requirement subverts the legislature's intent when 
it stated in the statute that "new [manufacturing] operations" 
qualify for a sales tax exemption. 
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(4) The new plant enabled NAC to produce products that could 
not be produced in NAC's old letter press printing facility, 
spadia, gatefolds, and printed color inserts. Decision, pp. 3-4. 
(5) The new plant enabled NAC to enter a new line of business 
it was unable to compete in with its old facilities, contract 
printing. Decision, p. 4. 
Despite these findings of fact, the Commission held that NAC 
was not eligible for an exemption for machinery and equipment to be 
used in an "expanding" manufacturing operation because the new 
machinery produced one product which the replaced machinery also 
produced, daily newspapers. 
The effect of the Commission's interpretation of Rule 85S in 
its NAC decision is that a manufacturer replacing its existing 
facilities with new machinery and equipment will never qualify for 
the exemption if the new equipment performs a single function, out 
of a multitude of functions, which the old equipment also 
performed. The exemption has been eliminated for any existing Utah 
manufacturer seeking to upgrade or modernize (expand) its 
manufacturing operations. 
This is not what the Utah Legislature intended in enacting the 
exemption. The exemption is to be available to both new and 
expanding manufacturing operations, not just new manufacturing 
operations. In the 19 85 Utah Senate debate respecting H.B. 103, 
the originally enacted exemption which is now codified at Utah Code 
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Ann. § 59-12-104(15) (Supp. 1994), Senator Sandberg expressed his 
concern that the exemption was not fair to existing Utah 
businesses. Dave Adams', from the Governor's office, response was 
that the exemption in the bill was good for those businesses that 
wanted to expand.5 
The Commission's use of Rule 85S to deny the sales and use tax 
exemption of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15), supra to NAC is also 
bad public policy. One purpose of the exemption is to encourage 
investment in manufacturing operations by businesses considering 
new operations in Utah. An equal, and concurrent, purpose is to 
encourage investment by existing Utah businesses, such as NAC, that 
are considering expanding their manufacturing operations in Utah. 
The effect of Rule 85S, and the Commission's interpretation of the 
rule in its NAC decision, is to deny the exemption to existing Utah 
manufacturers. The Commission has eliminated the "expanding" 
operations language from the statute in its NAC and Eaton-Kenway, 
supra, decisions. This is improper and an abuse of the discretion 
granted the Commission in the statute. 
Amici Curiae's membership is composed almost entirely of 
existing Utah manufacturers and businesses. The Commission's 
message to Amici's membership is ominous: If you modernize and 
5
 A copy of relevant portions from a transcript of the Utah 
Senate debate respecting H. B. 103, February 26, 1985, is 
reproduced in the Appendix. 
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upgrade your manufacturing plants to compete in the new global 
economy, don't expect any help in Utah. Even though the Utah 
Legislature has enacted a statute to encourage investment by Utah 
companies in "expanding" operations by granting a sales and use tax 
exemption, in Rule 85S and in the NAC and Eaton-Kenway decisions 
the Commission has eliminated the exemption for an "expanding" 
manufacturing operation. 
The court should not allow the Commission to rewrite and 
restrict this exemption in this fashion. The policy decision 
about the availability of the exemption for an "expanding" 
manufacturing operation is the Legislature's alone. The 
Legislature has already made that policy decision in favor of 
extending the exemption to a manufacturer such as NAC in this case. 
The Commission's decision is incorrect, improper, and unreasonable 
and it should be reversed. 
III. THE COMMISSION'S RULE AND ITS DECISION IN THIS CASE VIOLATE 
CANONS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. 
The sales and use tax exemption denied by the Commission to 
NAC states in pertinent part: 
(15) sales or leases of machinery and equipment purchased 
or leased by a manufacturer for use in new or expanding 
operations (excluding normal operating replacements, 
which includes replacement machinery and equipment even 
though they may increase plant production or capacity, as 
determined by the Commission) in any manufacturing 
facility in Utah. 
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(a) manufacturing facility means an establishment 
described in SIC Codes 2000 to 3999 of the 1987 Standard 
Industrial Classification Manual, of the federal 
Executive Office of the President, Office of Management 
and Budget. 
(b) for purposes of this subsection, the commission shall 
by rule define "new or expanding operations" and 
"establishment." 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) (Supp. 1994). 
The Commission has attempted to implement this rule by 
promulgating Rule 865-19-85S ("Rule 85S"). That rule defines "new 
or expanding operations" as follows: 
3. "New or expanding operations" means manufacturing, 
processing, or assembling activities which: 
(a) are substantially different in nature, 
character, or purpose from prior activities; 
(b) are begun in a new physical plant location in 
Utah; or 
(c) increase production or capacity. This definition is 
subject to limitations dealing with normal operating 
replacements. 
The Commission then defines "normal operating replacements" in 
Rule 85S, stating: 
6. "Normal operating replacements" means machinery or 
equipment which replaces existing machinery or equipment 
of a similar nature, even if the use results in increased 
plant production or capacity. 
Apparently, the Commission has interpreted the statutory 
language "excluding normal operating replacements, which includes 
replacement machinery and equipment even though they may increase 
plant production or capacity, as determined by the commission," as 
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granting the Commission the authority to define "normal operating 
replacements." However, the actual authority granted the 
Commission in the statute is the more limited power to determine 
the circumstances under which more productive machinery and 
equipment is, or is not, a "normal operating replacement." This is 
not the broad authority to define a "normal operating replacement" 
as machinery and equipment of a "similar nature," as the Commission 
is attempting in Rule 85S. Grammatically, the statutory language 
"as determined by the commission" modifies "increased plant 
production or capacity," not "normal operating replacement." 
In Wells Fargo Armored Service Corporation Public Service 
Commission of Utah. 626 P.2d 450 (Utah 1981) the Utah Supreme Court 
approved this "last antecedent" rule of statutory construction.6 
In sustaining the interpretation by the Public Service Commission 
6
 See 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.33 (4th ed. 
rev. 1984) ("Referential and qualifying words and phrases, where no 
contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent.") 
See, also Webster's Legal Secretaries Handbook 258 (1981) ("In 
order to achieve maximum clarity and to avoid the possibility that 
the reader will misinterpret what he reads, one should place a 
modifying clause as close as possible to the word or words it 
modifies.") See, also Jensen v. City and County of Denver. 806 
P.2d 381, 385 (Colo. 1991); Taylor v. Perdition Minerals Group. 
Ltd. . 244 Kan. 126; 766 P.2d 805, 810 (1988); Harris Trust & 
Savings Bank v. Mack. 49 111. App.3d 349; 364 N.E.2d 349, 354 
(1977). Since the Legislature uses words "advisedly," Savage 
Industries. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission. 811 P.2d 664, 670 
(Utah 1991) , it must also be assumed, given a possibility of 
different constructions, that the grammatically correct usage was 
intended. 
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of a statutory exemption from regulation of an armored car company, 
the court stated: 
The words of the statutory provision and the statutory 
policy embodied therein assist in ascertaining that 
meaning. Resort to principles of statutory construction 
provide some guidance in the endeavor. In reaching its 
conclusion, the Commission relied on the "last 
antecedent" rule of statutory construction. The rule 
provides in general terms that when there is a modifier 
following a series of nouns, the modifier will apply only 
to the immediately prior antecedent, which in this case 
has the effect of excluding armored vehicles from 
regulation. 
Id., at p. 451 
As an example of how the last antecedent rule of statutory 
construction operates, Amici suggests an examination of the 
following sentence: "Indonesia, Venezuela, Mexico and Canada, 
which also has gas reserves, are countries with significant oil 
production." The modifying phrase "which also has gas reserves" 
applies only to the noun "Canada" in this sentence, not to all the 
other nouns which precede the phases, i.e., Indonesia, Venezuela, 
and Mexico. Similarly, the statutory language "as determined by 
the Commission" does not modify "normal operating replacements" as 
the Commission seems to believe. 
In this case the Commission has adopted a rule defining the 
statutory term "normal operating replacement" to mean replacement 
machinery and equipment which is "of a similar nature." This is an 
effort by the Commission to exercise authority which the statute 
does not grant. A proper reading of the statute permits the 
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Commission to determine what an "increase [in] plant production and 
capacity," is, but not to define "a normal operating replacement" 
as any machinery and equipment "of a similar nature, " as the 
Commission has attempted in Rule 85S. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission has improperly construed Rule 85S to require 
replacement machinery and equipment to produce a new, or different, 
product in order to qualify for the sales and use tax exemption of 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15), supra. The Commission's action in 
applying rule 85S in this case, and in Eaton-Kenway, supra. has 
effectively rewritten the statute to eliminate the exemption for an 
"expanding operation." Contrary to legislative intent, this 
discriminates against existing Utah manufacturers. The Commission 
has also incorrectly read the language of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
104(15), supra, in promulgating Rule 85S. The statute does not 
grant the Commission the authority to define "normal operating 
replacement" as any machinery and equipment which is "of a similar 
nature" to existing machinery and equipment. The Commission's 
actions are incorrect, are unreasonable, and are an usurpation of 
legislative authority. The Commission should be reversed. 
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59-1-504 REVENUE AND TAXATION 
History: C. 1953,59-1-602.5, enacted by L. became effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to 
1993, ch. 248, ft 1. Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 248 
59-1-504. Time determinat ion final. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Judicial review. which governs petitions for redetermination of 
A petitioner's time limit for filing for judicial deficiencies before the commission and not pe-
review of a final tax commission order is pre- titions for judicial review. Dusty's, Inc. v. Audit-
scribed by i 63-46b-14(3) and not this section, ing Div., 842 P.2d 868 (Utah 1992). 
59-1-505. Deposit of amount due prerequisi te to appeal . 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Constitutionality. applied; however, the statutory requirement is 
lb the extent that this section precludes not unconstitutional in all cases. For example, 
reasonable access to judicial review, it violates when a taxpayer is able to meet the require-
the open courts provision, Art. I, Sec. 11, of the ment, the deposit must be paid. Jensen v. State 
Utah Constitution and is unconstitutional as Tax Comm'n, 836 P.2d 966 (Utah 1992). 
PART 6 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
59-1-601. District cour t jurisdiction. 
(1) In addition to the jurisdiction granted in Section 63-46b-15, beginning 
July 1,1994, the district court shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo 
all decisions by the commission resulting from formal adjudicative proceed-
ings. 
(2) As used in this section, "trial de novo" means an original, independent 
proceeding, and does not mean a trial de novo on the record. 
(3) In any appeal taken after July 1, 1994, from a formal hearing to the 
district court pursuant to this section, the commission shall certify a record of 
its proceedings to the district court which record shall be reviewed and 
considered by the district court. A district court may not, unless the parties 
otherwise agree in writing, hear witnesses that were not called to testify or 
consider exhibits that were not presented to the commission at the formal 
hearing. If the parties do not agree, and a district court determines that 
additional witnesses should be heard or additional exhibits considered in the 
interest of justice, the district court shall remand the case to the commission 
for that purpose. This subsection supercedes Section 63-46b-16 pertaining to 
judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1963, 69-24-1, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
1977, ch. 80, I 20; renumbered by L. 1987, merit, effective May 3, 1993, rewrote the former 
ch. 8, | 36; 1987, ch. 161, ft 215; 1992, ch. provisions of this section as Subsection (1) and 
127,1 2; 1993, ch. 248, f 2. added Subsections (2) and (3). 
GENERAL TAXATION POLICIES 69 1-610 
59-1-602. Right to appeal— 
interest . 
ANALYSIS 
Applicability of section. 
Cited 
Applicability of section. 
This section applied to case begun before its 
enactment, because standard of review is pro-
cedural, not substantive. Board of Equalization 
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n ex rel. Benchmark, 
Inc., 226 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (1993). 
 Venue — County as party in 
Cited in Miller Welding Supply, Inc. v Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 221 Utah Adv. Rep 8 (Ct. 
App. 1993); OSI Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Ct. App. 1993); 
Orton v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 225 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 26 (Ct. App. 1993); Harper Invs , Inc. 
v. Auditing Div., 231 Utah Adv. Rep 3 (Utah 
1994); Matrix Funding Corp. v. Auditing Div., 
231 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah Ct. App 1994). 
(1) (a) Any aggrieved party appearing before the commission or county 
whose tax revenues are affected by the decision may at that party's option 
petition for judicial review in the district court pursuant to this section, or 
in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 
63-46b-16. 
(b) Judicial review of formal or informal adjudicative proceedings in the 
district is in the district court located in the county of residence or 
principal place of business of the affected taxpayer or, in the case of a 
taxpayer whose taxes are assessed on a statewide basis, to the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County. 
(2) A county whose tax revenues are affected by the decision being reviewed 
shall be allowed to be a party in interest in the proceeding before the court. 
History: C. 1953, 59-24-2, enacted by L. ment, effective May 3, 1993, inserted "at that 
1977, ch. 80,ft 21; 1983, ch. 278, ft 2; renum- party's option" in Subsection UXa), added the 
bered by L. 1987, ch. 3, ft 37; 1987, ch. 161, language beginning "in the district court" at the 
ft 216; 1992, ch. 127, ft 3; 1993, ch. 248, ft 3. end of that subsection, and inserted "formal or" 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend- and "in the district" in Subsection (1Kb). 
59-1-610. S tandard of review of appellate court. 
(1) When reviewing formal adjudicative proceedings commenced before the 
commission, the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court shall: 
(a) grant the commission deference concerning its written findings of 
fact, applying a substantial evidence standard on review; and 
(b) grant the commission no deference concerning its conclusions of law, 
applying a correction of error standard, unless there is an explicit grant of 
discretion contained in a statute at issue before the appellate court. 
(2) This section supercedes Section 63-46b-16 pertaining to judicial review 
of formal adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 59-1-610, enacted by L. became effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to 
1993, ch. 248, ft 4. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 248 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
59-12-104 REVENUE AND TAXA1TON 
taxes. B J Titan Serve, v. SUte Tax Comm'n, 
842 P.2d 822 (UUh 1992). 
Purchaser. 
The focus of Subsection (IXa) is on the pur-
chaser, rather than the item purchased. Thorup 
Bros. Constr. v. Auditing Div. of UUh State Tax 
Comm'n, 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (1993). 
A contractor is not liable for sales taxes on 
property that it did not purchase or own. 
Thorup Bros. Constr. v. Auditing Div. of Utah 
SUte Tax Comm'n, 221 UUh Adv. Rep. 39 
(1993). 
Electrical contractor could not be assessed a 
use tax on materials purchased by owners that 
were tax-exempt entities. Arco Elec. v. UUh 
State lax Comm'n, 222 UUh Adv. Rep. 11 
(1993), following Thorup Brothers Constr, Inc. 
v. Auditing Division of the UUh State Tax 
Comm'n, 221 UUh Adv. Rep. 39 (1993). 
Repair* and renovations. 
The tax commission erred when it included 
the cost of milling and drilling raw logs in-
curred by a railroad in assessing a use tax on 
railroad ties brought insUU for use. The basis 
for calculating the use tax in such a case is the 
amount paid for the raw logs when purchased 
plus the amount paid for services that fall into 
one of the specified categories of taxable ser-
vices set forth in this section. The commission 
erroneously concluded that the milling and 
drilling procedures were "repairs or renova-
tions" within the meaning of Subsection (lXg). 
Union Pac. R.R. v. Auditing Div., 842 P.2d 876 
(UUh 1992). 
Sale of goods to subsidiary. 
A seller was liable under Subsection (IXa) for 
sales of goods to another corporation despite 
the fact that the Department of Transportation 
found the two corporations to be a single entity 
for the purposes of the Davis Bacon Act. One 
agency's determination is not necessarily bind-
ing on the deliberations of another agency, and 
federal labor law criteria are irrelevant to a 
determination of sUU taxability. Hales Sand A 
Gravel, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 842 P.2d 887 (UUh 
1992). 
Transfer of vehicles. 
Transfer of vehicles subject to sales tax. See 
B.J.-TiUn Servs. v. SUU Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 
822 (UUh 1992). 
Transportation cosU as part of sales price. 
Transportation charges are taxable under 
Subsection (IXa) as part of the sales price of 
personal property if they are incurred before 
the transfer of title. When a sales contract 
requires delivery at destination, title passes at 
destination and the transportation cosU are 
therefore subject to taxation unless the parties 
explicitly agree otherwise. Hales Sand & 
Gravel foe % Auditing Div., 842 P2d 887 (UUh 
1992). 
—"Small-batch" charge*. 
"Small-batch" charges added by a concrete 
seller to concrete batches that were too small to 
absorb the cosU of delivery were taxable under 
Subsection (IXa) as a transportation charge 
added to the sales price. Hales Sand & Gravel, 
Inc. v. Auditing Div., 842 P.2d 887 (Utah 1992). 
Water softeners. 
The sale of water softeners, sold pursuant to 
sales and insUllation contracU, are sales of 
improvemenU to real esUU, and not sales of 
Ungible personal property subject to sales tax. 
Superior Soft Water Co. v. UUh SUte Tax 
Comm'n, 843 P.2d 525 (UUh Ct. App. 1992). 
Cited in Matrix Funding Corp. v. Auditing 
Div, 231 UUh Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). 
59-12-104. Exemptions. 
The following sales and uses are exempt from the taxes imposed by this 
chapter: 
(1) sales of aviation fuel, motor fuel, and special fuel subject to a Utah 
state excise tax under Title 59, Chapter 13, Motor and Special Fuel Tax 
Act; 
(2) sales to the state, its institutions, and its political subdivisions, 
except sales of construction materials however, construction materials 
purchased by the state, its institutions, or its political subdivisions which 
are installed or converted to real property by employees of the state, its 
institutions, or its political subdivisions are exempt; 
(3) sales of food, beverage, and dairy products from vending machines 
in which the proceeds of each sale do not exceed $1 if the vendor or 
operator of the vending machine reports an amount equal to 150% of the 
cost of items as goods consumed; 
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(4) sales of food, beverage, dairy products, similar confections, and 
related services to commercial airline carriers for in-flight consumption; 
(5) sales of parts and equipment installed in aircraft operated by 
common carriers in interstate or foreign commerce; 
(6) sales of commercials, motion picture films, prerecorded audio pro-
gram tapes or records, and prerecorded video tapes by a producer, 
distributor, or studio to a motion picture exhibitor, distributor, or commer-
cial television or radio broadcaster; 
(7) sales made through coin-operated laundry machines that are: 
(a) located in multiple dwelling units; 
(b) used exclusively for the benefit of tenants; and 
(c) not available for use by the general public; 
(8) sales made to or by religious or charitable institutions in the conduct 
of their regular religious or charitable functions and activities, if the 
requirements of Section 59-12-104.1 are fulfilled; 
(9) sales of vehicles of a type required to be registered under the motor 
vehicle laws of this state which are made to bona fide nonresidents of this 
state and are not afterwards registered or used in this state except as 
necessary to transport them to the borders of this state; 
(10) sales of medicine; 
(11) sales or use of property, materials, or services used in the construc-
tion of or incorporated in pollution control facilities allowed by Sections 
19-2-123 through 19-2-127; 
(12) sales or use of property which the state is prohibited from taxing 
under the Constitution or laws of the United States or under the laws of 
this state; 
(13) sales of meals served by: 
(a) public elementary and secondary schools; 
(b) churches, charitable institutions, and institutions of higher 
education, if the meals are not available to the general public; and 
(c) inpatient meals provided at medical or nursing facilities; 
(14) isolated or occasional sales by persons not regularly engaged in 
business, except the sale of vehicles or vessels required to be titled or 
registered under the laws of this state; 
(15) sales or leases of machinery and equipment purchased or leased by 
a manufacturer for use in new or expanding operations (excluding normal 
operating replacements, which includes replacement machinery and 
equipment even though they may increase plant production or capacity, as 
determined by the commission) in any manufacturing facility in Utah; 
(a) manufacturing facility means an establishment described in 
SIC Codes 2000 to 3999 of the 1987 Standard Industrial Classification 
Manual, of the federal Executive Office of the President, Office of 
Management and Budget; 
(b) for purposes of this subsection, the commission shall by rule 
define "new or expanding operations" and "establishment"; 
(c) by October 1, 1991, and every five years thereafter, the commis-
sion shall review this exemption and make recommendations to the 
Revenue and Taxation Interim Committee concerning whether the 
exemption should be continued, modified, or repealed. In its report to 
the Revenue and Taxation Interim Committee, the tax commission 
review shall include at least: 
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(i) the cost of the exemption; 
(ii) the purpose and effectiveness of the exemption; and 
(iii) the benefits of the exemption to the state; 
(16) sales of tooling, special tooling, support equipment, and special test 
equipment used or consumed exclusively in the performance of any 
aerospace or electronics industry contract with the United States govern-
ment or any subcontract under that contract, but only if, under the terms 
of that contract or subcontract, title to the tooling and equipment is vested 
in the United States government as evidenced by a government identifi-
cation tag placed on the tooling and equipment or by listing on a 
government-approved property record if a tag is impractical; 
(17) intrastate movements of freight by common carriers; 
(18) sales of newspapers or newspaper subscriptions; 
(19) tangible personal property, other than money, traded in as full or 
part payment of the purchase price, except that for purposes of calculating 
sales or use tax upon vehicles not sold by a vehicle dealer, trade-ins are 
limited to other vehicles only, and the tax is bated upon the then existing 
fair market value of the vehicle being sold and the vehicle being traded in, 
as determined by the commission; 
(20) sprays and insecticides used to control insects, diseases, and weeds 
for commercial production of fruits, vegetables, feeds, seeds, and animal 
products; 
(21) sales of tangible personal property used or consumed primarily and 
directly in farming operations, including sales of irrigation equipment and 
supplies used for agricultural production purposes, whether or not they 
become part of real estate and whether or not installed by farmer, 
contractor, or subcontractor, but not sales of: 
(a) machinery, equipment, materials, and supplies used in a man-
ner that is incidental to farming, such as hand tools with a unit 
purchase price not in excess of $100, and maintenance and janitorial 
equipment and supplies; 
(b) tangible personal property used in any activities other than 
farming, such as office equipment and supplies, equipment and 
supplies used in sales or distribution of farm products, in research, or 
in transportation; or 
(c) any vehicle required to be registered by the laws of this state, 
without regard to the use to which the vehicle is put; 
(22) seasonal sales of crops, seedling plants, or garden, farm, or other 
agricultural produce if sold by the producer; 
(23) purchases of food made with food stamps; 
(24) sales of nonreturnable containers, nonreturnable labels, nonre-
turnable bags, nonreturnable shipping cases, and nonreturnable casings 
to a manufacturer, processor, wholesaler, or retailer for use in packaging 
tangible personal property to be sold by that manufacturer, processor, 
wholesaler, or retailer; 
(25) property stored in the state for resale; 
(26) property brought into the state by a nonresident for his or her own 
personal use or enjoyment while within the state, except property pur-
chased for use in Utah by a nonresident living and working in Utah at the 
time of purchase; 
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(27) property purchased for resale in this state, in the regular course of 
business, either in its original form or as an ingredient or component part 
of a manufactured or compounded product; 
(28) property upon which a sales or use tax was paid to some other 
state, or one of its subdivisions, except that the state shall be paid any 
difference between the tax paid and the tax imposed by this part and Part 
2, and no adjustment is allowed if the tax paid was greater than the tax 
imposed by this part and Part 2; 
(29) any sale of a service described in Subsections 59-12-103(l)(b), (c), 
and (d) to a person for use in compounding a service taxable under the 
subsections; 
(30) purchases of food made under the WIC program of the United 
States Department of Agriculture; 
(31) sales or leases made before June 30, 1996, of rolls, rollers, refrac-
tory brick, electric motors, and other replacement parts used in the 
furnaces, mills, and ovens of a steel mill described in SIC Code 3312 of the 
1987 Standard Industrial Classification Manual, of the federal Executive 
Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget; 
(32) sales of boats of a type required to be registered under Title 73, 
Chapter 18, State Boating Act, boat trailers, and outboard motors which 
are made to bona fide nonresidents of this state and are not thereafter 
registered or used in this state except as necessary to transport them to 
the borders of this state; 
(33) sales of tangible personal property to persons within this state that 
is subsequently shipped outside the state and incorporated pursuant to 
contract into and becomes a part of real property located outside of this 
state, except to the extent that the other state or political entity imposes 
a sales, use, gross receipts, or other similar transaction excise tax on it 
against which the other state or political entity allows a credit for taxes 
imposed by this chapter; 
(34) sales of aircraft manufactured in Utah if sold for delivery and use 
outside Utah where a sales or use tax is not imposed, even if the title is 
passed in Utah; 
(35) until July 1, 1999, amounts paid for purchase of telephone service 
for purposes of providing telephone service; and 
(36) fares charged to persons transported directly by a public transit 
district created under the authority of Title 17A, Chapter 2, Part 10. 
History: L. 1988, ch. 68, § 8; 1988 (2nd 1989, ch. 169, ft 1; 1989, ch. 247, ft 1; 1990, 
B.8.), ch. 20, ft 1; 1989, ch. 108, ft 1; C. 1943, ch. 22, ft 2; 1990, ch. 36, ft 1; 1991, ch. 5, ft 57; 
80-15-6; 1946, ch. 110, ft 1; 1967, ch. 126, ft 1; 1991. ch. 111. ft 1; 1991, ch. 112, ft 216; 1992, 
1967, ch. 127, ft 1; 1966, ch. 128, ft 1; 1967, ch. 66, ft 3; 1992, ch. 298, ft 2; 1993, ch. 166, 
ch. 162. ft 1; 1969. ch. 187. ft 3; 1969 (1st ft 1; 1993, ch. 296, ft 1; 1994, ch. 49, ft 1;1994, 
8.8.), ch. 14, ft 3; 1973, ch. 42, ft 9; 1973, ch. ch. 156, ft 1; 1994, ch. 213, ft 1; 1994, ch. 217, 
164, ft 1; 1976. ch. 179. ft 2; 1976. ch. 28, ft 1; ft 2; 1994, ch. 226, ft 2; 1994, ch. 248, ft 1. 
1979, ch. 196, ft 1; 1981, ch. 288, ft 1; 1981, Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
ch. 289, ft 2; 1982. ch. 70. ft 1; 1988. ch. 264. ment by ch. 166, effective May 3, 1993, substi-
ft 1; 1988. ch. 281. ft 1; lffe3 (1st 8.S.). ch. 6. tuted "sales of aviation fuel, motor fuel, and 
ft 2; 1984, ch. 59, ft 1; 1984, ch. 60, ft 1; 1986, special fuel" for "sales of motor fuels and special 
ch. 80, ft 3; 1986, ch. 9, ft 1; 1986, ch. 55, ft 6; fuels" in Subsection (1) 
1986, ch. 99, ft 1; 1986, ch. 134, ft 1; 1986, ch. The 1993 amendment by ch. 296, effective 
168, ft 1; C. 1963,59-15-6; renumbered by L. May 3, 1993, substituted "1996" for "1994" in 
1987, ch. 6, ft 26; 1987, ch. 51, ft 1; 1987 (1st Subsection (31). 
8.S.), ch. 10, ftft 1, 2; 1988, ch. 58, ft 1; 1988, The 1994 amendment by ch. 49, effective Ma> 
ch.66.ft 2; 1988. ch. 69, ft 1; 1989, ch. 89, ft 1; 2, 1994, rewrote Subsection (24), which for 
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merly read: "any container, label, shipping 
case, or, in the case of meat or meat products, 
any casing." 
The 1994 amendment by ch 248, effective 
May 2, 1994, in Subsection (31), deleted "after 
July 1, 1987, and" after "leases made" and "but 
only if the steel mill was a nonproducing Utah 
facility purchased and reopened for the produc-
tion of steel" at the end. 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 156, effective 
July 1, 1994, substituted "160%" for "120%" in 
Subsection (3). 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 213, effective 
July 1, 1994, redesignated the subsections un-
der Subsection (16); substituted "by common 
carriers" for "and express or street railway 
fares" in Subsection (17); and added Subsection 
(36), making a related stylistic change. 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 217, effective 
July 1, 1994, deleted "coin-operated dry clean-
ing machines, or coin-operated car washes" in 
the introductory language of Subsection (7); 
added Subsections (7Xa) through (7Xc); subdi-
vided Subsection (15); and made related stylis-
tic changes. 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 226, effective 
July 1, 1994, inserted the language following 
the first occurrence of "political subdivisions" in 
Subsection (2) and deleted "and, after July 1, 
1993" after "activities" in Subsection (8). 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 




—Purchase by subcontractor. 
"Consumption." 
Intrastate movement of freight. 
Isolated or occasional sale. 
"Manufacturer." 
Medicine. 
New or expanding operations. 
Real property. 
Registered vehicle. 
—Sale to nonresident. 
Sale in sister state. 
Sale to state. 
Sprays to control disease. 
Cited. 
C h a r i t a b l e i n s t i t u t i o n . 
—Act iv i t i e s . 
Church industry auxiliary, chartered as a 
non-profit corporation, which ran, among other 
things, a transient shelter, a vocational educa-
tion program, a retirement center, and a day 
care center, charging nominal fees to defray 
costs, lost its sales-tax-exempt status by sever-
ing from its religious institution, since the 
auxiliary's remaining common membership 
and weekly spiritual practices did not convert 
the auxiliary from a business organization into 
a religious institution. SEMECO Indus., Inc. v. 
Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 849 
P.2d 1167 (Utah 1993). 
—Purchase by subcontractor. 
The fact that the amount of the tax might be 
passed along to the general contractor and then 
on to the church owning the buildings in which 
the general contrator was installing products 
did not bring a subcontractor's purchase of 
materials used in making the products under 
Subsection (8). Niederhauser Ornamental & 
Metal Works Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 219 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 43 (Ct. App. 1993). 
"Consumption." 
Steel manufacturers who lance pipes, stir-
ring lances, and mill rolls primarily for their 
use as equipment and only incidentally for 
their use as ingredients in the manufacturing 
process are liable for sales and use taxes on the 
items. Nucor Corp. v. Utah Sta te Tax Comm'n, 
832 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1992). 
Intrastate movement of freight. 
Subsection (17), providing for a sales tax 
exemption for intrastate movements of freight, 
is limited to common carriers and does not 
provide an exemption for intrastate delivery 
made by the seller in its own trucks. Hales 
Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 842 P.2d 
887 (Utah 1992). 
Isolated or occas ional sale . 
The "isolated or occasional sales" exemption 
applied to the trade-in of used computer equip-
ment by a customer to a retailer of computer 
systems and thus the retailer's own use of the 
equipment was exempt from the use tax. 
Knowledge Data Sys. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
"Manufacturer." 
Subsection (16) does not authorize the State 
Tax Commission to define the term "manufac-
turer" to restrict the manufacturing sales tax 
exemption set forth therein; a rule of the Com-
mission limiting the availability of the exemp-
tion was invalid. Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit 
Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 846 P.2d 
1304 (Utah 1993). 
Medic ine . 
Sales tax on sales of oxygen concentrators to 
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medically dependent individuals was erroneous 
because oxygen concentrators fall under "any 
oxygen .. . prescribed by a physician" in $ 59-
12-102(4XaXiii). Miller Welding Supply, Inc. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 
(Ct. App. 1993). 
N e w or expand ing operations. 
The commission erroneously interpreted SIC 
Code 3652, incorporated by reference in Sub-
section (16), when it determined that activities 
of video tape producer in expanding its manu-
facturing capacities did not fall within the 
scope of the federal definition. Bonneville Int'l 
Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 219 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 62 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Real property. 
Where, under its sales contracts, an Illinois 
corporation fabricated, erected, and installed 
on its customers' real property large tanks that 
were not readily removable, and it was not 
intended that they be moveable or removed, 
then the installed tanks, once attached, were 
real property and the corporation was a real 
property contractor, not a manufacturer, and 
was not eligible for the exemption for materials 
used in manufacturing. Chicago Bridge & Iron 
Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 839 P2d 303 (1992). 
Where an Illinois corporation's customers in-
tended to purchase fully assembled tanks per-
manently installed on real estate, whether that 
real estate was located in Utah or another state 
was not relevant as to the corporation's status 
as a real property contractor. Chicago Bridge & 
Iron Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 839 P.2d 303 
(1992). 
R e g i s t e r e d vehic le . 
—Sa le t o n o n r e s i d e n t . 
While taxpayer's legal residence created a 
legitimate source of dispute, because he main-
tained a registered vehicle with Utah desig-
nated as home state and allowed a vehicle to be 
kept or used by a Utah resident, the State Tax 
Commission reasonably found that the tax-
payer had resident status for sales tax purposes 
and thus was disqualified from claiming the 
nonresident exemption. Putvin v. Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, 837 P.2d 689 (Utah Ct. App 
1992). 
Sale in s i s ter state . 
Taxes that come due first take priority over 
taxes paid first. Therefore, petitioner was liable 
for the Utah tax first because the sales to 
petitioner in Utah of materials used in making 
the finished products occurred long before peti-
tioner sold finished products in Nevada. 
Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co. 
v. Tax Comm'n, 219 Utah Adv Rep 43 (Ct. App. 
1993). 
Sale t o s tate . 
Payment for goods by a state warrant does 
not alone make it a sale to the state or its 
institutions or political subdivisions to exempt 
it from sales tax. Rocky Mt. Energy v. Utah Tax 
Comm'n, 862 P2d 284 (Utah 1993). 
Contractor was not liable for sales tax for 
materials purchased by and used on behalf of a 
school district because the purchaser within 
the meaning of $ 59-12-103( 1X1) was the school 
district. Since the school district was exempt 
from sales taxes as a subdivision or institution 
of the state, the fact that the school district had 
a nonexempt party incorporate the purchased 
property into its realty did not change the 
character of the transaction. Brown Plumbing 
& Heating Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 224 Utah 
Adv Rep 12 (1993). 
S p r a y s t o c o n t r o l d i s e a s e . 
Spraying liquid nitrogen on meat patties to 
prevent microorganisms that cause disease fits 
within the plain meaning of Subsection (20), 
and reference to other rules of statutory con-
struction to determine the proper meaning of 
this subsection is unnecessary OSI Indus , Inc. 
v Utah State Tax Comm'n, 221 Utah Adv Rep 
34 (Ct. App 1993). 
C i t ed in Thorup Bros Constr v Auditing 
Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 221 Utah Adv 
Rep 39(1993) 
59-12-104.1. Exemptions for religious or charitable insti-
tutions. 
(1) Sales made by religious or charitable institutions or organizations are 
exempt from the sales and use tax imposed by this chapter if the sale is made 
in the conduct of the institution's or organization's regular religious or 
charitable functions or activities. 
(2) (a) Sales made to a religious or charitable institution or organization are 
exempt from the sales and use tax imposed by this chapter if the sale is 
made in the conduct of the institution's or organization's regular religious 
or charitable functions and activities. 
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services that become part of a pollution control facil-
ity until the facility is certified, and invoices and 
records should be retained to show the amount of tax 
paid Upon verification of the amount of tax paid for 
pollution control facilities and verification that a cer-
tificate has been obtained, the Tax Commission will 
refund the taxes puid on these purchases. 
1. Claims for refund of tax paid prior to certifica-
tion must be filed within 180 days after certification 
of a facility. Refund claims filed within this time pe-
riod will have interest added at the rate prescribed in 
Section 59 1-402 from the date of the overpayment. 
2. If claims for refund are not filed within 180 days 
after certification of a facility, it is assumed the delay 
was for investment purposes, and interest shall be 
added at the rate prescribed in Section 59-1-402 how-
ever, Interest will not begin to accrue until 30 days 
after receipt of the refund request. 
B. After the facility is certified, qualifying pur-
chases should be made without paying tax by provid-
ing an exemption certificate to the vendor. 
1. If sales tax is paid on qualifying purchases for 
certified pollution control facilities, it will be deemed 
that the overpayment was made for the purpose of 
investment. Accordingly, interest, at the rate pre-
scribed in Section 59-1-402, will not begin to accrue 
until 30 days after receipt of the refund request. 
C. In the event part of the pollution control facility 
is constructed under a real property contract by some-
one other than the owner, the owner should obtain a 
statement from the contractor certifying the amount 
of Utah sales and use tax paid by the contractor and 
the location of the vendors to whom tax was paid, and 
the owner will then be entitled to a refund of the tax 
paid and included in the contract. 
I) The owner shall apply to the Tax Commission 
for a refund using forms furnished by the Tax Com-
mission The claim for refund must contain sufficient 
information to support the amount claimed for credit 
and show that the tax has in fact been paid 
E The owner shall retain records to support the 
claim that the project is qualified for the exemption. 
R865-10-84S. Sales and Use Tax Exemption For 
Construction, Expansion, or Modernization of 
Mineral Facilities Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Section 59-12-104. 
A. Effective July 1, 1984 through June 30, 1989 
except as otherwise provided in this rule, sales and 
leases to any person of materials, machinery, equip-
ment, and services used for a project involving new 
construction, expansion, or modernization of any 
mine, mill, reduction works, smelter, refinery (ex-
cluding oil and gas refineries), synthetic-fuel process-
ing und upgrading plant, rolling milt, coal-washing 
plant, or melting facility are exempt from sales and 
use taxes in Utah. The exemption applies only to 
projects; construction of which is commenced after 
July 1, 1984; and to sales and leases which are sub-
ject to sales or use tax and which in the aggregate 
exceed $500,000 during any tax year. 
For the purpose of this rule, construction com-
menced after July 1, 1984 may be evidenced by con-
tracts signed or executed after the date the governor 
signed Senate Bill No 22 of the 1984 Budget Session 
of the Utah legislature (February 16, 1984) but un-
der which construction was not commenced prior to 
July 1. 1984 In the absence of s signed contract, 
there is a rebuttable presumption that the project 
does not qualify 
B For purposes of Utah Code Ann. Section 
59 12 104 
1. "Person" means any individual, firm, co-partner, 
ship, joint venture, corporation, estate or trust, or any 
group or combination acting as a unit. 
2. 'Tax year" means July 1 through June 30. 
3. "New construction" means: 
a construction of a new mineral facility; or 
b. any alteration to the real property of an existing 
mineral facility other than normal repairs and main. 
te nance. 
4. "Expansion" means an increase in production or 
capacity as a result of the project. 
5. "Modernization," except as provided in para-
graph D(l) of this rule, means a change or contrast in 
character or quality resulting from the introduction 
of improved techniques, methods, or products — in-
eluding changes necessary to meet health, environ-
mental, or safety standards. 
6. "Mineral facility" means any mine, mill, reduc-
tion works, smelter, refinery (except oil and gas refin-
eries), synthetic-fuel processing and upgrading plant, 
rolling mill, coal-washing plant, or melting facility in 
Utah; including ancillary facilities necessary for and 
used primarily in the operation of the mineral facil-
ity. 
7. "Project" means any iinaarUiing involving new 
construction, expansion, or inopafnjsation of a min-
eral facility. 
8. "Owner" means any person who owns or operates 
a mineral facility in Utah. 
9. "Prime contractor" means any contractor dealing 
directly with the owner of a mineral facility and des-
ignated by the owner as a prime contractor. 
10. "Normal operating replacements" means sup-
plies, equipment, and tools which replace existing 
items of a similar nature and which do not enhance 
the productive capacity of a mineral facility beyond 
that normally associated with new equipment as com-
pared with old. 
C. The first $500,000 of the aggregated taxable 
sales or leases subject to either sales or use tax which 
are made to any person for use in a project in a tax 
year will be taxed. For purposes of assigning sales 
and leases to the appropriate tax year, the date of 
delivery to the person or to a common carrier for de-
livery to the person is determinative. 
0. The exemption shall not apply to, and the 
$500,000 base shall not include: 
1. sales and leases of pollution control facilities 
which qualify for sales and use tax exemption under 
Utah law; 
2. sales and leases of normal operating replace-
ments and supplies not used in a project; 
3. sales and leases subject to another state's sales or 
use tax, except the amount subject to use taxes in 
Utah as a result of a lower tax rate in another stats; 
4. construction equipment and fungible tools or 
supplies sold or leased to a contractor, subcontractor, 
or individual acting in a similar capacity, which i* 
not entirely consumed or physically incorporated into 
a project. This provision does not preclude exemption 
for sales and leases made to the owner for use in or oo 
a project; 
5. leases of construction equipment for nonexclu-
sive use on a project will not be eligible for sales and 
use tax exemption except to the extent of any lease 
period during which the equipment is used exclu-
sively on the project. 
E. A person may seek a declaratory judgment ac-
cording to Tax Commission Rule R861-1-5A to deter-
mine that the project is a new construction, expan-
sion, or modernization project Pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. Section 69-12-104 if denied, the Commission 
m 
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may grant a rehearing to reconsider the request for a 
declaratory judgment under the provisions of Rule 
R861-1-5A 
f. Upon application, the Tax Commission shall is-
8ue the project a sales tax exemption number or num-
bers to be used by the owner of the project, or by any 
prime contractor designated by the owner, in pur-
chasing tangible personal property for use in the 
project If the purchaser is unable to differentiate tan-
gible personal property being bought for exempt use 
in the project from other property at the time of pur-
chase, all purchases shall be taxed. Each quarter, the 
owner and the prime contractor^) shall file sales and 
ii§e tax returns which disclose the total cost of tangi-
ble personal property purchased for purposes that do 
not qualify for exemption under the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. Section 5912-104, including the 
1600,000 minimum annual amount. This return must 
be filed in accordance with the provisions set forth in 
Utah Code Ann. Section 59-12 107 
G. For any tangible personal property entirely con-
sumed or physically incorporated into a project by a 
person other than the owner or his designated prime 
contractor, pr in the case of sales or use taxes paid by 
the owner or his prime contractor under conditions 
set forth in paragraph F of this rule, exemption shall 
be claimed in the following manner: 
1. The owner must prepare a schedule showing the 
amount of sales and use taxes paid by him or his 
prime contractor on the purchases actually consumed 
or incorporated into a project, and to this amount 
shall add the amount of sales and use taxes paid by 
subcontractors. This schedule must disclose: 
a. the items used; 
b. the county of purchase, if bought within the state 
of Utah; and 
c. the taxes paid. 
2. The owner shall apply to the Tax Commission for 
« refund using forma furnished by the Tax Commis-
sion. The claim for refund must contain sufficient 
records and information to: 
a. determine the county in which the sale was origi-
nally made; 
b. support the amount claimed for credit and show 
that tax has in fact been paid on the first $500,000 
•ubject to Utah tax each year. 
3. The owner shall retain records to support the 
claim that the project is qualified for the exemption 
under paragraph A of this rule. 
Refunds not paid and mailed within thirty (30) 
days after receipt by the Tax Commission will have 
interest added at the rate prescribed in Utah Code 
Ann. Section 69-1-402. 
8866-10-858. Machinery and Equipment Exemp-
tion For Use in Certain Manufacturing Facili-
ties Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 
M-12-104. 
A. Definitions: 
1 "Machinery" means electronic or mechanical ma-
chines incorporated into a manufacturing or assem-
bling process from the initial stage where actual pro 
c
**sing begins through the completion of the finished 
*nd product, including final processing, finishing or 
Packaging of articles which are sold as tangible per-
gonal property. 
Automated material handling and storage machin-
er> is included in this definition when such machin 
e r v
 is part of the integrated continuous production 
c>cle. 
2 "Equipment" means any independent device sep-
t a t e from any machinery but essential to an inte-
grated or continuous manufacturing or assembly pro-
cess or any suhunit comprising a component of any 
machinery or auxiliary thereof, including such items 
as dies, jigs, patterns, molds, and similar items used 
in manufacturing, processing, or assembling Quali-
fying equipment also include** devices necessary to 
the control or operation of machinery and equipment 
qualifying under this rule even though not located in 
the specific manufacturing area 
3. "New or expanding operations" means manufac-
turing, processing, or assembling activities which: 
a) are substantially different in nature, character, 
or purpose from prior activities; 
b) are begun in a new physical plant location in 
Utah; or 
c) increase production or capacity This definition is 
subject to limitations deuling with normal operating 
replacements. 
4. "Manufacturer" means a person who: 
a) functions within the activities included in SIC 
code classification 2000-3999, 
b) produces a new, reconditioned, or remanufac-
tured product, article, substance, or commodity from 
raw, semi-finished, or used material; and 
c) in the normal course of business produces prod-
ucts which are sold as tangible personal property. 
5. "Establishment" means an economic unit of oper-
ations that is generally at a single physical location 
in Utah where qualifying manufacturing activities 
are performed. Where distinct and separate economic 
activities are performed at a single physical location, 
each activity should be treated as a separate estab-
lishment. 
6. "Normal operating replacements" means ma 
chinery or equipment which replaces existing ma-
chinery or equipment of a similar nature, even if the 
use results in increased plant production or capacity. 
(a) If new machinery or equipment is purchased or 
leaned which has the same or similar purpose as ma-
chinery or equipment retired from service within 12 
months before or after the purchase date, such ma-
chinery or equipment is considered as replacement 
and is not exempt. 
b) If existing machinery or equipment is kept for 
back-up or infrequent use; new, similar machinery or 
equipment purchased would be considered as replace-
ment and is not exempt. 
7. "Improvement" is defined in Utah ('ode Ann. 
Section 59 2 102(3) 
B. Application of Exemption: 
1 The machinery and equipment exemption ap-
plies only to tangible personal property. It does not 
apply to real property or to tangible personal prop-
erty which is purchased and becomes an improve-
ment to real property. The exemption does not apply 
to charges for labor to repair, renovate, or clean ma-
chinery or equipment. 
2. Machinery or equipment used for an activity 
which is not pari of the manufacturing process, such 
as research and development; refrigerated or other 
storage of raw materials, component parts, or the fin-
ished product; or shipping the finished product is not 
exempt. 
3. Machinery or equipment with a useful economic 
and/or accounting life of less than three years is not 
eligible for the exemption. 
4 Machinery or equipment purchased or leased for 
use in activities which may qualify it for exemption, 
as well as in other activities, will not lose the exemp-
tion if the use in nonqualifying activities is deter-
mined to be de minimis. Nonqualifying activities are 
activitiea such as maintenance or production of tangi-
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ble personal property that is not sold in arms length 
transactions 
5 Sales of manufactured tangible personal prop 
erty may be at retail as defined in rule R865 19 27S 
or at wholesale as defined in rule R865 19 29S but 
they must be arms length sales for the exemption to 
qualify An arms length sale is defined as a transac 
tion that occurs in an open market, between unre 
lated parties and neither party is under duress to buy 
or sell 
6 The manufacturer shall retain records to support 
the claim that the machinery and equipment are 
qualified for exemption under the provisions of this 
rule 
7 A person may seek a declaratory judgment ac 
cording to Tax Commission Rule R861 1 5A to deter 
mine whether any particular purchase or lease qua)) 
fies for this particular exemption If denied, the Tax 
Commission may grant a hearing to reconsider the 
request for a declaratory judgment under the provi 
sions of Rule R861 1 13A 
8 Exemption will be allowed for any qualified pur 
chase or lease if delivery to the buyer or to a carrier 
for shipment to the buyer or lessee, takes place on or 
after July 1, 1985 
C Vendors are required to obtain a tax exemption 
certificate upon which the purchaser certifies that the 
use of the machinery or equipment qualifies for ex 
emption under Utah Code Ann Title 69, Chapter 12 
D The effective date of this rule is July 1, 1991 
R065-19-868. Monthly Payment of Sale* Taxes 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann Section 59-12-106. 
A Definitions 
1 For purposes of the monthly filing and the elec 
tronic remittance of sales taxes, the term "tax liabil 
ity for the previous year" means the tax liability for 
the previous calendar year 
2 "Fiscal year" means the year commencing on 
July 1 and ending the following June 30 
3 "Mandatory filer" means a vendor who meets the 
threshold requirements for monthly filing and remit 
tance of sales taxes or for electronic funds transfer 
(EFT) remittance of sales taxes 
4 "Cash equivalent" means either 
a) cash, 
b) wire transfer, or 
c) cashier's check drawn on the bank in which the 
Tax Commission deposits sales tax receipts 
B The determination that a vendor is a mandatory 
filer shall be made by the Tax Commission at the end 
of each calendar year and shall be effective for the 
fiscal year 
C A vendor who meets the qualifications for a 
mandatory filer but does not receive notification from 
the Tax Commission to that effect, is not excused 
from the requirements of monthly filing and remit 
tance or EFT remittance 
D Mandatory filers shall also file and remit any 
waste tire fees and transient room, resort communi 
ties, and tourism recreation, cultural, and conven 
tion facilities taxes to the commission on a monthly 
basis or by EFT respectively 
E Vendors who are not mandatory filers may elect 
to file and remit their sales taxes to the commission 
on a monthly basis or remit sales taxes by EFT or 
both 
1 The election to file and remit sales taxes on a 
monthly basis or to remit sal »s taxes by EFT is effec 
tive for the immediate fiscal year and every fiscal 
year thereafter unless the Tax Commission receives 
written notification prior to the commencement of a 
fiscal year that the vendor no longer elects to nU 
remit sales taxes on a monthly basis, or to remit * L ! 
taxes by EFT, respectively ^* l 
2 Vendors who elect to file and remit sales taxes 
a monthly basis, or to remit sales taxes by Epf * 
subject to the same requirements and penalties 
mandatory filers * 
3 Vendors who elect to file and remit sales taxai 
a monthly basis are not entitled to reimbursement*? 
the cost of collecting and remitting sales taxes on » 
monthly basis 
F Vendors who are not mandatory filers may ^ 
quest mandatory filer designation if they expect fe 
incur a $50,000 tax liability for the current calendar 
year and the business they operate 
1 has had no prior history in Utah, 
2 is a new business that was formed within tat 
previous calendar year, 
3 was formed within the previous calendar year as 
the result of a merger, or 
4 expects a significant increase in its operation* 
G A vendor who reqtlests mandatory filer designa-
tion under F shall A *jsd remit sales taxes oo I 
monthly basis, comajltoajf Mttb the first month of a 
calendar quarter, TOfjHVwTf* treated aB a man-
datory filer until thw month ItfWwing the month fai 
which that vendor's galea tax liability totals $60,000 
1 Upon designation aa a mandatory filer, the Tan-
dor shall be entitled to reimbursement for the coat ef 
collecting and remitting sales taxes 
2 The mandatory filer designation shall remain in 
effect for the remainder of the fiscal year 
H Vendors who are mandatory filers may request 
deletion of their mandatory filer designation tf they 
do not expect to accumulate a $60,000 sales tax liabil-
ity for the current calendar year 
1 The request must be accompanied by documenta-
tion clearly evidencing that the business that led U 
the $50,000 tax liability for the previous year will no* 
recur 
2 The request must be made prior to the com* 
mencement of a fiscal year 
3 If a vendor's request is approved and the vendor 
does accumulate a $50,000 sales tax liability, a simi 
lar request by that vendor the following year shall be 
denied 
I No reimbursement is allowed for the monthly 
filing and remittance of waste tire fees or transient 
room, resort communities, tourism recreation, cul 
tural, and convention facilities taxes 
J Only mandatory filers who file and remit on • 
timely basis and in the required manner, are entitles 
to reimbursement for the cost of collecting and remit-
ting sales taxes 
K Vendors who are required to remit sales tax by 
EFT may, following approval by the Tax Commission, 
remit a cash equivalent in lieu of the EFT 
1 Approval for remittance by cash equivalent shall 
be limited to those vendors who are able to establwb 
that remittance by EFT would cause a hardship ta 
their organization 
2 Requests for approval shall be directed to th« 
Deputy Executive Director of the Tax Commission 
3 Vendors who receive approval to remit their 
sales taxes by cash equivalent shall ensure that the 
cash equivalent is received at the Tax Commission* 
main office no later than three working days prior U> 
the due date of the sales tax 
L Vendors who are required to remit sales taxes by 
EFT but remit these taxes by some means other than 
EFT or a Tax Commission approved cash equivalent, 
are not entitled to reimbursement for the cost of col 
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and remitting sales taxes and are subject to 
**U Prior to remittance of sales taxes by EFT, a 
shall complete an EFT agreement with the 
Commission The EFT Agreement shall indicate 
J** « E F T payments shall be made in one of the 
fallowing manners 
1 Except as provided in M 2 , vendors shall remit 
' jjjpT payment by an ACH-debit transaction 
Iwtough the National Automated Clearing House As 
rJSstion (NACHA) system CCD application 
j If an organization's bylaws prohibit third party 
w<f fa its bank account or extenuating circum 
Ounces exist, a vendor may remit its EFT payment 
kv an ACH credit with tax payment addendum trans 
action through the NACHA system CCD Plus appli 
attion 
N In unusual circumstances, a particular EFT pay 
pent may be accomplished in a manner other than 
that specified in Subsection M Use of any manner of 
remittance other than that specified in Subsection M 
anwt he approved by the Tax Commission prior to its 
149-678. Government-Owned Tooling and 
Equipment Exemption Pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. Section 60-12-104. 
A As used in Utah Code Ann Section 69-12-104(6), 
aad for the purpoae of this rule 
1 Tooling^ means jigs, dies, fixtures, molds, pat 
tarns, taps, gauges, teat equipment, other equipment, 
and other similar manufacturing aids generally 
available aa stock items 
2 "Special Tooling" means jigs, dies, fixtures, 
molds, patterns, taps, gauges, other equipment and 
BMUiufacturing aids, and all components of these 
items that are of such a specialized nature that with 
tut substantial modification or alteration their use is 
United to the development or production of particular 
supplies or parts thereof or performing particular ser 
vices 
3 "Support equipment" means implements or de 
vices that are required to inspect, test, service, adjust, 
calibrate, appraise, transport, safeguard, record, 
g*uge, measure, repair, overhaul, assemble, disas 
•atnble, handle, store, actuate or otherwise maintain 
the intended functional operation status of an aero 
•pace electronic system 
4 "Special test equipment" means either single or 
multipurpose integrated test units engineered, de 
«fned, fabricated, or modified to accomplish special 
Purpose testing in performing a contract These test 
"*• umta may pe electrical, electronic, hydraulic, 
P°*umatic, or mechanical Or they may be items or 
"•enibliea of equipment that are mechanically, elec 
trically, or electronically interconnected so as to be-
C0
°M a new functional entity, causing the individual 
•tern or items to become interdependent and essential 
*
n
 Performing special purpose testing in the develop 
m
*nt or production of peculiar supplies or services 
B
 The effective date of this rule is July 1, 1986 
^•So-lB-aaS Requirement to Report Certain 
Sales Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 
NM2-106 
p Every retailer is required to report on its Utah 
"*'•*
 ftnd use tax return all exempt sales of farm ma 
chinery, equipment, and supplies The total amount 
JjPorted applies to transactions exempt under Utah 
~°d« Ann Section 59 12 104(22) and should not in 
J^ ude sales that are exempt under other provisions of 
*•*• law such as sales to church operated farms, sales 
to non Utah farmers when delivery is made outside 
Utah, sales for resale etc 
B Every licensed or registered consumer must re-
port on its sales and use tax return the total amount 
of purchases and leases of materials, machinery, 
equipment, and services used in a qualified Utah 
mineral facility expansion or modernization project 
Refer to Utah Code Ann Section 59 12 104(15) and 
Rule R865 19 84S for information regarding this ex 
emption 
C Every licensed or registered manufacturer must 
report on its sales and use tax return the total pur 
chases or leases of machinery and equipment for use 
in new or expanding Utah manufacturing facilities 
Refer to Utah Code Ann Section 59 12 104(16) and 
Rule R865 19 85S for information regarding this ex 
emption 
D If the retailer or the purchaser fails to report the 
amount of the exempt sales or purchases in the appro-
priate section provided on the sales and use tax re 
turns for each reporting period, the Tax Commission 
shall disallow the exemptions granted under Utah 
Code Ann Section 59 12 104(15), (16), and (22) 
E Requirements and provisions of this rule apply 
to all purchases and/or sales made on or after July 1, 
1986 
R866-19-90S Telephone Service Defined Pursu-
ant to Utah Code Ann Section 69-12-103 
A Telephone service" means the transmission for 
hire of signs, signals, writings, images, sounds, mes-
sages, data, or other information of any nature by 
wire, radio, light waves, or other electromagnetic 
means, and includes the following 
1 Nonrecurring telephone service charges are tele-
phone service charges which are ordinarily charged 
to subscribers only once or only under exceptional 
circumstances 
a Nonrecurring telephone service charges include, 
but are not limited to charges for initially establish 
ing telephone service, changing the type of telephone 
service being provided, changing the types of fea 
tures, options, or enhancements being provided in 
connection with a particular type of telephone ser 
vice, disconnecting the subscriber s telephone service, 
disconnecting a feature or features being provided 
with a subscriber's telephone service, analyzing or 
repairing the cause of malfunctions in a subscriber's 
telecommunications equipment apparatus or system, 
and installing on a subscriber H preruses telecommu 
nication equipment or apparatus which does not be 
come a fixture of real property 
b Nonrecurring telephone service charges exclude, 
but not by way of limitation charges for subscriber's 
premises telecommunications equipment or appara 
tua which becomes a fixture of real property, such aa 
the installation of inside wire, subscriber deposits, 
interest, late charges, contributions in aid of con-
struction, land development fees, payments in lieu of 
land development fees and special plant construction 
and facilities relocation charges 
c Nonrecurring services involving real property 
transactions shall be taxed in accordance with rule 
R865 19 58S 
2 Subscriber line charges, regardless of how they 
may be referred to in the future for telephone service 
that were referred to or created by the Federal Com 
munication Commission in FCC Docket Number 
78 72, are telephone service 
B 'Telephone corporation" means any corporation 
owning, controlling, operating or managing any tele-
phone service for the shared use with or resale to any 
Addendum I 
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8. [Mrs. Morgan's) attorneys' fees in 
the amount of $67,567.35 are reasonable. 
The Court finds that this was a compli-
cated estate and presented difficult legal 
and factual issues under the best of cir-
cumstances. The task of locating and 
valuating the assets of the marital estate 
[was] complicated and made more diffi-
cult by [Dr. Morgans] failure to cooper-
ate, thereby necessitating extensive for-
mal discovery. 
In the instant case, the evidence was 
sufficient to support the trial court's find-
ings that Mrs. Morgan has a need for attor-
ney fees, that Dr. Morgan has the ability to 
pay those fees, and that such fees were 
reasonable. Accordingly, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in awarding 
attorney fees to Mrs. Morgan.5 
CONCLUSION 
Dr. Morgan's objection to the trial 
court's amended findings of fact and con-
clusions of law concerning the distribution 
of the parties' stocks is moot. Further, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
valuing and distributing the parties' prop-
erty, nor in awarding alimony and attorney 
fees to Mrs. Morgan. Accordingly, we af-
firm. 
BENCH and BILLINGS, JJ., concur. 
5. While the trial court did not abuse its discrc 
lion in awarding attorney fees to Mrs. Morgan, 
the record reflects, and Mrs. Morgan concedes, 
that the trial court miscalculated the amount of 
fees to be awarded. In the prior appeal, we 
determined that the trial court improperly 
awarded $11.617 44 in costs to Mrs. Morgan. 
ALBERTSONS, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, Petitioner, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY, and Gayle Fullerton. 
Respondents. 
No. 920530-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 18, 1993. 
Employer appealed final decision of 
Board of Review of Utah Industrial Com-
mission awarding unemployment compen-
sation benefits to claimant. The Court of 
Appeals, Billings, P.J., held that substantial 
evidence supported finding that claimant 
did not willfully destroy employer's proper-
ty, and board reasonably concluded that 
claimant was not discharged for just cause. 
Affirmed. 
1. Administrative Law and Procedure 
«=»788 
Social Security and Public Welfare 
<*=65L1 
Decision of Board of Review of Utah 
Industrial Commission awarding unemploy-
ment compensation benefits would be re-
viewed for reasonableness. U.C.A.1953, 
63-46b-16(4)(h)(i). 
2. Social Security and Public Welfare 
«=>562.5 
Employer bears burden of proving just 
cause for termination of claimant of unem-
ployment benefits. U.C.A.1953, 35-4-
5(b)(1). 
3. Social Security and Public Welfare 
«=562.5 
Employer claiming employee seeking 
unemployment benefits was discharged for 
"just cause" must show culpability, knowl-
See Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 
App 1990). Subtracting the disallowed costs 
from $75,000 (the combined amount initially 
awarded by the trial court), the correct amount 
of attorney fees is $63,382.56, not $67,567.35 as 
calculated by the trial court on remand. 
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edge and control; the failure to establish 
any one of the three factors is fatal to 
employer's claim of just cause. U.C.A. 
1953, 35-4-5(b)(l). 
I. Social Security and Public Welfare 
<3=>584.6 
Substantial evidence supported finding 
of administrative law judge, adopted by 
Board of Review of Utah Industrial Com-
mission, that damage to employer's equip-
ment was an accident and claimant of em-
ployment benefits did not willfully destroy 
employer's property, and Board's determi-
nation that claimant's conduct did not give 
rise to level of culpability required to deny 
unemployment benefits was reasonable. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-4-5(b)(l), 63-46b-16(4), 
(4Xd), (4)(h)(i). 
5. Administrative Law and Procedure 
«=»791 
Court grants great deference to agen-
cy's findings, and will uphold them if they 
are supported by substantial evidence when 
they are viewed in light of whole record 
before court. 
6. Administrative Law and Procedure 
«=791 
"Substantial evidence" in support of 
an agency's findings is such relevant evi-
dence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support conclusion. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
7. Administrative Law and Procedure 
«=>791 
In applying substantial evidence test in 
reviewing agency decision, court will re-
view whole record and consider both evi-
dence that supports agency's findings and 
evidence that fairly detracts from them. 
8. Administrative Law and Procedure 
«=>786 
Social Security and Public Welfare 
«=»663 
Court reviewing decision of Board of 
Review of Utah Industrial Commission will 
defer to Board's assessment of conflicting 
evidence. U.C.A.1953, 35-4-5(b)(l), 63-
46b-16(4), (4)(d). 
John S. Chindlund, Robert G. Wing, and 
Roger J. McConkie, Prince, Yeates & Geld-
zahler, Salt l^ake City, for petitioner. 
K. Allan Zabel and Emma R. Thomas, Sp. 
Asst. Attys. Gen., Dept. of Employment 
Sec, Salt Lake City, for respondents. 
Before BILLINGS, P.J., 
GREENWOOD, JJ. 
GARFP and 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
Petitioner Albertsons, Inc. (Albertsons), 
appeals the final decision of the Board of 
Review of the Utah Industrial Commission 
(Board) awarding unemployment compensa-
tion benefits to the claimant, Gayle Fuller-
ton (Fullerton). In affirming the decision 
of the Administrative Law Judge (AIJ), a 
majority of the Board concluded Fullerton 
was not discharged from his employment 
for "just cause" under Utah ("ode Ann. 
§ 35-4-5(b)(l) (Supp.1992). We affirm. 
FACTS 
On April 3, 1992, Albertsons discharged 
Fullerton, an eleven year employee, claim-
ing he damaged an Albertsons forklift. 
The incident resulting in Fullerton's termi-
nation occurred on April 2, 1992, and in 
volved changing a 1500 pound forklift bat-
tery. To change a battery, the battery 
must first be pushed out of the forklift 
onto a rack system with rollers. A new 
battery is then moved onto the forklift with 
rollers and held in place by a heavy metal 
plate. This process takes two people. 
Fullerton and Earl Ellis (Ellis), the main-
tenance worker assisting Fullerton with 
the battery change, describe the incident at 
issue differently. Fullerton claims he acci-
dentally damaged the forklift. According 
to Fullerton, he slipped while standing on 
the oily rollers and as he fell the metal 
plate he was holding in his hand inadver-
tently hit the forklift twice before he re 
gained his balance. Fullerton maintains he 
did not break the plastic cover to the fork 
lift battery, he claims it was broken before 
he went into the battery area. 
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Conversely. Ellis claims the damage done 
to the forklift was intentional. Ellis testi-
fied he personally saw Fullerton beat on 
the forklift resulting in damage to the bat-
tery cover. According to Ellis, Fullerton 
had trouble putting the retaining plate on 
the forklift and "started beating on the 
machine." Ellis reported to Albertsons 
that Fullerton1 purposely damaged the bat-
tery cover. However, Fullerton claims El-
lis's testimony is inaccurate because Ellis 
could not see his feet from where he was 
standing and thus could not see whether he 
slipped. 
Albertsons's company policy allows for 
the immediate dismissal of an employee 
who willfully damages company property. 
Fullerton was aware of the policy, having 
signed a company policy sheet on April 8, 
1991, which set forth among other causes 
of dismissal the "[unauthorized . . . dam-
age to company . . . property." 
As a result of this incident, Fullerton's 
supervisor dismissed Fullerton on April 3, 
1992, finding Fullerton willfully broke the 
plastic battery cover. The supervisor 
based his decision on Ellis's report and 
Fullerton's past record of similar repri-
mands.1 
Fullerton applied for unemployment in-
surance compensation after his discharge 
from employment at Albertsons. The Utah 
Department of Employment Security de-
nied benefits. Fullerton objected to the 
ruling and a hearing was held before an 
ALJ on June 1, 1992. 
The ALJ awarded benefits to Fullerton. 
Acknowledging the conflict in testimony, 
the ALJ found the damage done to the 
Albertsons forklift was accidental. The 
ALJ stated: 
While their [Fullerton's and Ellis's] testi-
mony is different, the claimant seems 
I. Prior to the April 2. 1992 incident, Fullerton 
received two warning notices from Albertsons. 
In April of 1989, Fullerton, while talking to 
another employee about a business matter, for 
got he had not lowered the forks on his forklift. 
When he drove away the forks caught an object 
which resulted in the forklift tipping over. Full 
crton was placed on suspension without pay 
from April 20. 1989 to April 25. 1989. 
more credible to the Administrative Liw 
Judge. . . . 
The employer did not establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the 
claimant's actions rose to the level of 
culpability, knowledge and control to im-
pose a disqualification. The claimant's 
testimony is accepted that the damage 
done on April 2, 1992 was accidental. 
In reaching this determination, the ALJ 
gave Fullerton's past reprimands no 
weight. The ALJ found Albertsons violat-
ed its union agreement by considering past 
reprimands when deciding to dismiss Full-
erton, since both incidents occurred more 
than two years earlier, well outside the 
time limitation for consideration under the 
union contract. 
Albertsons appealed the decision of the 
ALJ to the Board. On July 27, 1992. the 
Board, with one dissent, adopted the find-
ings of the ALJ and affirmed the decision 
of the ALJ that Albertsons did not have 
just cause within the meaning of section 
35-4-5(b)(l) for discharging Fullerton. 
The Board found: 
In affirming the decision of the Adminis-
trative Law Judge, the Board of Review 
notes that the employer is correct in its 
argument that this case hinges on bal-
ancing the respective credibility of Mr. 
Ellis and the claimant. The ALJ, who 
had the opportunity to observe the de-
meanor of both witnesses, made a specif-
ic finding that the claimant "seems more 
credible to the Administrative Law 
Judge." The Board of Review only re-
views written transcripts and documents 
associated with the Administrative I^ aw 
Judge hearing and does not have the 
opportunity to observe witnesses. The 
Board must, therefore, rely on the im-
pressions of the ALJ on matters of cred-
ibility derived from observing the de-
The second warning was in January of 1990 
when Fullerton kicked and damaged a door 
while "horsing around" with members of his 
crew on Super Bowl Sunday. For this infrac 
tion Fullerton received two weeks suspension 
without pay. 
Importantly, Albertsons has a union contract 
which provides that warnings will not remain in 
effect for more than one vear. 
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meanor of the witness. Since the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge found the claim-
ant to be more believable than the em-
ployer witness and since the ALJ's find-
ing of fact that the claimant accidentally 
slipped and inadvertently broke the bat-
tery plate is supported by substantial 
evidence in the record, the Board affirms 
that finding and affirms the Administra-
tive Law Judges decision that the em-
ployer did not have just cause within the 
meaning of the Utah Employment Securi-
ty Act for discharging the claimant. 
(Emphasis added). 
On appeal, Albertsons claims Fullerton 
was terminated for just cause because he 
willfully destroyed company property, and 
knew, or should have known, his actions 
could result in his termination. In so 
claiming, Albertsons essentially challenges 
the Board's finding the incident was acci-
dental. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
These proceedings were commenced af-
ter January 1, 1988, therefore our review is 
governed by the Utah Administrative Pro-
cedures Act (UAPA). See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-0.5 to -22 (1989 & Supp.1992). 
Judicial review of agency action under 
UAPA is controlled by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-16 (1989). 
HI Because this appeal involves the ap-
plication or interpretation of an agency-
specific statute we must determine wheth-
er review is under section 63~46b-16(4)(d) 
or section 63-46b-16(4Mh)<i).' See SEME-
CO Indus., Inc. v. Auditing Div., 849 P.2d 
1167, 1173 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dis-
senting); King v. Industrial Comm 'n, 850 
P.2d 1281, 1285-1286 (Utah App.1993). If 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-5(b)(l) (Supp.1992) 
2. Section 63-46b-l6(4) provides in part: 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only 
if, on the basis of the agency's record, it 
determines that a person seeking judicial re 
view has been substantially prejudiced by any 
of the following: 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted 
or applied the law; 
contains a legislative grant of discretion to 
the Board, we review under section 63-
46b-16(4)(h)(i) for reasonableness. Howev-
er, if it contains no grant of discretion, we 
review under section 63-46b-16(4)(d) for 
correction of error. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. 
Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 587-89 (Utah 
1991); King, 850 P.2d at 1285-1286. See 
also SEMECO, 849 P.2d at 1173 (Durham. 
J., dissenting). 
Section 35-4-5(b)(l) provides a claimant 
is ineligible for unemployment benefits if 
the individual is "discharged for just cause 
. . . if so found by the commission." Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-4-5(b)(l) (Supp.1992). This 
explicit grant of discretion to the Industrial 
Commission to apply the statute requires 
we review the Board's action under section 
63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) for reasonableness. See 
Morton, 814 P.2d at 589; King, 850 P.2d at 
1291. See also Bhatia v. Department of 
Employment Sec, 834 P.2d 574, 577 (Utah 
App.1992); Gibson v. Department of Em-
ployment Sec, 840 P.2d 780, 783 (Utah 
App.1992); Wagstaff v. Department of 
Employment Sec, 826 P.2d 1069, 1072 
(Utah App.1992); Department of Air 
Force v. Sunder, 824 P.2d 448, 451 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
JUST CAUSE TERMINATION 
[2,3] In this appeal we must decide 
whether the Board reasonably concluded 
Fullerton was not discharged for just cause 
and is therefore entitled to unemployment 
benefits. Albertsons bears the burden of 
proving just cause for Fullerton's termi-
nation. See Utah Code Admin.P. R562-5b-
103; Bhatia, 834 P.2d at 577. To establish 
just cause, Albertsons must show Fuller-
ton's conduct involved three factors: I) cul-
pability, 2) knowledge and 3) control. See 
Utah Code Admin.P. R562-5b-102.3 Ac 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to 
the agency by statute; . 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1989). 
3. Counsel for Albertsons erroneously cites to 
Utah Code Admin.P. R475-5b-l02 (1991) for the 
factors which establish just cause. The Admin 
istrativc Code has been renumbered in the 1992 
version and Utah Code Admin.P. R562-Sb-102 
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cord Bhntta v Department of Employ 
ment Sec 834 P 2d 574 577 (Utah App 
1992) Nelson v Department of Employ 
ment Sec, 801 P 2d 158 161 (Utah App 
1990) * The failure to establish any one of 
the three factors is fatal to [the em 
ployer s] claim of just cause" Depart 
ment of Air Force v Department oj Em 
ployment Set, 786 P 2d 1361, 1364 (Utah 
App 1990) cert dented sub nom US v 
Industrial Comm'n, 795 P 2d 1138 (Utah 
1990) (citing Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc v 
Board of Review, 775 P 2d 439, 442-43 
(Utah App 1989)) In the instant case we 
need not reach the issues of knowledge and 
control as we uphold the Board's determi 
nation that Fullerton's conduct was not cul 
pable 
Culpability 
[4| Rule R562-5b-102(lMa) provides 
guidance to the Board in determining 
whether an employee s conduct was suffi 
ciently culpable to deny benefits In defin 
ing culpability, these regulations provide 
[tjhe wrongness of the conduct must be 
considered in the context of the particu 
lar employment and how it affects the 
employer's rights If the conduct was an 
isolated incident of poor judgment and 
there is no expectation that the conduct 
will be continued or repeated, potential 
harm may not be shown and therefore it 
ts not necessary to discharge the employ 
ee 
Utah Code Admin P R562-5b-102(1 Ma) 
See Gibson v Department of Employ 
ment Sec, 840 P 2d 780, 783-84 (Utah App 
1992), Nelson v Department of Employ 
ment Sec, 801 P 2d 158, 161-62 (Utah App 
1990), Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc v Board 
of Review, 775 P 2d 439, 443 (Utah App 
1989) 
In Gibson, this court called for a liberal 
construction of the Employment Security 
Act to assist those attached to the work 
force, stating " 'mere inefficiency or failure 
of good performance as the result of inabil 
ity or incapacity, inadvertences, isolated in 
stances of ordinary negligence, or good 
faith errors in judgment or decisions do not 
constitute culpable conduct which pre 
eludes a discharged employee from receiv 
ing unemployment compensation bene 
fits ' Gibion 840 P 2d at 783 (quoting 
Logan Regional Hosp v Board of Review, 
723 P2d 427, 429 (Utah 1986)) 
In resolving the conflicting testimony, 
the AU found "the claimant seems more 
credible to the Administrative Law Judge," 
thus "[tjhe claimant's testimony is accepted 
that the damage done on April 2, 1992 was 
accidental" 
In affirming the decision of the ALJ, the 
Board adopted the ALJ's Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law The Board stat 
ed 
The Board must, therefore, rely on the 
impressions of the ALJ on matters of 
credibility derived from observing the de 
meanor of the witnesses Since the Ad 
mimstrative Law Judge found the claim 
ant to be more believable than the em 
ployer witness the Board affirms 
that finding 
[5-71 Albertsons necessarily challenges 
the Board's finding that Fullerton did not 
intentionally beat on an Albertsons forklift 
in their effort to demonstrate Fullerton's 
conduct was culpable In seeking to over 
turn the Board's factual findings Albert 
sons bears a heavy burden "[TJhis court 
grants great deference to an agency's find 
ings, and will uphold them if they are 'sup-
ported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before 
the court' " Department of Air Force v 
Swtder, 824 P 2d 448, 451 (Utah App 1991) 
(quoting Utah Code Ann § 63-46b-16(4)(g) 
(1989)) '"Substantial evidence is "such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a con 
elusion " ' " Grace Drilling Co v Board 
of Review, 776 P 2d 63, 68 (Utah App 1989) 
(quoting Idaho State Ins Fund v Hum 
cutt, 715 P2d 927, 930 (Idaho 1985) (quot 
ing Consolo v Federal Maritime 
Comm'n, 383 US 607 620 86 S Ct 1018, 
1026, 16 L Ed 2d 131 (1966))) 'In applying 
the substantial evidence test, we review the 
'whole record' before the court and consid 
er both evidence that supports the Board s 
(1992) is ihe applicable rule since the incident al issue occurred in 1992 
11(11* I V. tVAIBAPffeVAa 
CIU M SS4 P 2d S79 (Utah App 1993) 
findings and evidence that fairlv detracts 
from them ' Swider, 824 P 2d at 451 
f 81 We defer to the Board's assessment 
of conflicting evidence We are in no posi 
tion to second guess the detailed findings 
of the A U which were adopted by the 
Board It is not our role to judge the 
relative credibility of witnesses "In un 
dertaking such a review, this court will not 
substitute its judgment as between two 
reasonably conflicting views, even though 
we may have come to a different conclusion 
had the case come before us for de novo 
review " Grace Drilling, 776 P 2d at 68 
"It is the province of the Board, not appel 
late courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, 
and where inconsistent inferences can be 
drawn from the same evidence, it is for the 
Board to draw the inferences " Id Ac 
cord Logan Regional Hosp v Board of 
Review, 723 P2d 427, 428 (Utah 1986), 
Buick v Department of Employment 
Sec, 752 P2d 358, 360 (Utah App 1988) 
Accepting Fullerton's testimony, as did 
the ALJ and the Board, there is substantial 
evidence to support a finding the incident 
was an accident and Fullerton did not will 
fully destroy Albertsons's property Thus, 
we find reasonable the Board's determma 
tion that Fullerton's conduct did not rise to 
the level of culpability required to deny 
unemployment benefits 
CONCLUSION 
We defer to the Board's assessment of 
conflicting evidence, and find reasonable 
the Board's determination that Albertsons 
did not have just cause within the meaning 
of the Utah Employment Security Act for 
discharging Fullerton Therefore, we af 
firm the award of unemployment compen 
sation benefits to Fullerton 
GARFF and GREENWOOD, JJ , concur 
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Keith C HOLT and Joyce S Holt. 
Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
v 
Manuel KATSANEVAS. Defendant 
and Appellee 
No 920225-CA 
Court of Appeals of Utah 
May 19 1993 
Vendors sued purchasers of real estate 
for breach of real estate sales contract 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Pat B Brian, J , entered judgment for pur 
chasers, and vendors appealed The Court 
of Appeals, Greenwood J , held that (1) 
material issue of fact as to oral modifica 
tion of contract precluded summary judg 
ment, and (2) oral modification of real es 
tate contract was enforceable 
Reversed and remanded 
Orme, J , concurred in result 
1. Appeal and Error «=»842(2), 934(1) 
In considering appeal of grant or deni 
al of summary judgment, court reviews 
facts and all reasonable inferences from 
them in light most favorable to losing par 
ty, and legal conclusions reached by trial 
court are accorded no deference, but in 
stead, are reviewed for correctness Rules 
Civ Proc , Rule 56(c) 
2. Judgment «=»18I<29) 
Material issue of fact as to whether 
vendor and purchaser of real estate under 
installment contract intended purchaser's 
payment of mortgage on land to be applied 
to payment due at beginning or at end of 
contract term precluded summary judg 
ment for purchaser in vendors action for 
breach of promise to make installment pay 
merits Rules Civ Proc , Rule 56(c) 
3 Frauds. Statute of «=>!29(I2), 131(1) 
Generally if original agreement was 
required to comply with statute of frauds 
any material modification of that agree 
ment must also conform to statute of 
frauds, however transactions for sale of 
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HARRIS TRUST AND SAVINGS BANK, Trustee, et al. , Plaintiffs, v. GERALDINE SWIFT TAYLOR 
et al. , Defendants-(JOSEPH L. MACK et al. , Defendants-Appellants; GERALDINE SWIFT TAYLOR 
et al. , Defendants-Appellees). 
HARRIS TRUST & SAV. BANK v. TAYLOR 
No. 76-661 
Appellate Court of Illinois; First District (5th Division) 
49 111. App. 3d 349; 364 N.E.2d 349; 7 111. Dec. 188 
May 20, 1977. 
PRIOR HISTORY: 
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the 
Hon. DANIEL A. COVELLI, Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION: Judgment affirmed. 
COUNSEL: Joseph L. Mack and Samuel L. Bullas, both 
of Chicago (Nathan Bennett, of counsel), for appellants. 
Winston & Strawn, of Chicago (Calvin Sawyier, 
Logan T. Johnston, HI, and R. David Bergonia, of coun-
sel), for appellees. 
OPINIONBY: WILSON 
OPINION: [*350] [**351] [***190] Mr. JUSTICE 
WILSON delivered the opinion of the court: 
This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of 
Cook County instructing the trustees of seven trusts as 
to the proper interpretation of a tax apportionment pro-
vision common to the seven trust agreements creating 
their trusts. The only issue raised on appeal is whether 
the court correctly construed this provision. We affirm. 
On December 30, 1933, Geraldine Swift (who subse-
quently became Mrs. Geraldine Swift Taylor) executed a 
trust agreement creating an irrevocable inter vivos trust 
(hereinafter Taylor trust A). The sole original trustee 
of this trust was Gustavus F. Swift, the settlor's fa-
ther. [*351] After his death in 1943, Harris Trust 
and Savings Bank (hereinafter Harris) became the sole 
successor trustee. 
On December 27, 1938, Mrs. Taylor executed a sec-
ond trust agreement creating another irrevocable inter 
vivos trust (hereinafter Taylor trust B). As with the 
former trust, the sole original trustee of this trust was 
Gustavus F. Swift. In contrast to the former trust, after 
the original trustee's death, Harris, Gustavus F. Swift, 
Jr., and A. Thomas Taylor (Mrs. Taylor's husband) be-
came successor co-trustees. 
Both trust agreements gave the original trustee a dis-
cretionary power to accumulate income. These accu-
mulation powers terminated at his death. Thereafter, 
income from Taylor trust A became payable to Mrs. 
Taylor. On her death, this income will be payable to 
her children and per stirpes to their respective lineal de-
scendants if any child of hers has predeceased her or 
survives her but dies before the termination of the trust. 
Parenthetically, Mrs. Taylor's children are: Thomas 
S. Taylor, Geraldine T. McLaughlin, Gustavus F. Taylor 
and Richard F. Taylor; and the lineal descendants of these 
children are Fiona M. Taylor, Alexandra T. McLaughlin, 
Geraldine S. McLaughlin and Peter B. McLaughlin, Jr., 
all of whom are minors. After the death of the last sur-
vivor of Mrs. Taylor, her children and their lineal de-
scendants, this income is payable to her siblings and per 
stirpes to their respective lineal descendants if any sib-
ling has predeceased this survivor or survives same but 
dies before the termination of the trust. Mrs. Taylor's 
siblings are Marie S. Spiel, Jane S. Moore and Gustavus 
F. Swift, Jr., and the lineal descendants of these sib-
lings are: Robert E. Spiel, Jr.; Richard A. Moore, Jr.; 
Elizabeth J. Moore, a minor; Matthew S. Moore; Joseph 
F. Moore; Kate L. Moore; Samuel S. Moore, a minor; 
Alice S. Reginos; Cynthia Reginos, a minor; Eleanor 
S. Glass; George B. F. Glass, a minor; and Gustavus F. 
Swift IV. The income disposition provisions of Taylor 
trust B differ from those of Taylor trust A in that income 
beneficiaries of Taylor trust B must exercise a power of 
withdrawal before income payments are made and any 
income not distributed is accumulated and added to the 
trust's principal. In all other respects, the income dispo-
EXIS-NEXISW LEXIS-NEXISW LEXIS-NEXIS^ 
rvices of Mead Data Central, Inc. 
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sition provisions of the two trusts are virtually identical. 
When each trust terminates, the principal of each trust 
is to be distributed to the beneficiaries then entitled to 
income in the same proportion as that in which income 
would be distributable. 
In 1974, Harris filed a complaint for instructions as to 
the proper interpretation of certain provisions, including 
a tax apportionment clause, of the trust agreement creat-
ing Taylor trust A. In the same complaint, the successor 
trustees of Taylor trust B petitioned for instructions as to 
the proper interpretation of certain provisions, including 
a spendthrift clause and a tax apportionment clause, in 
the trust agreement creating Taylor [*352] trust B. After 
the settlor and the other adult defendants filed separate 
answers to this complaint, the court appointed guardians 
ad litem for all minor defendants. 
[**352] [***191] Prior to the filing of this com-
plaint, Mrs. Taylor had informed the successor trustees 
of Taylor trust B of her intention to relinquish all of her 
retained interests, rights, powers and privileges in and 
with respect to Taylor trust B. The successor trustees 
of Taylor trust B questioned whether such a voluntary 
alienation was possible in light of the terms of the trust's 
spendthrift clause. After the guardians filed separate an-
swers to the aforementioned complaint, the court found 
that such an alienation was possible in an order disposing 
of this question only. Thereafter, Mrs. Taylor executed 
a release, renunciation and relinquishment of all rights, 
titles and interests in and with respect to that trust. 
After Mrs. Taylor executed this release, plaintiffs and 
all adult defendants including the settlor filed a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings. Memoranda of law were 
filed by the various parties including one of the guardians 
and the settlor's siblings thereafter petitioned for entry 
of a supplementary decree adjudging that the court's rul-
ings are equally applicable and binding in respect to six 
other trusts they created. In their petition the siblings 
stated that Marie S. Spiel executed a trust agreement on 
December 30, 1933, which is identical to the trust agree-
ment executed the same day by Mrs. Taylor, and thereby 
created an A trust which is identical to Taylor trust A. 
The petition further stated: (1) that Jane S. Moore ex-
ecuted a trust agreement on December 23, 1938, which 
is substantially identical to the trust agreement creating 
Taylor trust A, and thereby created a trust (hereinafter 
Moore trust A) which is substantially identical to Taylor 
trust A; (2) that Gustavus F. Swift, Jr., executed a trust 
agreement that same day which is identical to the one 
executed by Jane S. Moore, and thereby created an A 
trust which is identical to Moore trust A; and (3) that on 
December 27, 1938, each of the three siblings executed 
a trust agreement identical to the one executed that day 
LEXIS-NEXlSs® LEXIS-
rage t 
51; 364 N.E.2d 349, **351; LEXSEE 
. 188, ***190 
by Mrs. Taylor, and thereby created trusts (hereinafter 
respectively Spiel trust B, Moore trust B and Swift trust 
B) identical to Taylor trust B. The siblings then requested 
instructions as to the proper interpretation of those provi-
sions of the trust agreements they executed having Taylor 
trust counterparts which the court had been asked to con-
strue. One of these provisions is the tax apportionment 
clause of the trust agreements executed by the siblings. 
In response to the foregoing, the court entered an or-
der in which it concluded that all eight trusts contained 
the following tax apportionment provision: 
If any estate, inheritance or other succession taxes or 
duties or 
[*353] transfer charges are assessed in connection 
with any distribution of income or principal hereunder, 
they shall be paid by the trustee or successor trustee out 
of the principal of the trust estate. 
The court went on to find as a matter of law that upon 
the death of a settlor, if trust assets are included in his 
gross estate for estate or inheritance tax purposes, then 
there should be apportionment of such taxes and the trust 
is obligated to pay its proportionate share out of the prin-
cipal of the trust estate. The court also found as a matter 
of law that such apportionment between nonprobate or 
trust assets taxed in the settlor's estate and the settlor's 
probate assets is fair, equitable and called for by the 
settlor's express language. The court concluded that the 
apportionment of taxes between the trusts and the estates 
of the settlors should be on the basis of the value of the 
trust assets included in the taxable estates compared to 
the value of all assets included in the taxable estates. The 
court additionally concluded that Mrs. Taylor's execu-
tion of a release, renunciation and relinquishment of all 
rights, titles and interests in and with respect to Taylor 
trust B nullified any right Mrs. Taylor had under the tax 
apportionment clause of that trust. The court then in-
structed the trustees of the four A trusts and of Spiel trust 
B, Moore trust B and Swift trust B that: (1) if any trust 
assets are included in a settlor's gross estate for estate 
or inheritance tax purposes upon the death of a settlor 
of any of these seven trusts, the estate of the deceased 
settlor has the right to require the [**353] [***192] 
trust to contribute its proportionate share of the estate or 
inheritance taxes providing such right was not released 
or relinquished by the settlor; (2) the amount of the con-
tribution by the trust shall be determined on the basis of 
the value of the trust assets included in the gross estate 
compared to the value of the total gross estate; and (3) 
the tax contribution is payable out of principal and not 
out of income. The court reserved jurisdiction over the 
remaining issues and directed the guardians to appeal 
from this order. This appeal followed. Opinion 
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The guardians ad litem urge that the tax apportionment 
provision in question neither authorizes nor requires 
payment of a proportionate share of estate or inheritance 
taxes upon inclusion of trust assets in the settlor's gross 
estate. In support of this contention they offer three ar-
guments which merit discussion. The first begins with 
the assertion that the trust instruments were drawn by ex-
perienced counsel and the observation that the settlor's 
death taxes are not expressly referred to in the tax appor-
tionment clause in question. The guardians submit that 
if it had been the settlor' s intent to have the trust pay such 
taxes, the draftsman would have been instructed to ex-
pressly state that the settlor's death taxes were chargeable 
to the trust and, if so instructed, the draftsman would 
[*354] have so stated. The guardians conclude that the 
absence of such an express direction clearly indicates 
that the settlor never instructed the draftsman to provide 
for payment of such taxes out of trust funds and clearly 
indicates a lack of intent to have such a payment made. 
Evidently the guardians failed to perceive that the tax ap-
portionment clause in question also does not expressly 
refer to beneficiaries' death taxes. If the absence of an 
express direction to pay the settlor's death taxes indi-
cates a lack of intent to have such a payment made, then 
it follows that the lack of an express direction to pay ben-
eficiaries' death taxes indicates a lack of intent to have 
the trust pay the beneficiaries' death taxes. Taking the 
guardians' position and its logical extension together, it 
follows that the tax apportionment clause in question is 
a nullity and indicates a lack of intent to have the trust 
pay any death taxes. We believe that the very presence 
of the tax provision indicates an intention to have the 
trust pay some death taxes on some occasion. Since the 
guardians' position leads to the opposite conclusion, we 
find it unpersuasive. 
The guardians' second argument pertains to the word 
if at the beginning of the tax apportionment clause in 
question. They point out that if indicates uncertainty 
and that there is no uncertainty regarding death and pay-
ment of death taxes by the settlor's estate. They argue 
that the draftsman knew that the settlor must eventu-
ally die and that estate taxes would thereafter have to 
be paid by settlor's estate, and since the taxes referred 
to following the preposition 'if make no reference to 
the settlor's death taxes or the settlor's death, it fol-
lows ineluctably that only beneficiaries' death taxes are 
included among those referred to in the tax apportion-
ment clause in question. We disagree. If the draftsman 
is chargeable with the knowledge that the settlor must 
eventually die, then he is equally chargeable with knowl-
edge that the beneficiaries must eventually die. Despite 
the certainty of both the settlor's eventual death and the 
eventual demise of all beneficiaries, neither the settlor 
_EXlS-NEXISw LEXIS-
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nor the beneficiaries are expressly referred to in the tax 
provision. It follows ineluctably that the tax provision 
refers to neither the settlor's nor the beneficiaries' death 
taxes. If the provision refers to neither the settlor's nor 
the beneficiaries' death taxes, then it is a nullity. If 
the provision is a nullity, then why do we find it in the 
trust instrument? Would an experienced draftsman draft 
a null and void tax apportionment provision? We think 
not. Moreover, as used in the provision in question, if is 
a subordinating conjunction which introduces a subjunc-
tive clause and means in the event that. (Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary 1124 (unabr. ed. 1976); 
The American Heritage [**354] [***193] Dictionary 
654 (1970).) So used, the uncertainty if indicates per-
tains to the occurrence of the assessment mentioned in 
the following subjunctive clause. As used in this sub-
junctive clause, the any which follows if is an adjective 
[*355] which modifies estate taxes, inheritance taxes, 
other succession taxes, duties and transfer charges which 
are assessed in the manner described by the remainder of 
the clause. The guardians' second argument fails to per-
suade us that this use of any does not bring the settlor's 
death taxes within the parameters of the tax provision in 
question. 
The guardians' third argument pertains to the last por-
tion of the subjunctive clause in the tax apportionment 
provision. The guardians argue that since the settlor's 
right to income terminates upon death and since the set-
tlor retains no right to receive any principal, upon sett-
lor's death there is no distribution of income or principal 
under the trust which would cause a death tax assess-
ment, therefore only successor beneficiaries can be cov-
ered by: assessed in connection with any distribution of 
income or principal hereunder. We disagree. Not only 
the settlor's income interest, but also all successor in-
come beneficiaries' income interests appear to terminate 
upon their respective deaths. Following the guardians' 
reasoning, it would seem that only holders of principal 
interests can be covered by this passage. If this was 
the settlor's intention, then why does the term income 
appear in this passage? We believe that this argument, 
like its predecessors, proves too much. One of its other 
flaws is that it overlooks the redistribution of income in-
terest upon settlor's death. Furthermore, a court's first 
concern in the construction of a trust is to ascertain the 
intent of its creator and give effect to that intent if it 
does not conflict with the law or public policy of the 
State. (See 2416 Corp. v. First National Bank (1976), 
64 III. 2d 364, at 371-72, 356 N.E.2d 20.) This intent 
must be gathered from the entire instrument evidencing 
the trust and if the language used therein, in its ordinary 
sense, is plain and its meaning is clear, and if the sett-
lor's actual intent can be ascertained therefrom without 
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reference to rules of construction which are used to affix 
a presumed intent, we must construe the trust so as to 
give effect to the actual intent expressed by the trust in-
strument's language. (See 2416 Corp. v. First National 
Bank; Storkan v. Ziska (1950), 406 III 259, 263-64, 
94 N.E.2d 185; Continental Illinois National Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Griffin (1970), 124 Hi App. 2d 334, 337, 
260 N.E.2d 281.) We believe that the language used 
in the tax apportionment provision in question, taken in 
its ordinary sense, is clear and unambiguous and that 
the settlor's intent can be ascertained therefrom without 
reference to rules of construction. We further believe 
that the court below correctly interpreted this language. 
There is more than one way to express an intention to 
have death tax burdens apportioned (compare Lipic v. 
Wheeler (1951), 362 Mo. 499, 242 S.W.2d 43, with 
Union Trust Co. v. Watson (1949), 76 R.I. 223, 68 
A. 2d 916), and this language expresses such an inten-
tion on its face. 
The other contentions submitted by the guardians in-
volve either rules [*356] of construction used to affix 
presumed intention in the absence of an expression of 
actual intention, or rules of law which operate in the 
same context such as the doctrine of equitable appor-
tionment discussed in In re Estate of \an Duser (1974), 
19 m. App. 3d 1022, 313 N.E.2d 228, and In re Estate 
of Phillips (1971), 1 III App. 3d 813, 275 N.E.2d 
685. Our conclusions render these contentions inappo-
site. Accordingly, the judgment of the Circuit Court of 
Cook County is affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
LORENZ and MEJDA, JI, concur. 
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the imposition of use taxes under the Code, 
as the Controller and the district court con-
cluded 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
reversed. 
EKICKSON, J , dissents. 
Justice EKICKSON dissenting: 
I would affirm the court of appeals. In-
vestment Hotel Properties, Ltd. v. City of 
Colorado Springs, 781 P.2d 113 (Colo.App. 
1989). The court of appeals, in my view, 
properly concluded thut Investment Proper 
ties' purchase of tangible personal property 
for the exclusive purpose of furnishing pri-
vate guest rooms in a hotel owned and 
operated by Investment Properties was not 
taxable under the Colorado Springs Sales 
and Use Tax Ordinance. City Code 
§ 7-2-101 to -1302. The issue in this case 
is whether property purchased at wholesale 
and used to furnish hotel guest rooms is 
exempt from use tax under the purchase 
for taxable resale exception. 
I 
The Colorado Springs city code declares 
that 
every person who stores, uses, distrib-
utes or consumes in the City any article 
of tangible personal property, or taxable 
services purchased, leased or rented at 
retail, as herein defined, is exercising a 
taxable privilege. 
City Code § 7-2-102(A) (emphasis added). 
The city may therefore levy a use tax on 
"the privilege of using, storing, distribut-
ing or otherwise consuming tangible per-
sonal property and taxable services in the 
City . ." City Code § 7-2-103(B). 
The authority to impose a use tax is 
dependent on the threshold question wheth-
er the item of personal property is pur-
chased at retail. If the item of personal 
property is not purchased at retail, then 
Colorado Springs does not have the author-
ity to impose a use tax regardless of the 
I. The sales or use lax is imposed on the pur 
chase price paid or charged or (oi any consid 
eralion for the furnishing of tangible personal 
properly, together with the services of an op 
eiaior thereof, foi any pcison, shall be lax 
able hcreundei as a rental of such personal 
pioju'ily, irrespective o/ (he fait that during 
all limes that the said piopcrly is so fur 
extent of use, storage, or distribution of 
that property. 
The city defines "retail sale" or "pur-
chased at retail" as: "Any sale, purchase, 
lease, rental or grant of license to use 
tangible personal property, or taxable ser-
vices within the City except a wholesale 
sate or purchase for taxable resale*' City 
Code § 7-2-104 (emphasis added). The 
code then defines wholesale sale as: 
A sale by wholesalers or retailers to re-
tail merchants, jobbers, dealers, vendors 
or other wholesalers for taxable resale. 
It does not include a sale by a wholesaler 
or retailer to users, consumers, purchas-
ers or customers not for taxable resale, 
which sales shall be deemed retail sales 
and subject to the prwrisfens of this Arti 
cle. v 
City Code § 7-2-104 (emphasis added). 
Under the code, if an item of tangible 
personal property is purchased for the pur-
pose of taxable resale, then it is a whole-
sale purchase and not subject to the use 
Lax. Although the code does not specifics I 
ly articulate a definition of taxable resale, 
the provisions of the code provide ample 
guidance regarding the legislative intent of 
the city. 
A "sale" is defined by City Code 
§ 7-2-104 to include all sales, leases and, 
rentals of personal property. A resale 
would therefore occur when the purchaser 
of the property sells, leases, or rents that 
property to another party or individual-
City Code § 7-2-310 provides that the fur-
nishing of tangible personal property is a 
taxable event,' and City Code § 7-2-311 
provides that the furnishing of rooms in a 
hotel is also a taxable event.2 The rental 
of a room and accompanying personal prop-
erty is thus a taxable resale. Because In-
vestment Properties purchased the person-
al property for taxable resale, Colorado 
Springs does not have authority under the 
nished, the control of the operation of the 
same remains in the person so providing the 
said property. 
City Code § 7-2-310. 
2. The sales or use lax is imposed on the entire-
price paid or charged on the liansaciion of 
furnishing rooms or other accommodations to 
JENSEN v. CITY AND 
ClUulM PJd 
code to impose a use tax upon that proper-
ty 
II 
The imposition of a UBe tax on the pur-
chase of hotel room furnishings in addition 
to the imposition of a sales tax when a 
furnished room is rented is inapposite to 
both the code, and Colorado case law. 
City Code § 7-2-103(0(2) provides: 
The sales tax and use tax complement 
each other in the City revenue plan, and 
together provide a uniform tax of two 
and one half percent (27*%) upon either 
the sale, purchase, use, storage, distribu-
tion or consumption of all tangible per-
sonal property and specific taxable ser-
vices purchased, leased or rented at re-
tail, as herein defined. 
(Emphasis added.) The purpose of a use 
tax is to supplement the sales tax, and 
therefore should not apply to property sub-
ject to sales tax. State Dep't of Rev. v. 
Adolph Coors Co., 724 P.2d 1341, 1344 
(Colo. 1986). The imposition of a use tax on 
personal property purchased to furnish a 
private guest room, in addition to a sales 
tax on the rental of that room is, therefore, 
improper as double taxation. See IBM v. 
Charnes, 198 Colo. 374, 376, 601 P.2d 622, 
625 (1979) (exemption of intermediate sales 
from use tax is designed to avoid multiple 
taxation, the goal being to impose the sales 
or use tax on the final consumptive trans-
action). 
Ill 
The majority applies the primary purpose 
test and accompanying factors that were 
articulated in Regional Transportation 
District v. Martin Marietta Corp., 805 
P.2d 1102 (Colo.1991), and A.B Hirschfeld 
Press, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 
806 P.2d 917 (Colo.1991). This court need 
not apply the four-factor analysis since the 
primary purpose of Investment Properties' 
purchase is clear. 
According to the majority, a purchase is 
a
 purchase for resale, and not a taxable 
purchase at retail, if the primary purpose 
any person who for a consideration uses, pos-
sesses or has the right to use or possess, any 
room or rooms in any hotel, apartment hoiel, 
guest house, guest ranch, motel, mobile home, 
COUNTY OF DENVER Colo. 381 
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of the transaction is the acquisition of 
tangible personal property for resale in an 
unaltered and basically unused condition. 
Investment Properties purchased the per-
sonal property at issue for no other reason 
than to furnish private guest rooms, which 
it intended to rent (resell) te its patrons 
The personal property was then rented to 
Investment Properties' patrons in an unal 
tered and unused condition. 
Thus, even applying the primary purpose 
test, I would hold that the personal proper 
ty purchased by Investment Properties foi 
the purpose of furnishing private guesl 
rooms should not be subject te a use tax b> 
the City of Colorado Springs. 
£ !(IVNUMMimTIM> 
Jon Chris JENSEN and Robert Roome, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
The CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, i 
municipal corporation; The City Coun 
cil, City and County of Denver, and al 
members thereof; Federico Pena, May 
or of the City and County of Denver 
Colfax on the Hill Business Improve 
ment District, and Marty Amble, th« 
Executive Director thereof; The Boarc 
of Directors of Colfax on the Hill Bust 
ness Improvement District, and Jacl 
Robinson, Tom Man ley, James Beatty 
Joseph Figueroa, and David Atkinson 
the Directors thereof; and The State ol 
Colorado, Defendants-Appellees. 
No. 90SA51. 
Supreme Court of Colorado, 
En Banc. 
Feb 25, 1991. 
Appeal was taken from an order of tht 
District Court for the City and C/Ounty ol 
aulo camp, trailer court or park, under an) 
concession, permit right or access, license tc 
use or other agreement, or otherwise 
City Code § 7 2-311. 
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Denver, Edward E. Carelli, J., which reject-
ed challenge to creation of business im-
provement district. The Supreme Court, 
Mullarkey, J., held that: (1) Business Im-
provement District Act did not violate uni-
formity clause of Colorado Constitution, 
and (2) city council substantially complied 
with statutory requirements in creating 
proposed district. 
Affirmed. 
1. Taxation «=>42( 1) 
That taxing provisions of Business Im-
provement District Act exempted apart-
ment rental properties and boarding and 
rooming houses used on long term basis 
from property tax imposed on commercial 
property did not violate uniformity clause 
of Colorado Constitution. West's C.R.S.A. 
§§ 31-25-1213 to 31-25-1218; West's C.R. 
S.A. Const. Art. 10, § 3(lKa). 
2. Taxation <s=*42( I) 
Uniformity clause of Colorado Consti-
tution applies only to ad valorem taxes and 
requires burden of such taxation to be uni-
form on same class of property within jur-
isdiction of authority levying tax. West's 
C.R.S.A. Const. Art. 10, § 3. 
3. Taxation <*=»42(!) 
Uniformity of taxation is required 
within class, not between or among differ-
ent classes. West's C.R.S.A. Const. Art. 
10, § 3. 
4. Evidence *=>83(1) 
Presumption of validity and regularity 
supported official acts of public officials 
and, in absence of clear contrary evidence, 
court would presume that they had proper-
ly discharged their official duties. 
5. Municipal Corporations *»450(4) 
City council, when verifying signatures 
of property owners petitioning for forma-
tion of business improvement district, was 
I. This court has jurisdiction because this case is 
an appeal from the final judgment of a district 
court in which one issue involves the constitu-
not required to verify property ownership 
as of date of hearing on creation of district. 
West's C.R.S.A. § 31-25-1207. 
6. Municipal Corporations *=>450(4) 
Validity of petitions requesting forma-
tion of business improvement district was 
not dependent upon presence of operating 
plan and budget and, thus, subsequent sub-
mission of amended operating plan and 
budget did not invalidate petitions that had 
been circulated with different operating 
plan and budget attached. West's C.R.S.A. 
§ 31-25-1211. 
Nancy P. Bigbee apd Sally S. Town-
shend, Denver, for plaintiffs-appellants. 
Patricia L. Wells, Denver City Atty., 
John L. Stoffel, Jr., Asst. City Atty., Den-
ver, for defendants-appellees City and 
County of Denver, The City Council, City 
and County of Denver, and all members 
thereof, and Federico Pefia, Mayor of the 
City and County of Denver. 
Susan E. Burch, Denver, for defendants-
appellees Colfax on the Hill Business Im-
provement Dist, Amble, and the Bd. of 
Directors of Colfax on the Hill Business 
Improvement Dist. 
Justice MULLARKEY delivered the 
Opinion of the Court. 
This is an appeal' from a Denver District 
Court decision holding that the Denver City 
Council did not abuse its discretion or ex-
ceed its jurisdiction when it created the 
Colfax on the Hill Business Improvement 
District pursuant to the Business Improve-
ment District Act, §§ 31-25-1201 to -1228, 
12B C.R.S. (1990 Supp.) (the "BID Act"). 
In reaching its decision, the district court 
held that the BID Act did not violate the 
Uniformity Clause of the Colorado Consti-
tution, Article X, Section 3(lHa). We af-
firm on both issues. 
lionality of a statute. See § 13-4-102( l>(b), 6A 
C.R.S. (1987). 
JENSEN v. CITY AND 
Cite u 806 P 2d 
I. 
In 1988, the legislature enacted the BID 
Act which allows municipalities to create 
Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) 
within their boundaries. Under section 31-
25-1205, a municipality may form a BID if 
it receives a petition signed by persons who 
own real or personal property equal to at 
least fifty percent of both the assessed 
valuation of the service area and the total 
acreage in the proposed district.2 The 
"service area," defined in section 31-25-
1203(10), is the area within the boundaries 
of the district. The district consists of all 
commercial property located in the service 
area and includes property in the service 
area which later is changed from resi-
dential or agricultural property to commer-
cial property. Id. Pursuant to section 31-
25-1213, the BID may raise revenue by 
levying an ad valorem tax upon all com-
mercial property in the district. The par-
ties stipulated that residential property, in-
cluding single family residence, board-
ing/rooming houses and apartment rental 
properties are not taxed under the BID 
Act. See § 31-25-1203(10) (residential 
property within service area may not be 
taxed). 
In March 1989, the BID organizers filed 
petitions with the City and County of Den-
ver seeking the creation of the Colfax on 
the Hill BID.1 Although not required by 
the BID Act, the petitioners attached cop-
ies of a proposed operating plan with speci-
fied tax rate and budget. The plaintiffs 
(collectively referred to as "Jensen") are 
owners of commercial property located 
within the boundaries of the BID who op-
pose the creation of the proposed district. 
Following the issuance of a public notice, 
the Denver City Council held a public hear-
ing on June 19, 1989 pursuant to section 
31-25-1206 of the BID Act. At the hear-
2. Section 31-25-1205 contains additional re 
quirements that are not at issue in this case. 
3. The service area boundaries are Sixteenth Ave-
nue on the north, the alley east of Josephine 
COUNTY OF DENVER Colo 3 8 3 
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ing, Jensen submitted petitions in opposi-
tion to the proposed district and alleged 
that the petitions submitted in favor of the 
proposed district should be dismissed be-
cause the petitions were deficient. Among 
the deficiencies Jensen alleged were that: 
(1) certain property owners who had signed 
the petition had since sold their property, 
(2) certain property owners who originally 
signed the petition in favor of the proposed 
district later signed a petition against the 
proposed district, (3) the verification of 
property ownership was not current as of 
the date of the hearing, and (4) the propo-
nents submitted an amended version of the 
operating plan and budget at the hearing 
that contained different terms from the 
operating plan and budget attached to the 
petition. The City Council subsequently 
postponed voting on the proposed district 
until June 26, 1989 so that the administra 
tion (i.e., the City Attorney's office and the 
Department of Public Works) could investi 
gate the protests. 
In the ensuing investigation, the city ad-
ministration determined that some of the 
signatures supporting creation of the BID 
were indeed not valid because the signato-
ries either no longer owned property in the 
BID or had signed a later petition opposing 
the proposed BID. The administration 
then recomputed the relevant percentages 
and reported to the City Council that cre-
ation of the BID was supported by the 
owners of 52.76% of the total assessed val-
uation in the service area and 52.361% of 
the total acreage in the district. In verify-
ing that the signatures belonged to proper-
ty owners within the service area, the ad-
ministration used information that was cur-
rent as of March 1989. The administra-
tion's report also concluded that the BID 
organizers were authorized by virtue of the 
petition to submit the amended operating 
plan and budget at the hearing. 
Street on the east, Fourteenth Avenue on the 
south, and Grant Street (south of Colfax Ave 
nue) and the alley between Sherman and Grant 
Streets (north of Colfax Avenue) on the west. 
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On June 20, 1989, after receiving the 
administration's report, the City Council en-
acted an ordinance creating the proposed 
BID and adopting the amended operating 
plan and budget. Subsequently Jensen 
filed a complaint requesting judicial review 
of the City Council's action pursuant to 
C.R.C.P. 10b'(a)(4), declaratory relief pursu-
ant to C.R.C.P. 57 and injunctive relief 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court 
held that the City Council acted within its 
discretion and jurisdiction in creating the 
district. It also held that the BID Act did 
not violate Article X, Section 3(1 Ma), of the 
Colorado Constitution Jensen now brings 
this appeal. 
II. 
[ 1 ] We address first Jensen's claim that 
the BID Act's taxing provisions, sections 
31-25-1213 to -1218, violate Article X, Sec-
tion 3(1 Ma), of the Colorado Constitution. 
At the outset, we note that statutes are 
presumed to be constitutional and that Jen-
sen, as the moving party, must establish 
that the BID Act is unconstitutional be-
yond a reasonable doubt. See Colorado 
Dep't of Social Serv. v. Board of County 
Comm'rs, 697 P.2d 1, 10 (Colo.1985). 
121 Article X, Section 3(1 )(a), the Uni-
formity Clause, states: 
Each property tax levy shall be uniform 
upon all real and personal property not 
exempt from taxation under this article 
located within the territorial limits of the 
authority levying the tax. 
As we have noted in the past, this section 
applies only to ad valorem taxes and re-
quires the "burden of such taxation to be 
uniform on the same class of property 
within the jurisdiction of the authority 
levying the tax." Colorado Dep't of So-
4. In 1982, Article X, Section 3 was amended to 
change the way actual value of property is de 
termined in order to achieve uniformity in 
property tax determination for the different 
classes of taxable property. The new amend 
men) provided thai the valuation for assessment 
cial Serv. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 
697 P.2d at ll.4 
Under section 31-25-1213 of the chal-
lenged BID Act, the BID "has the power to 
levy and collect ad valorem taxes on and 
against all taxable commercial property, as 
defined in section 31-25-1203(2), within the 
boundaries of the district." By defining 
"commercial property" in section 31-25-
1203(2) as "any taxable real or personal 
property which is not classified for proper-
ty tax purposes as either residential or 
agricultural," the BID Act incorporates the 
definitions already used in the general tax 
statutes. See§ 39-1-102(5.5), (14.3), (14.4), 
(14.5), 16B C.R.S. (1990 Supp). These defi-
nitions correspond to Article X, Section 
3(1 Mb) of the Colorado Constitution which 
has defined the classification "residential 
real property" since the section was amend-
ed in 1982 as "all residential dwelling units 
and the land, as defined by law, on which 
such units are located, and mobile home 
parks, but shall not include hotels and mo-
te l s . . . ." 
Jensen claims that the BID Act, insofar 
as it exempts apartment rental properties 
and boarding/rooming houses used on a 
long-term basis, violates the Uniformity 
Clause. Jensen asserts that these proper-
ties benefit from the improvements funded 
by the BID Act and thus properly should 
be taxed as commercial property. Since 
such properties are treated as residential 
under the BID Act, Jensen concludes that 
the tax classification adopted by the legis-
lature results in unequal treatment of two 
types of property belonging in the same 
classification. We do not agree. 
(3) We have construed Article X, Sec-
tion 3, to allow the legislature to make 
reasonable classifications for tax purposes. 
See Senior Corp. v. Board of Assessment 
Appeals, 702 P.2d 732, 738 (Colo.1985); 
American Mobile Home Ass'n, Inc. v. Do-
Ian, 191 Colo. 433, 438, 553 P.2d 758, 762 
(1976); District 50 Metro. Recreation Dist. 
of residential real properly would be set at a 
lower percentage than other taxable property. 
See legislative Council of Colorado, An Analysis 
of 1982 Ballot Proposals, Research Publ. No 
269, 1-9 (1982). 
JENSEN v. CITY AND 
Che a . 806 P 2d 
v. Bumside, 167 Colo. 425, 431, 448 P.2d 
788, 790-91 (1968). Uniformity of taxation 
is required within a class, not between or 
among different classes. 
In this instance, the legislature enacted 
the BID Act primarily to "promote the 
continued vitality of commercial business 
areas within municipalities." 
§ 31-25-1202(1). To achieve this aim, the 
legislature provided that a BID would have 
the power to impose an ad valorem tax on 
"commercial property" rather than on "res-
idential property." Incorporated into the 
BID Act are the definitions of residential 
property from the general property tax 
definitions that correspond to the definition 
of residential property contained in Article 
X, Section 3(1 Mb). By this constitutional 
provision, hotels and motels are excluded 
from the residential property. "Hotels and 
motels" are defined to include lodging 
which is "predominantly used on an over-
night or weekly basis." § 39-1-102(5.5), 
16B C.R.S. (1990 Supp.). Apartments and 
boarding/rooming houses used on a long 
term basis do not come within the defini-
tions of hotel and motel and properly are 
included within the definition of residential 
property. 
The distinction that Jensen attacks thus 
has its origins in Article X, Section 3(1 )(b), 
which is a companion constitutional provi-
sion to the Uniformity Clause; it directly 
follows and modifies subsection (l)(a), the 
subsection containing the Uniformity 
Clause. Both provisions were adopted by 
the voters in the 1982 general election. 
H.R.J. Res. 1005, 54th Leg., 1983 Colo.Sess. 
Laws 1675, 1682. Clearly then, a classifi-
cation based on Article X, Section 3(1 )(b), is 
reasonable and does not violate the Uni-
formity Clause found in the exact same 
section. Moreover, we do not view the 
legislature's adoption of the classification 
3. We need not reach Jensen's third claim for 
injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 since 
we find the BID Act to be constitutional. 
*. C.R.C.P. 106(a). 7A C.R.S. (1990), provides in 
relevant part: "In the following cases relief may 
be obtained in the district court by appropriate 
action under the pi at lice prescribed in the Colo 
rado Rules of Civil Procedure: (4) Where 
any governmental body 01 officei or any lower 
B06P2d 10 
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M l (Colo 1991) 
as unreasonable given the purpose of the 
BID Act. Accordingly, Jensen has failed 
to prove that the BID Act is unconstitution-
al beyond a reasonable doubt and we af-
firm the trial court ruling.5 
HI. 
| 4 | We now address Jensen's second 
claim challenging the trial court's decision 
that the Denver City Council substantially 
complied with the statutory requirements 
in creating the proposed BID. Jensen 
brings this action under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4).' 
The standard of review under this provision 
is whether the government body exercising 
judicial or quasi judicial functions has ex-
ceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discre-
tion. We have construed this rule to mean 
that the district court should affirm the 
governing body where there is "any compe-
tent evidence" to support its decision. See 
Bauer v. City of Wheat Ridge, 182 Colo. 
324, 327, 513 P.2d 203, 204-205 (1973). 
To determine whether the City Council 
abused its discretion or exceeded its juris-
diction, we must examine the dictates of 
the BID Act. Section 31-25-1207 outlines 
the procedure that the City Council must 
follow. First, on the date of the hearing, 
the City Council "shall ascertain, from the 
tax rolls of the county or counties in which 
the district is located, the total valuation 
for assessment of the taxable real and per-
sonal property in the service area and the 
classification of taxable property." Sec-
ond, "|i|f it appears that said petition is not 
signed in conformity with this part 12, the 
governing body shall dismiss the peti-
tion. . . ." If, however, "it appears that an 
organization petition has been duly signed 
and presented in conformity with this part 
12 and that the allegations of the organiza-
tion petition are true, the governing body 
judicial body exercising judicial o^ quasi judicial 
functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or 
abused its discretion, and there is no plain, 
speedy and adequate remedy otherwise piovid 
ed by law: (1) Review shall be limited to a 
determination of whether the body or olficer 
has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused Us dis 
cietion, based on the evidence in the record 
be!ore (he defendant body or officer." 
ovw ™v, ir i i . KuriJKTKK, 2d SERIES 
. . . may, in its sole discretion, declare the 
district organized, " 
Section 31-25-1205 sets out the require-
ments with which the organizers must com-
ply when submitting the petitions. Jensen 
contends that the City Council did not prop-
erly determine that the requirement found 
in subsection (2) was followed. This sec-
tion provides: 
The petition shall be signed by persons 
who own real or persona) property in the 
service area of the proposed district hav-
ing a valuation for assessment of not 
less than fifty percent, or such greater 
amount as the governing body may pro-
vide by ordinance, of the valuation for 
assessment of all real and personal prop-
erty in the service area of the proposed 
district and who own at least fifty per-
cent, or such greater amount as the gov-
erning body may provide by ordinance, of 
the acreage in the proposed district. 
§ 31-25-1205(2). The record indicates that, 
prior to the hearing, the city administration 
verified that the BID petitions were signed 
by property owners of at least fifty percent 
of the assessed valuation of real and per-
sonal property in the service area and fifty 
percent of the total acreage in the proposed 
district as of March 1989. As discussed 
above, Jensen challenged the city adminis-
tration's calculations and the City Council 
postponed consideration of the BID peti-
tions until the alleged deficiencies could be 
investigated. Once the investigation 
showed that some of the signatures sup-
porting the creation of the proposed district 
were invalid, the city administration recal-
culated the relevant percentages to reflect 
the lower representation. 
Even after the recalculations, however, 
the signatures still represented more than 
fifty percent of the assessed valuation in 
the service area of the proposed district 
and total acreage of the district. Absent 
7. Section 39-5-123(1). 16B C.R.S. (1990 Supp), 
provides: "(T]he assessor shall complete the as-
sessment roll of all taxable property within his 
county, and no later than August 25 in each 
year he shall prepare therefrom two copies of 
the abstract of assessment, and in person, and 
not by deputy, shall subscribe his name, under 
oath, to the following statement, which shall be 
a part of such abstract: i , , the 
further evidence that the petitions were 
deficient, we must presume that the City 
Council properly made its determination 
that the signatures represented the requi-
site amount of property owners. A "pre-
sumption of [validity and] regularity sup-
ports the official acts of public officials and 
in absence of clear evidence to the con-
trary, courts presume that they have prop-
erly discharged their official duties." 
United States v. Chemical Foundation, 
272 U.S. 1, 14-15, 47 S.Ct. 1, 6, 71 L.Ed. 
131 (1926); City of Colorado Springs v. 
District Court, 184 Colo. 177, 181, 519 P.2d 
325, 327 (1974). Thus, once the City Coun-
cil adopted the administration's revised per-
centage determinations made in response 
to protests raised at the hearing, we find 
that the City Council complied with the 
statute. 
15] Jensen argues, however, that the 
City Council misinterpreted the require-
ments of section 31-2S-1207 of the BID 
Act when it verified the signatures. He 
construes this provision to require the City 
Council to determine the percentage of 
property owners represented with respect 
to value and acreage as of the date of the 
hearing. He asserts that because the in-
formation used to verify the property own-
ership was current as of March 1989 in-
stead of June 26, 1989, the date of the 
hearing, the petition was deficient and 
should have been dismissed. Jensen's ar-
gument must fail. 
Section 81-25-1207(1) specifically states 
that the total valuation for assessment and 
the classification of taxable property shall 
be ascertained from the tax rolls of the 
county. Because the tax rolls are prepared 
yearly by the assessor,7 it is evident that 
the legislature did not contemplate the 
time-consuming and costly up-to-the-minute 
title searches that would be required by 
assessor of county, Colorado, do sol-
emnly swear that in the assessment roll of such 
county I have listed and valued all taxable prop-
erty located therein and that such property has 
been assessed for the current year in the man 
ner prescribed by law and that the foregoing 
abstract of assessment is a true and correct 
compilation of each schedule.'" 
MARTIN v. FEUFI.K 
Cite M 806 P.2d 387 (Colo. 1991) 
Jensen's theory. Due to the date when the 
hearing occurred, the tax rolls last certified 
would have been current up to mid-1988. 
Since the Denver City Council used data 
current as of March 1989, it more than 
satisfied the property ownership verifica-
tion requirements. 
161 Last, we address Jensen's claim 
that the subsequent submission of the 
amended operating plan and budget invali-
dated the petitions since the petitions had 
been circulated with a different operating 
plan and budget attached. Jensen does not 
contend that the amendments were sub-
stantial or that those who signed the peti-
tion were misled because of the changes 
later made.8 
Section 31-25-1211 provides, "No district 
created under the provisions of this part 12 
shall issue bonds, levy taxes, fees, or as-
sessments, or provide improvements or ser-
vices unless a municipality has approved an 
operating plan and budget for the district." 
There is no requirement in the statute that 
the operating plan and budget be circulated 
with the petition. Although the record in-
dicates that prior to filing the petition, the 
organizers may submit the operating plan 
and budget for approval by the City Plan-
ning Office, they are not required to do so. 
This practice is designed to insure against 
delays later in the organizing process. 
Furthermore, section 31-25-1205(2Kd) 
makes explicit that the organizers listed on 
the petition have "the power to enter into 
agreements relating to the organization of 
the district" which indicates that they are 
authorized to change the operating plan 
and budget. Thus, it is apparent that the 
validity of the petitions is not dependent 
upon the presence of an operating plan and 
budget. 
*• The amended plan was the same as the operat-
ing plan and budget circulated with the peti-
tions except for three changes. The mill levy 
was raised from 5.77 to 5.8 mills in response to 
• decrease in the total valuation of commercial-
use property in the district. Two restrictive 
provisions, a $175,000 per year budget cap and 
a
 three-year sunset provision for the new dis-
trict, were added in response to comments from 
Property owners who had signed the petitions. 
Accordingly, we agree with the trial 
court's determination that the City Council 
complied with the statute* and neither 
abused its discretion nor exceeded its juris-
diction when it declared the proposed dis-
trict organized. 
Judgment affirmed. 
| KEY H U N 
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Sherry Denise MARTIN, Petitioner, 
v. 
The PEOPLE of the State of 
Colorado, Respondent. 
No. 90SC747. 
Supreme Court of Colorado, 
En Banc. 
March 11, 1991. 
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Ap-
peals, 88CA1130, Pitkin County District 
Court, 88CR5. 
David F. Vela, Colorado State Public De-
fender, Jaydee K. Bachman, Deputy State 
Public Defender, Greeley, for petitioner. 
Gale A. Norton, Atty. Gen., Timothy M. 
Tymkovich, Sol. Gen., Robert M. Russel, 
First Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for respon-
dent. 
Prior report: Colo.App., 806 P.2d 393. 
ORDER OF COURT AND MANDATE 
Upon consideration of the Record on Ap-
peal, together with briefs filed herein, 
9. The trial court properly did not make any 
determination regarding the genuineness of the 
signatures since section 31-25-1207(2) provides 
that, "(Tlhc findings of the governing body upon 
the question of the genuineness of the signa-
tures and all matters of fact incident to such 
determination shall be final and conclusive." 
See People ex rel. Setters v. Lee, 72 Colo. 598, 
604. 213 P 583. 587 (1923); Kaiser v. City of 
Ukewood, 33 Colo.App. 239. 244, 517 P 2d 471. 
474 (1973). 
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SANDERS BRINE SHRIMP. Petitioner, 
v. 
AUDIT DIVISION OF the UTAH STATE 
TAX COMMISSION, Respondent 
No. 910106. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 28, 1993. 
State Tax Commission held that brine 
shrimp cyst operator did not qualify for 
sales tax exemptions as manufacturer. 
Taxpayer petitioned for judicial review. In 
original proceeding, the Supreme Court, 
Zimmerman, J , held that: (1) administra-
tive rule improperly restricted definition of 
manufacturer and was invalid, and (2) ex-
press finding was required on whether op-
erator complied with requirement* for ex-
emption permitted by statute. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Taxation *=>1245 
State Tax Commission sales tax ex-
emption rule requiring that manufacturer 
produce tangible personal property to qual-
ify for exemption as manufacturer was in-
valid in that rule improperly restricted 
manufacturing sales tax exemption con-
tained in statute. U.C.A.1953, 69-12-
104(16) (1990). 
2. Administrative Law and Procedure 
•=•386 
Administrative agency's rules must be 
consistent with its governing statutes. 
3. Administrative LAW and Procedure 
«=»386 
Administrative rule that is out of har-
mony with governing statute is invalid. 
4. Taxation e=>1319 
Remand to State Tax Commission was 
required to determine whether brine 
I. The sales lax exemption statute, section 59-12-
104, has been amended several limes in the pasl 
few years The subparts cited in the text have 
h*^ll l/>r /WMKWI UC (IK\ -.r^J O h . - . „ - ^ . . . . - l . . 
shrimp cyst operation qualified for sales 
tax exemption for purchase of harvesting 
and processing equipment where Commis-
sion made no express finding on whether 
operator's activities were included in statu-
tory code classification system. U.C.A 
1953, 69-12-104(16) (1^90). 
R, Paul Van Dam, Mark E. Wainwright, 
Salt Lake City, for Utah Stat* Tax Com'n. 
Richard C. Cahoojo/ $ak Lake City, for 
Sanders Brine S h ^ p ^ 
Kent B. Linebaugb, Joa* N. Brems, Salt 
Lake City, for airiei Water $ Power Tech-
nology, Inc., and Ifount Olytnpua Waters, 
Inc. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Sanders Brine Shrimp, a Utah partner-
ship, seeks review of a February 13, 1991, 
final order of the Utah State Tax Commis-
sion. The Commission held that Sanders 
did not qualify for the sales tax exemptions 
provided for either manufacturers or farm-
ers under subpart* (16) and (22), respective 
ly, of section 69-12-104 of the Code. Utah 
Code Ann. ft 5^-12-104(16), (22) (Supp. 
1988) (amended 1989, 1991, and 1992).1 
Sanders argues, inter alia, that in ruling 
that its brine shrimp operation did not qual-
ify as a manufacturer under subpart (16), 
the Commission relied upon an administra-
tive rule that impermissibly narrowed the 
availability of the exemptions. We agree 
and reverse the order of the Commission, 
but we remand the case for a factual deter 
ruination regarding Sanders' compliance 
with the remaining statutory requirements 
for the sales tax exemption. 
Sanders harvests and processes brine 
Bhrimp cysts, or eggs, from the Great Salt 
of this statute as they were codified at the end 
of the auditing period. The relevant subparts of 
the sales tax exemption statute have remained 
SANDERS BRINE SHRIMP v. AUDIT DIV. 
CIUMS4* PJd 1304 (Utali 1993) 
Utah 1305 
Lake and sells them as a source of food for 
tropical fish and prawns. Purchasers 
hatch the cysts, raise the resulting brine 
shrimp, and use them as feed. During the 
audit period (July 1, 1985, to June 30, 1988), 
Sanders spent $319,260.97 on equipment 
and machinery to use in harvesting and 
processing the brine shrimp cysts. Relying 
on the sales tax exemptions for manufac-
turers and farmers found in subparts (16) 
and (22) of section 59-12-104, Sanders did 
not pay sales tax on these purchases. The 
equipment and machinery expanded Sand-
ers' production capacity by 1500 percent. 
Sanders' operation consists of two phas-
es. First, the brine shrimp cyste are har-
vested from the Great Salt Lake. Second, 
the cysts are transported to Sanders' River-
dale facility, where they are processed. 
Until Sanders processes the brine shrimp 
cysts, they have little or no commercial 
value. The harvesting and processing 
phases are both necessary to Sanders' busi-
ness, and the new equipment and machin-
ery were purchased for use in both phases. 
On March 27, 1989, the Commission's 
Auditing Division assessed a sales tax defi-
ciency based on Sanders' failure to pay 
sales tax on the equipment and machinery 
purchased during the audit period. Sand-
ers petitioned for redetermination. 
The Commission held a formal hearing 
during which evidence was presented. The 
Commission issued its decision on June 7, 
1990, finding that Sanders was neither a 
manufacturer nor a "farming operation" 
and therefore did not qualify for either of 
the claimed sales tax exemptions. The 
Commission found that Sanders was not a 
manufacturer because it could not satisfy 
the criteria set forth in rule R865-85S-
1(A)(4). Utah Admin.Code R865-85S-
2. The version of the relevant administrative rule 
in place at the end of the auditing period is 
substantially the same as the current version. 
3. Olher issues have been briefed and argued by 
the names, including whether Sanders' harvest-
1(AK4) (1987-88) (recodified as amended 
Utah Admin.Code R865-1&-86S(AX4) 
(1992)).2 Specifically, the Commission de-
termined that Sanders did not satisfy rule 
R865-85S-l(AK4)'s requirement that a 
"manufacturer . . . produce[ ] a new, recon-
ditioned, or remanufactured product, arti-
cle, substance or commodity from raw, 
semifinished, or used material." Id. 
R865-85S-l(AK4Kb). 
Sanders filed a request for reconsidera-
tion, which the Commission granted. At 
the Commission's reconsideration hearing, 
Sanders argued, inter alia, that rule R865-
85S-1(AH4) impermissibly narrowed the 
availability of the manufacturer's exemp-
tion in subpart (16) of section 59-12-104. 
By an order dated February 13, 1991, the 
Commission rejected Sanders' arguments 
and affirmed its previous order. 
On appeal, the dispositive issue is wheth-
er the Commission applied a rule that im-
properly restricts the statutory definition 
of "manufacturer."3 Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-12-104(16) (Supp. 1988) (amended 
1989, 1991, and 1992). Questions of statu-
tory construction are matters of law, and 
we give no deference to an administrative 
agency's interpretation of a statute absent 
certain circumstances, none of which exist 
here. Chris & Dick's Lumber & Hard-
ware v. Tax Comm'n, 791 P.2d 511, 513-14 
(Utah 1990). 
[1] The relevant part of the sales tax 
exemption statute states: 
The following sales and uses are ex-
empt from the taxes imposed by this 
chapter: 
(16) sales or leases of machinery 
and equipment purchased or leased 
by a manufacturer for use in new or 
ing of brine shrimp cysls constitutes a farming 
operation under subpart (22) of section 59-12-
104. Because the subpart (16) issue is disposi 
live, we do not address the other issues. 
expanding operations (excluding nor-
mal operating replacements, which in-
cludes replacement machinery and 
equipment even though they may in-
crease plant production or capacity, as 
determined by the commission) in any 
manufacturing facility in Utah. 
Normal operating replacement shall in-
clude replacement machinery and 
equipment which increases plant pro-
duction or capacity. Manufacturing 
facility means an establishment de-
scribed in SIC Codes 2000 to 3999 of 
the Standard Industrial Classification 
Manual 1972, of the federal Executive 
Office of the President, Office of Man-
agement and Budget. For purposes of 
this subsection, the commission shall 
by rule define "new or expanding op-
erations" and "establishment." . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16) (Supp. 
1988) (emphasis added) (amended 1989, 
1991, and 1992). 
Rule R865-85S-1 (A)(4), which was appar-
ently promulgated by the Commission to 
implement section 59-12-104(16), states: 
"Manufacturer" means a person who: 
(a) functions within the activities includ-
ed in SIC code classification 2000-3999; 
(b) produces a new, reconditioned, or re-
manufactured product, article, sub-
stance, or commodity from raw, semi-
finished, or used material; and 
(c) in the normal course of business pro-
duces products for sale as tangible per-
sonal property. 
Utah Admin.Code R865-85S-1(A)(4) (1987-
88) (recodified as amended Utah Ad-
min.Code R865-19-«5S(AK4) (1992)). Un-
der this rule, one purchasing equipment for 
use in any "manufacturing facility" is enti-
tled to the exemption provided in section 
59-12-104(16) only if he or she meets the 
criteria for being a manufacturer set forth 
in subparts (a), (b), and (c) of the rule. 
While the requirement in subpart (a) mir-
rors the statute, i.e., the business must fall 
within SIC code descriptions, the require 
ments in subparts (b) and (c) have no statu-
tory counterparts. Nothing in the statute 
requires the qualifying facility to produce 
"a new, reconditioned or remanufactured 
product, article, substance, or commodity" 
that is for sale "in the normal course of 
business . . . as tangible personal proper-
ty" 
Thus, under the Commission's rule, one 
might operate a manufacturing facility as 
defined by the statute and not be a manu-
facturer as defined by the rule. We find 
no obvious source for the Commission's 
narrowing of the exemption's availability. 
Section 59-12-104(16) authorizes the Com-
mission to define by rule the terms "new or 
expanding operation" and "establishment." 
However, it does nq^AH^o^ize the Commis-
sion to define the tenjn "manufacturer," 
nor does it authorise tjbe Commission to 
otherwise limit the availability of the ex-
emption as it has done in subparts (b) and 
(c) of rule R865-86S-KAK4). 
[2,3] It is a long-standing principle of 
administrative law that an agency's rules 
must be consistent with its governing stat-
utes. See, e.g., Merrill Bean Chevrolet, 
Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 549 P.2d 443, 
445 (Utah 1976); Robert H. Hinckley, Inc. 
v. State Tax Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 70, 77, 
404 P.2d 662, 668 (1965). Thus, a rule that 
is out of harmony with a governing statute 
is invalid. See, e.g., Manhattan Gen. 
Equip. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, 297 U.S. 129, 134, 56 S.Ct. 397, 
399, 80 L.Ed. 528 (1936). 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that 
the Commission's rule defining "manufac-
turer" is invalid because it improperly re-
stricts the manufacturing sales tax exemp-
tion set forth in section 59-12-104(16). 
Therefore, we reverse the Commission's de-
nial based on noncompliance with its defini-
tion of "manufacturer." 
(41 Sanders argues that we should or-
der the Commission to grant the exemp-
tion. However, the invalidity of the Conn-
ate M M6 P 2d 
mission's rule defining "manufacturer" 
does not necessarily mean Sanders quali-
fies for the sales tax exemption. Sanders 
contends that the Commission's order im-
plicitly found that Sanders met all the oth-
er criteria required by the rule and statute, 
specifically that it is in compliance with 
subpart (a) of the rule, which follows the 
statute and requires that the petitioner be 
"functioning] within the activities included 
in SIC code classification 2000-3999." We 
disagree. The Commission made no ex-
press finding on whether Sanders complied 
with the first requirement, dealing with 
SIC code classifications. Its order sug-
gests that it probably did not reach that 
issue because there was no reason to do so 
in light of Sanders' failure to meet the 
second factor, dealing with new or recondi-
tioned products. We refuse to interpret 
the lack of a finding of noncompliance as 
the equivalent of an affirmative finding of 
compliance. Because the Commission did 
not resolve whether Sanders complied with 
the remaining statutory requirements of 
the sales tax exemption, we remand the 
case to the Commission for further pro-
ceedings. 
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J., and 
STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
( o | KtV NUMMR iVSHM> 
Lorrie Ann ARNOLD, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Dr. Glade B. CURTIS, Defendant 
and Appellee. 
No. 910146. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 29, 1993. 
Medical malpractice suit was com-
menced against obstetrician for failing to 
J U U I 
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diagnose adenocarcinoma of mother's bow 
el until 35 weeks into pregnancy. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Ijeslie A. I>ewis, J.r granted obstetrician's 
motion for summary judgment after refus-
ing to consider affidavit from patient's ex 
pert witness. Appeal was taken. The Su 
preme Court, Howe, Associate C.J., held 
that: (1) refusing to consider expert affida 
vit as sanction for failing to timely identify 
witness was not abuse of discretion, and (2) 
undisputed evidence that carcinoma could 
not have been treated earlier mandated 
finding of no proximate cause. 
Affirmed. 
1. Pretrial Procedure «=»753 
Refusing to consider expert's affidavit 
submitted in opposition to motion for sum-
mary judgment, on ground that affiant was 
not identified as possible witness before 
deadline established in scheduling order, 
was not abuse of discretion; scheduling 
order was made with concurrence of both 
counsel and proponent of affidavit did not 
request change in trial court's scheduling 
order or file designation of witnesses. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 16, 28 U.S.C.A. 
2. Evidence <*=»538 
Physicians practicing in one specialty 
are not ordinarily competent to testify as 
experts on standard of care applicable in 
another specialty except when witness is 
knowledgeable about standard of care of 
another specialty or when standards of dif-
ferent specialties on issue in particular case 
are the same. 
3. Evidence «=>571(9) 
Uncontradicted expert evidence, that 
earlier diagnosis of pregnant patient's car-
cinoma would not have permitted earlier 
treatment or surgery, in that baby was 
delivered at earliest time that safe delivery 
was possible and surgery for carcinoma 
followed, established that any negligence in 
obstetrician's failure to earlier diagnose 
carcinoma was not proximate cause of 
mother's damage. 
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SAVAGE INDUSTRIES, INC., 
Petitioner, 
v. 
UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, Respondent. 
No. 900248. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 3, 1991. 
Corporation sought writ of review of 
final order of State Tax Commission deny-
ing petition for redetermination and up-
holding finding of auditing division that 
subsidiary corporations were not entitled to 
carry over their own preacquisition losses 
in determining their annual income for 
preparation of consolidated returns of par-
ent. The Supreme Court, Hall, CJ., held 
that statute prohibiting acquiring corpora-
tion from using preacquisition losses of 
acquired corporation does not prohibit ac-
quired corporation from taking advantage 
of its loss carryovers incurred prior to date 
of acquisition in order to offset its own as 
opposed to acquiring corporation's income; 
deduction may be taken by acquired corpo-
ration, whether filing separately or filing 
consolidated return as part of affiliated 
group. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Administrative Law and Procedure 
«=>759 
Statute* e=»219(l) 
Intermediate standard of review is 
only to be applied in areas of agency tech-
nical expertise or in areas where legisla-
ture has specifically granted agency discre-
tion in its decision-making process; for 
most questions of basic statutory interpre-
tation or construction of law, court is as 
suited to decide issues involved as is agen-
cy and therefore will review agency deci-
sion for correctness, 
2. Administrative Law and Procedure 
«=»74l 
Section of AdnunietraUve Procedure 
Act governing rvvtvw of agvnry decauoiui 
made after formal adjudicative hearing and 
requiring that "substantial prejudice" be 
shown before court may grant relief from 
agency action refers to person seeking re-
view and does not modify actual standards 
of review nor does it relate to degree of 
deference court must give agency decision. 
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4). 
3. Administrative Law and Procedure 
*»800 
Taxation *=»493.8 
Under the Administrative Procedure 
Act, state Tax Commission's interpretation 
of law in denying corporation's petition for 
redetermination and upholding finding of 
auditing division that ajibai4iary corpora-
tions were not enlft)*4 t* pury over their 
own preacquiaitioft tpaif* in determining 
their annual income to preparation of con-
solidated returns of pjwirt corporation 
would be reviewed using correction of er-
ror standard, giving no deference to Com-
mission's interpretation of law. U.C.A. 
1963, 69-7-108<14)<f), 63-46b-16<4), (4Kd). 
4. Statutes *»188 
Terms of statute should be interpreted 
in accord with usually accepted meanings. 
5. Statutes *»189 
In construing legislative enactments, 
reviewer assumes that each term in statute 
was used advisedly; thus statutory words 
are read literally, unless such reading is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable. 
6. Taxation *=>1041 
Statute prohibiting acquiring corpora-
tion from using preacquisition losses of 
acquired corporation does not prohibit ac-
quired corporation from taking advantage 
of loss carryovers incurred prior to date of 
acquisition in order to offset its own as 
opposed to acquiring corporation's income; 
the deduction may be taken by acquired 
corporation, whether filing separately or 
filing consolidated return as part of affil-
iated group. U.C.A1963, 59-7-108(14X0 
7. Taxation <*=>1041 
For purpose of statute prohibiting »c' 
quiring corporation from using preacquisi 
Uon ioaMNi of acquired corporation, filing <" 
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consolidated returns by acquiring corpora-
tion does not transform deductions by ac-
quired corporations into those of acquiring 
corporation. U.C.A.1953, 59-7-108(14X0-
8. Statutes <*=*181(1) 
Court's primary responsibility in con-
struing legislative enactments is to give 
effect to legislature's underlying intent. 
9. Statutes <S»184 
In determining legislative intent of 
statute, statute should be considered in 
light of purpose it was designed to serve 
and so applied as to carry out that purpose 
if it can be done consistent with its lan-
guage. 
10. Taxation «=>1041 
Intent of statute prohibiting acquiring 
corporation from using acquisition losses of 
acquired corporation is to prevent buying 
of loss corporations by high profit corpora-
tions solely for use of loss corporation's 
previous loss carryover deductions; further 
intent may be to limit use of loss carryover 
deductions to those corporations which 
have previously suffered losses and there-
fore are entitled to average their low in-
come years with their high income years. 
U.C.A.1953, 59-7-108(14Hf). 
11. Taxation «=»1041 
Statute prohibiting acquiring corpora-
tion from using preacquisition losses of 
acquired corporation does not, as written, 
prevent manipulation of corporate assets 
for purpose of accruing tax deductions 
based on preacquisition losses. U C A. 
1953, 59-7-108O4Kf). 
R. Brent Jenkins, Dale R. Kent, Salt 
Lake City, for petitioner. 
R. Paul Van Dam and Mark E. Wain 
wright, Salt Lake City, for respondent. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Savage Industries, Inc., seeks a writ of 
review of a final order of the Utah State 
Tax Commission ("the Commission") en-
tered on April 20, 1990, which denied Sav-
age Industries' petition for redetermination 
and upheld the finding of the auditing divi-
v. STATE TAX COM'N Utah 665 
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sion that subsidiary corporations of Savage 
Industries were not entitled to carry over 
their own preacquisition losses in determin-
ing their annual income for preparation of 
the consolidated returns of Savage Indus-
tries. 
The facts in the case have been stipu-
lated to by the parties and are supplement-
ed by findings of the Commission in its 
redetermination hearing. Prior to April 1, 
1982, Kenneth Savage, T. Luke Savage, 
and Neal Savage owned the majority of the 
stock of fourteen different operating corpo-
rations. On April 1, 1982, a stock holding 
and management corporation, Savage 
Western Industries Corporation ("Savage 
Western"), was formed to consolidate the 
corporations into a manageable structure. 
On April 1, 1982, the stock of Savage West-
ern was entirely owned by the three broth-
ers and members of their families. On 
November 28, 1984, Savage Western under-
went a statutory merger with Savage In-
dustries, Inc., and Savage Western 
changed its name to Savage Industries, 
Inc. On December 31, 1986, shares of Sav-
age Industries stock were transferred be-
tween the brothers to give each brother an 
equal percentage of ownership after the 
settlement of divorces. 
Prior to April 1, 1982, the stock of KNT 
Leasing Corporation ("KNT") was owned 
by the brothers, with each owning 33'/» 
percent of the stock. On April 1, 1982, 
Savage Western acquired 86.7 percent 
(2,600 shares) of the stock of KNT in ex-
change for its own stock. The remaining 
13.3 percent (400 shares) was retained by 
Neal Savage pending divorce settlements. 
Prior to its acquisition by Savage Western, 
KNT filed separate Utah corporate fran-
chise tax returns. In order to conform its 
tax year to that of Savage Western, KNT 
filed a separate corporate franchise tax 
return for the partial tax year June 1, 1981, 
to March 31, 1982. The return reported a 
current year's loss of $74,641 and reported 
$61,252 of prior years' losses as being 
available for carryover. On November 15, 
1984, the name of KNT was changed to 
Savage Transportation Corporation. On 
January 15, 1985, the remaining 400 shares 
of Savage Transportation were acquired by 
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Savage Industries On March 80, 1987, 
Savage Transportation was merged with 
Savage Industries 
Prior to April 1, 1983, the shares of 
Western Rock Products Corporation 
("Western Rock") were owned by Kenneth 
Savage, T Luke Savage, Charles Black 
burn, and Eldon Reese On April 1, 1983, 
Savage Western acquired the shares of 
Kenneth Savage and T Luke Savage, for a 
total of 81 percent ownership of Western 
Rock During the next two years, the 
shares owned by Blackburn and Reese 
were redeemed, giving Savage Western 100 
percent ownership in Western Rock For 
periods of time prior to the April 1, 1983 
acquisition by Savage Western, Western 
Rock filed separate corporate franchise tax 
returns In order to conform its tax year 
to that of Savage Western, Western Rock 
filed a separate corporate franchise tax 
return for the partial tax year January 1, 
1983, to March 31, 1983 The return re-
ported a current year's loss of $648,291 
Western Rock's separate return loss was 
first carried back to prior Western Rock 
separate returns, where $369,685 (as deter 
mined by Commission adjustment) was ap-
plied to offset income, thus leaving $288, 
606 of the loss available to be carried for 
ward 
Starting with the fiscal year ending 
March 31, 1983, Savage Western, and later 
Savage Industries, joined with its subsidiar 
ies in filing a Utah consolidated corporate 
franchise tax return ' In August of 1987, 
Savage Industries filed amended consol 
idated franchise tax returns for the years 
ended March 31, 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986 
to correct errors made on previously filed 
returns In its amended consolidated re 
turn for the fiscal year ending March 31, 
1983, Savage Western earned over $26,770 
of KNT*8 separate return loss and applied 
it to offset KNT's income on the consolidat 
ed return In its amended consolidated 
return for the fiscal year ending March 31, 
1985, Savage Industries earned over $290, 
I Utah Code Ann § 59-7 124 prescribes the re 
quirements for filing a consolidated corporate 
franchise tax return The ability to file a ton 
solidatcd return is described in the statute as a 
privilege of corporation* with common stock 
332 of Western Rock's separate return logg 
and applied it to offset Western Rock's 
income on the consolidated return KNT'g 
net operating loss was used to offset in 
come generated by KNT Western Rock's 
net operating loss was used to offset in 
come generated by Western Rock Neither 
net operating loss was used to offset the 
income of any other member of Savage 
Industries' consolidated group 
In November of 1987, the auditing divi 
sion began examining these amended re-
turns and, in an audit report dated Febru 
ary 2, 1988, disallowed carryovers of the 
losses on the consolidated returns Savage 
Industries petitioned the auditing division 
for a reconsideration ^| ,iU decision On 
March 21, 1988, the auditing division re 
sponded to Savage Industries' petition and 
reiterated its position 
On April 5, 1988, Savage Industries filed 
a request for hearing before the Co mm is 
sion in order to orally present arguments 
pnor to the Commission's rendenng a final 
decision on its petition for redetermination 
Oral argument was made before the Utah 
State Tax Commission on August 17, 1989 
The Commission found in favor of the au 
diting division and against Savage Indus 
tries 
I STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Our first task in this case is to determine 
the appropriate standard of review of the 
Commission's decision The Commission's 
decision to deny Savage's petition for rede-
termination was based on its interpretation 
of Utah Code Ann § 59-7-108 In its con 
elusions of law, the Commission stated that 
Savage's interpretation of this section was 
incorrect and that the plain language of the 
statute prohibited the deductions sought by 
Savage The Commission's decision was 
therefore based purely on its construction 
and interpretation of the legislative enact 
ment and is purely a question of law 
ownership There is no dispute that Savage 
Industries and its subsidiary corporations qua'1 
fied to file consolidated returns under this s^ 
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In determining the standard of review of viewing it for correctness * Third, in be 
agency decisions, the Utah courts have con tween these two standards, agency deci 
gistently followed three basic standards of sions involving mixed questions of law and 
review, which were set forth in the case of fact or the application of specific factual 
Utah Department of Administrative Ser situations to the legislative enactments un 
vices v Public Service Commission * In der which the agency operates were to be 
that case, Justice Oaks, writing for a unani
 g I v e n deference by the courts and were to 
mouB court, held that review of administra ^
 upheld so long as they fell within the 
tive decisions fell into three distinct catego bounds of reasonableness and rationality 5 
nes which required differing standards of 
judicial deference to be given to the agen Subsequent to Department of Admtnis 
cy's decision First, agency determinations trative Services, a large body of case law 
of basic fact were to be given great weight has evolved appl> ing and refining the scope 
and would only be overturned if they were of the three standards • Review of agency 
not supported by any evidence of substance determinations of fact has remained con 
whatsoever * Second, agency determina sistent, with courts upholding agency find 
tions of general law, including interpreta ings of fact if they were based upon any 
tion of the state and federal constitutions evidence of substance 7 Review of agency 
and of acts of Congress and of the Utah determinations of law, however, has been 
Legislature, were to be reviewed giving no less clear under Department of Admims 
deference to the agency's decision, but re trative SenncesH This is especially so in 
2. 658 P 2d 601 (Utah 1983) 
S Id at 609 
4. id at 608 
S Id at 610 
The degree oi deference extended to [agency 
decisions] on these intermediate types of is 
sues has been given various expressions but 
all are variations of the idea that the (agency) 
decisions must fall within the limits of reason 
ableness or rationality As used in this con 
text, the words 'arbitrary and capricious' 
mean no more than this 
Id 
* See, e.g, Telecommunications v Public Serv 
Comm'n, 747 P 2d 1029, 1030 (Utah 1987), Toy 
lor v Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 743 P 2d 1183, 
1186 (Utah 1987), True-Flo Mechanical Sys v 
Board of Review, 743 P 2d 1161, 1163 (Utah 
1987), Spreader Specialists, Inc v Public Serv 
Comm'n, 738 P2d 1043, 1044 (Utah 1987), 
Smith v Board of Review of Indus Comm'n, 714 
P2d 1154, 1155 (Utah 1986), Big K Corp v 
Public Serv Comm'n. 689 P 2d 1349, 1353 (Utah 
1984), Barney v Department of Employment 
Sec, 681 P2d 1273, 1275 (Utah 1984), Benmon 
v Utah State Bd of Oil, Gas A Mining, 675 P 2d 
1135, 1139 (Utah 1983), Salt Uke City Corp v 
Confer, 674 P 2d 632. 636 (Utah 1983) Young A 
Sons v Public Serv Comm'n, 672 P 2d 728. 729 
(Utah 1983) The court of appeals has also 
decided several cases applying the three stan 
dards of review of agency determinations See, 
*-g. USX Corp v Industrial Comm n 781 P 2d 
883 886 (Utah Ct App 1989) Olympus Oil Inc v 
Harrison, 778 P 2d 1008. 1010 (Utah Ct App 
1989), Capital Gen Corp v Department of Bus 
Regulation, 777 P 2d 494. 496 (Utah Ct App 
1989) cert dented, 781 P 2d 878 (1989) Kline v 
Utah Dept of Health 776 P 2d 57 60 (Utah 
Ct App 1989) Taylor v Utah State Training 
School, 775 P2d 432 433-34 (Utah Ct App 
1989) Boyd v Department of Employment Sec, 
773 P 2d 398 400 (Utah Ct App 1989) Smith A 
tdwards v Industrial Commn 770 P 2d 1016 
1017 (Utah Ct App 1989) Stsco Hilte v Industn 
al Commn, 766 P 2d 1089 1091 (Utah Ct App 
1988) 
7 There has been a trend in recent case law to 
require factual findings of an agency to be 
based on substantial evidence See, e g, Bennett 
v Industrial Commn 726 P 2d 427 429 (Utah 
1986), Big K Corp, 689 P 2d at 1353 This 
standard for icviewing agency findings of fact is 
incorporated into the Utah Administrative Pro 
cedure Act, effective January 1 1988 and found 
at Utah Code Ann § 63-46b-l6(4)(g) 
8. Compare Bennett 726 P 2d at 429 (defining 
"employee under Utah s workers compensation 
statute) with Johnson v Department of Employ 
ment Sec 782 P 2d 965 968 (Utah Ct App 1989) 
(defining just cause under Utah s unemploy 
ment statute) The distinction between these 
two cases can be clarified by looking at the 
organic statutes of the agencies involved The 
statute giving the agency power to determine 
whether an employee has left emplo>ment for 
just cause for purposes of unemployment com 
pensation gives the agency wide discretion 
based on equity and good conscience Utah 
Code Ann § 35-4-5 The statute determining 
the scope of employment for workers compen 
sation benefits does not give the Industrial Com 
mission such agency discretion Utah Code 
Ann § 35-l-43(l)(b) 
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cases distinguishing between agency deci-
sions which were granted deference by the 
courts and those reviewed for correctness. 
Recent decisions of this court have ad-
dressed this distinction and have clarified 
which agency decisions are granted defer-
ential review and which fit within the "gen-
eral law" category, to be reviewed using a 
correction of error standard. 
In Hurley v. Hoard of Review of Indus-
trial Commission,9 this court attempted to 
clarify the distinction between cases requir-
ing deference to agency decisions and cases 
which would be reviewed using a correction 
of error standard. In distinguishing the 
two standards, we noted that agency deci-
sions which are granted a more deferential 
review are often mixed questions of law 
and fact, which require application of spe-
cific technical fact situations to the statutes 
which an agency is empowered to adminis-
ter. These are the types of decisions and 
applications in which the agency's special 
expertise puts it in a better position than 
an appellate court to evaluate the circum-
stances of the case in light of the agency 
mission. In contrast, decisions involving 
statutory interpretation, issues of basic leg-
islative intent, or construction of ordinary 
terms in the organic statute of an agency 
involve areas in which an appellate court is 
as well suited to decide the legal questions 
as is the agency. In cases where the basic 
question is what does the law require? the 
standard is a correction of error standard.1* 
In Chris & Dicks v. Tax Commission," 
we reiterated that correction of error is the 
basic standard of review of agency deci-
sions of law. We stated: 
In the usual case, questions of statutory 
construction are matters of law for the 
courts, and we rely on a "correction of 
9. 767 P.2d 524 (Utah 1988). 
10. See id. at 528. 
11. 791 P.2d 511 (Utah 1990). 
12. Id. at 513-14 (citations omitted). 
13. This standard has evolved through several 
Utah cases, beginning pnoi to Department of 
Administrative Services. See, e.g.. Salt l^tke City 
Corp. v. Department of Employment Sec, 657 
P.2d 1312. 1316 (Utah 1982). Big A Corp., 689 
V 2d at H53 (applying a collection of CIIOI 
error" standard of review, according
 no 
deference to the agency's interpretation 
There are a limited number of circum 
stances where the agency's interpreta-
tion of a statute or rule may be entitled 
to some deference, as where construction 
of the statute should take into account 
the agency's expertise developed from iu 
practical, firsthand experience with the 
subject matter.1* 
Ill This language clarifies that the in-
termediate standard of review is only to be 
applied in areas of agency technical exper-
tise or in areas where the legislature has 
specifically granted the agency discretion 
in its decision-making process. For most 
questions of basic statutory interpretation 
or construction of the law, the court is as 
suited to decide the issues involved as is 
the agency and therefore will review the 
agency decision for correctness.13 
The instant case would clearly fit within 
the correction of error standard under 
Chris & Dicks, Hurley, and their predeces-
sors. The Commission's decision was 
based upon its interpretation of ordinary 
statutory terms. Its interpretation was not 
based upon any technical expertise of the 
Commission nor upon application of a com-
plex, technical fact situation to the statute. 
The Commission's decision was merely its 
interpretation of what the statute prohibits. 
The decision is therefore one which this 
court is as competent as the Commission to 
decide, and a correction of error standard 
would be appropriate under our prior case 
law. 
Because Savage's petition for redetermi-
nation was filed after January 1, 1988, the 
Utah Administrative Procedure Act 
("UAPA")M governs our review of the 
standard "unless the Commission by virtue *>» 
expertise and experience with the regulatory 
scheme is in a superior position to give effect «*> 
the regulatory objectives to be achieved or inc 
terms of the statute make clear that the Com 
mission was intended to have broad discretion 
in construing those terms"), Bennett, 726 P 2d 
at 429. 
14. U tah Code A n n . §& 63 4 6 b - 1 i h i o u g h 2 2 
(1989) . 
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Commission's decision denying that peti-
We therefore must inquire into what 
ffect that act has upon the standard of 
eview of the Commission's interpretation 
f law. I" ifc* 1987 legislative session, the 
Utah Legislature enacted the UAPA for 
the direction, governance, and review of all 
agency action within the state. Specifical-
ly section 63-46b-16(4) governs appellate 
review of agency decisions made after a 
formal adjudicative hearing. Section 63-
46b-l6<4) states. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant re 
lief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seek-
ing judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or 
rule on which the agency action is based, 
is unconstitutional on its face or as ap-
plied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the 
jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of 
the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously inter-
preted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an un-
lawful procedure or decisionmaking pro-
cess, or has failed to follow prescribed 
procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency ac 
tion were illegally constituted as a deci-
sion-making body or were subject to dis-
qualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a 
determination of fact, made or implied by 
the agency, that is not supported by sub 
stanlial evidence when viewed in light of 
the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated 
to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior 
practice, unless the agency justifies 
the inconsistency by giving facts and 
reasons that demonstrate a fair and 
rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
• t-'uiiuncnis ol the Utah Administialive l a w 
Advisory Coiinnillce, Utah A.I' A. at IS (Code 
»M HAJ- 16 
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(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
12) The Commission argues tha^ the 
language of section 63~46b-16(4) requires 
us to give deference to agency decisions. 
This argument is based on the language in 
subsection (4) requiring that "substantial 
prejudice" be shown before a court may 
grant relief from agency action. The Com-
mission's position is that this phrase im-
plies that we should give deference to 
agency decisions and that we should uphold 
those decisions unless they are "substan-
tially" incorrect. 
The phrase "substantial prejudice" with-
in subsection (4) refers to the "person seek 
ing review." It does not modify the actual 
standards of review found within subsec-
tion (4). This means that the person seek 
ing review of an agency action must suffer 
substantial prejudice as a result of that 
action before a court may grant relief from 
the action. This portion of subsection (4) 
relates to the damage or harm suffered by 
the person seeking review and was written 
to ensure that a court will not issue adviso-
ry opinions reviewing agency action when 
no true controversy has resulted from that 
action. The phrase simply does not relate 
to the degree of deference a court must 
give an agency decision. 
In this case, Savage has been substan-
tially prejudiced by the Commission's deci-
sion denying its petition for redetermina-
tion. Savage's subsidiaries have been de-
nied the use of over $300,000 in tax deduc-
tions in the form of loss carryovers. 
Therefore, the substantial prejudice re 
quirement of subsection (4) is clearly met. 
| 3 | Under section 63 46b-16(4)(d), a 
court may grant relief based upon an agen-
cy's erroneous interpretation of law. This 
incorporates the correction of error stan-
dard previously applied by the Utah courts 
in cases involving agency interpretations of 
law. This incorporation of the correction 
of error standard is confirmed by looking 
at the legislative history of the UAPA. 
The Utah Administrative Procedure Act 
was patterned after the Model State Ad 
mimstrative Procedure Act.15 Section 63-
Co l a w Publishes . Apnl 25. 1988). 
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46b-16(4) is in nearly all respects identical 
to the Model Act's section 5-116(c). There-
fore, helpful information about the intend-
ed scope and application of Utah's Act can 
be obtained by resort to the comments and 
cases concerning the Model Act and its 
application in other states. In reviewing 
subsection 6-II6(c)(4) of the Model Act (the 
equivalent of subsection 63-46b-16(4)(d) of 
Utah's Act), the commentators stated: 
Paragraph (c)(4) includes two distinct 
matters—interpretation and application 
of the law. With regard to the agency's 
interpretation to [sic] the law, courts 
generally give little deference to the 
agency, with the result that a court may 
decide that the agency has erroneously 
interpreted the law if the court merely 
disagrees with the agency's interpreta-
tion." 
This comment confirms that under the 
Model Act and therefore under the UAPA, 
an agency's interpretation of the law is to 
be reviewed using a correction of error 
standard. It is clear that the Commission's 
decision in this case is to be reviewed for 
correctness, giving no deference to the 
Commission's interpretation of the law. 
This approach is mandated whether arrived 
at under the terms of the UAPA or under 
the holdings of our prior case law. We will 
therefore review the Commission's decision 
concerning Savage's petition for redetermi-
nation using a correction-of-error standard. 
II. SECTION 59-7-108(14Hf). 
Turning now to the merits of the case, 
the basic issue presented is the correct 
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-7-108(14X0, which prohibits an ac-
quiring corporation from using preacquisi-
tion losses of an acquired corporation. 
Utah Code Ann. $ 59-7-108(14X0 (1987) 
reads: "Corporations acquiring the assets 
14. Model State Admin. Procedure Act § 5-116 
comment, 15 U.L.A. 127-30 (1981). 
17. Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P. 2d 707, 708 
(Utah 1985). 
18. Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 796 
P.2d 1256. 1258 (Utah 1990); Home v. Home, 
737 P.2d 244, 247 (Utah Ct.App.1987). 
or stock of another corporation may jw 
deduct any net loss of the acquired corpo. 
ration incurred prior to the date of acqu^j. 
tion." 
[4,51 The terms of a statute should be 
interpreted in accord with usually accepted 
meanings.17 In construing legislative en-
actments, the reviewer assumes that each 
term in the statute was used advisedly; 
thus the statutory words are read literally, 
unless such a reading is unreasonably con-
fused or inoperable.18 
[€] The plain language of section 59-7-
108(14X0 is specific in its operation and 
intent. The section specifically prohibits 
the deduction of <*rtftin types of net loss 
carryovers, those WfeiJWdf by an acquired 
corporation prior* to Ait Mte of its acquisi-
tion. Section 69-7-i0fli(i4)i(O »» also specif-
ic as to who is prohibited from deducting 
preacquisition loss carryovers. The section 
prohibits all "corporations acquiring the as-
sets or stock of another corporation" from 
taking these deductions. All other corpora-
tions or entities are left outside the prohibi-
tions of the statute. Therefore, by the 
plain terms of the statute, the acquired 
corporation is not prohibited from deduct-
ing its preacquisition losses merely because 
its stock has been purchased by another 
entity.1* The acquired corporation does not 
fit within the statute's specific prohibitions 
and should be free to deduct the preacquisi-
tion losses from its own income. 
17) The Commission argues that the fil-
ing of consolidated returns by petitioner 
somehow transforms the deductions by the 
acquired corporations into those of Savage 
Industries, the acquiring corporation. 
While the filing of a consolidated return 
does create a single taxing unit which in-
cludes both the acquiring and the acquired 
19. This situation differs from instances where 
the acquired corporation is merged into the 
acquiring corporation. There, the surviving 
corporation is the "acquiring" corporation, and 
it appears that the deduction would be prohibit 
ed. See generally Golf Digest/Tennis Inc. * 
Dubno, 203 Conn. 455. 525 A.2d 106, 110-H 
(1987); Beldcrest Milb, Inc. v. Coble, 290 N.C 
586, 227 S.E.2d 562, 574 (1976). 
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-nrporation, the form of the consolidated 
return does not change the deduction from 
one of the acquired corporation. The con-
solidated return is not merely the return of 
the acquiring or parent corporation. All 
deductions taken on the return should not 
therefore be considered to be the deduc-
tions of the parent corporation. The Com-
mission's own regulations regarding prepa-
ration and filing of a consolidated return 
make it clear that the corporations filing 
such returns maintain their separate identi-
ties although a single tax is calculated for 
the group. Tax Commission regulation 
R865-6-4F(G) states that the parent corpo-
ration acts as the agent for the consolidat-
ed group. This provision does not state 
that the return is considered that of the 
parent; indeed, it mandates that the group 
must notify the Commission of its new 
agent if the parent is contemplating disso-
lution and is not qualified to file as part of 
the consolidated return. Regulation R865-
6-4F(H) allows the Commission to pursue 
individually the subsidiaries that make up 
the group if the tax is filed improperly as 
separate returns. Therefore, it is clear 
that the return is filed for each member of 
the affiliated group and is not just that of 
the parent corporation. 
The form of the return itself also makes 
distinctions between the parent corporation 
and its individual subsidiaries. Under 
R865~6-4F(JX3), separate schedules for 
«ach corporate entity listing income and 
deductions must be filed with the consol-
idated return. It is on these separate 
schedule*, that the deductions at issue were 
taken by the acquired corporations. The 
deductions were only taken in years when 
**• The prior net losses of Western Rock were 
not deducted until 1985. although they were 
incurred in 1983. This was because Western 
Rock itself did not generate sufficient income to 
offset these net losses until 1985. During the 
intervening years, however, Savage Industries 
had net income sufficient to offset these losses. 
The fact that Savage Industries did not seek to 
use these losses illustrates the proper applica-
tion of this statute to the acquiring corporation. 
*I. See Milieu v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P 2d 934, 
936 (Utah 1980); Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake 
v. STATE TAX COM'N Utah 671 
664 (Utah 1991) 
the specific acquired corporations had suf-
ficient income to offset the previous loss-
es.20 The deductions taken by KNT and 
Savage Western were the separate deduc-
tions of these acquired corporations. The 
fact that they were taken in years when 
the acquired corporations filed consolidated 
returns does not make them the deductions 
of Savage Industries, the acquiring corpo-
ration, and does not make the deductions 
violations of section 59-7-108. 
(8-10] The Commission argues that the 
allowance of deductions for preacquisition 
losses by an acquired corporation will vio-
late the legislative intent of section 59-7-
108. This court's primary responsibility in 
construing legislative enactments is to give 
effect to the legislature's underlying in-
tent.21 "In determining the legislative in-
tent of a statute, 'the statute should be 
considered in the light of the purpose it 
was designed to serve and so applied as to 
carry out that purpose if it can be done 
consistent with its language.'"22 The 
Commission cites no legislative record or 
other history to ascertain the intent of the 
legislature in drafting section 59-7-108. 
Therefore, in attempting to determine leg-
islative intent, we should look first to the 
plain meaning of the language at issue in 
the statute." The words of the statute 
indicate an intent to prevent buying of loss 
corporations by high profit corporations 
solely for the use of the loss corporation's 
previous loss carryover deductions. A fur-
ther intent may be to limit the use of loss 
carryover deductions to those corporations 
which have previously suffered the losses 
and therefore are entitled to average their 
low income years with their high income 
County, 568 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1977); Utah 
Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Utah Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 
564 P.2d 751, 754 (Utah 1977). 
22. Utah Power A Light v. Municipal Power Sys., 
784 P.2d 137, 141 (Utah 1989) (quoting Johnson 
v. State Tax Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 337, 411 P.2d 
831, 832 (1966)) 
23. Chris <£ Dick's iMtnber v. Tax Comm'n, 791 
P.2d 511, 514 (Utah 1990), Alltsen v. American 
Ugton Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 
1988). 
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years.14 
Evaluation of the current case shows 
that the allowance of preacquisition losses 
by the acquired corporation does not vio-
late this intent. Allowance of the deduc-
tion does not encourage high profit corpo-
rations to buy loss companies merely for 
the purpose of deducting loss carryovers, 
as the high profit company is required to 
turn around the loss corporation until it 
generates profit before any carryover* 
may be deducted. This type of turnaround 
of loss corporations is not the type of loss 
"manipulation" the legislature intended t» 
prohibit by the statute. The secondary inr 
tent of the statute is also furthered by 
allowing acquired corporations to deduct 
loss carryovers. The subsidiary or entity 
which incurred the loss is the one that later 
is able to benefit from the carryover in 
averaging its income between high and low 
income years. No deduction may be taken 
by the acquired corporation or any affil-
iated group of which it is a member until 
that acquired corporation generates 
enough income to offset the loss carryover. 
[11] The Commission also urges that 
the deduction sought by Savage Industries 
should not be allowed because it will en-
courage corporations to manipulate assets 
between parent and subsidiaries to wrong-
fully take advantage of the net loss carry-
overs by the transfer of profitable opera-
tions to the companies with prior net loss-
es. The simple response to this argument 
is that the statute must be enforced as it is 
written, and as written, it does not prevent 
that type of manipulation. Further, there 
is no evidence of misuse of assets or of the 
feared manipulation in this case. Savage 
Industries was formed to consolidate and 
manage existing corporations owned by the 
Savage brothers. The organization and 
corporate ownership of these corporations 
remained the same both before and after 
the formation of Savage Industries and the 
stock purchases by which KNT and Savage 
Western became Savage Industries subsidi-
aries. The entire thrust of these transac-
24. Set FuUcrtsl, 227 S H 2d at 5*5 (discusuon 
of the purpott btftUod allowani* of low carry 
tions appears to have been for organization 
and management purposes and not for tax 
manipulation. 
Even the Commission's interpretation of 
the statute would not prevent manipulation 
of corporate assets for the purpose of ac-
cruing tax deductions based on preacquisi-
tion losses. A mere reversal of parent and 
subsidiary positions by corporations would 
allow the "parent" loss corporation to take 
advantage of its losses incurred prior to 
the purchase of the profitable "subsidiary." 
This type of manipulation, as well as that 
feared by the Commission under our inter-
pretation of the statute, is not addressed in 
section 59-7-lQg atyd is kptter dealt with 
through other m a j ^ s ^ h j a j careful Com-
mission a u d i ^ l J ^ p M t ^ n p ^ B y trans-
fers. The i n ^ g S m ^ ^ statute to 
ajjpw acquire^ J'jfJtffPrM^j^ deduct the 
prior net losses <tys* ^ p ^ y e n t alternate 
means for discoyeruur improper manipu-
lation of assets. 
We therefore hold that the statute as 
written doe* not prohibit an acq Hired corpo-
ration from taking advantage of its loss 
carryovers incurred prior to the date of 
acquisition in order to offset its pwn as 
opposed to the acquiring corporation's in-
come. The deduction may be taken by the 
acquired corporation, whether filing sepa-
rately or filing a consolidated return as 
part of an affiliated group. The decision of 
the Commission denying Savage's petition 
is reversed, and the case is hereby remand-
ed to the Commission for proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion. 
HOWE, Associate CJ., and STEWART, 
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., 
concur. 
f0 iMyNVMMRmilM> 
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overs as deductions from corporate franchise 
tax) 
OLYMPIC S.S. CO. v. 
CiteMti l T2d 
OLYMPIC STEAMSHIP COMPANY, 
INC., Petitioner, 
v. 
CENTENNIAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
and Atlantic Mutual Insurance 
Company, Respondents, 
and 
New York Marine and General Insur-
ance Company and Marsh and 
McLennan, Inc., Defendants. 
No. 57167-8. 
Supreme Court of Washington, 
En Banc. 
May 23, 1991. 
As Changed May 29, 1991. 
After insured warehouseman paid 
claims of salmon packers for cost of in-
specting cans of salmon which they re-
called after it was determined that some 
had been damaged by the warehouseman, 
it sought reimbursement from its general 
comprehensive liability insurer. The Supe-
rior Court, King County, John M Darrah, 
J., granted relief and insurer appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, 57 Wash.App. 517, 
789 P.2d 309, reversed. The Supreme 
Court, Dore, C.J., held that: (1) Bistership 
clause does not apply when product is with-
drawn by third party; (2) cans of salmon 
were not the insured's product for pur-
poses of the sistership clause; and (3) in-
sured was entitled to recover attorney fees. 
Affirmed. 
1. Judgntent 4=181(2, 3) 
Summary judgment motion can be 
granted only when there is no genuine is-
Bue of material fact and the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
I. Insurance <t=M3S.24(2), 513 
Exclusion from comprehensive general 
liability policy for damages claimed for the 
withdrawal, inspection, or loss of use of the 
named insured's products form if they are 
withdrawn from the market or from use 
because of any known or suspected defect 
CENTENNIAL INS. CO. Wash. 673 
ATJ (Wash. 1991) 
or deficiency therein is a "sistership 
clause." 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Insurance «=513* 
Intent of sistership exclusion from lia-
bility policy is to exclude the cost of pre-
venting defects of failures in the insurance 
goods or property. 
4. Insurance «=»513 
Under sistership clause, general liabili-
ty insurer is not liable for costs of preven-
tative or curative action taken by its in-
sured. 
5. Insurance *=>435.24(2) 
Sistership clause in comprehensive 
general liability policy issued to warehouse-
man did not exclude coverage for ware-
houseman's liability following salmon pack-
ers' withdrawal from the market of cans of 
salmon because it was determined that ma-
chinery used by the warehousemen U> place 
label on the cans had caused damage to a 
small percentage of then), as it was not the 
insured warehouseman which withdrew the 
product from the market. 
6. Insurance <*=>435.24(2) 
For purposes of sistership exclusion 
from general liability policy, the term "in-
sured's product" refers to goods or prod-
ucts in which the insured trades or deals, 
including goods created or manufactured 
by the insured. 
7. Insurance «=435.24(2) 
Cans of salmon which packers sent to 
insured warehouseman for labeling, casing, 
and shipping, were not the "insured's prod-
uct" for purposes of sistership exclusion, 
so that insured was entitled to coverage for 
its liability to the packers after they with-
drew the cans of salmon from the market 
because some had been damaged during 
labeling. 
8. Insurance e»435.24(2) 
Term "handle" as used in sistership 
exclusion from general comprehensive lia-
bility policy means to buy, sell, distribute, 
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the district court first granted partial sum-
mary judgment in favor of the Bank on the 
claim for punitive damages. The district 
court later dismissed the plaintiffs petition 
for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted, basing its decision 
on K.S.A.1987 Supp. 60-218(a), the compul-
sory counterclaim statute, and the doc-
trines of res judicata and collateral estop-
pel. Everett Loving timely appeals. 
[1] The first issue is whether the dis-
trict court erred in relying upon K.S.A.1987 
Supp. 60-218(a) in dismissing the tort 
claims. The statute reads: 
"(a) Compulsory counterclaims. A 
pleading shall state as a counterclaim 
any claim which at the time of serving 
the pleading the pleader has against any 
opposing party, if it arises out of the 
transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject matter of the opposing party's 
claim and does not require for its adjudi-
cation the presence of third parties of 
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdic-
tion " (Emphasis added.) 
While the statute itself does not explicitly 
provide that failure to plead a compulsory 
counterclaim precludes the pleader from 
asserting it in a subsequent action, this 
court has consistently applied the statute in 
that fashion. See Mohr v. State Bank of 
Stanley, 241 Kan. 42, 51, 734 P.2d 1071 
(1987); Haysville State Bank v. Hauser-
man, 226 Kan. 671, 673, 694 P.2d 172 
(1979); Stock v. Nordhus, 216 Kan. 779, 
781, 533 P.2d 1324 (1975) (citing 6 Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Civil} 1417 [1971]). K.S.A.1987 Supp. 60-
213(a) is virtually identical to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 13(a). The Advisory 
Committee's Note to Rule 13 explicitly 
states: 
"If the action proceeds to judgment with-
out the interposition of a counterclaim as 
required by subdivision (a) of this rule, 
the counterclaim is barred." 
6 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Civil § 1417, p. 95 n. 32. 
Judge Gard explains the Kansas rule as 
follows: 
"By the new rule, which is now the 
same as in the federal courts, the asser-
tion of counterclaims and setoffs by way 
of answer, if they arise out of the trans-
action or occurrence that is the subject of 
the plaintiffs claim, is mandatory. Fail-
ure to assert results in an estoppel or 
bar. 
". . . The test, so far as the mandatory 
requirement is concerned, depends on 
whether the counterclaim or setoff arises 
out of the same transaction." 1 Card's 
Kansas C.Civ.Proc. ft 60-218(a), pp. 77-
78 (1979). 
[2] It is well established in Kansas that 
the failure to assert a compulsory counter-
claim prevents a party from bringing a 
later independent action on that claim. It 
is clear that the claims asserted in the 
present action should have been asserted in 
the earlier foreclosure action. In that ac-
tion Everett E. Loving testified at length 
as to his negotiations with Regalado and 
the Bank. In fact, in his testimony he 
raised the issue of the $20,000 and asserted 
they were entitled to a credit or setoff of 
that amount in the foreclosure action. 
That contention was determined adversely 
to the Lovings by the court. The same 
$20,000 was also the subject matter of the 
federal court action. The issue of the right 
to the $20,000 paid by Regalado to the 
F LB. has been litigated on at least two 
prior occasions. 
[3] Appellant makes several arguments 
in support of his position that his claims in 
this action are different from those in the 
foreclosure action and are not compulsory 
counterclaims under K.S.A.1987 Supp. 60-
213(a). However, his principal argument 
seems to be that because the mortgage 
foreclosure action was an equitable action, 
the present claims, which sound in tort, 
could not be the subject of a compulsory 
counterclaim. The argument has no merit 
Numerous foreclosure actions have implic-
itly recognized that legal counterclaims 
sounding in tort may be asserted by a 
defendant in an equitable action to fore-
close a mortgage. E.g., Bank of Whitewa-
ter v. Decker Investments, Inc., 238 Kan. 
308, 314, 710 P.2d 1258 (1985), and cases 
cited therein. 
[4] As stated by Gard, the essential test 
of a mandatory counterclaim depends upon 
TAYLOR v. PERDITION 
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whether the counterclaim or setoff arises 
out of the same transaction. The mort-
gage foreclosure action arose from the loan 
transaction between the Lovings and the 
F.L.B., and the subsequent default on the 
payments due on the loan. In fact, the 
$20,000 asserted in the appellant's conver-
sion claim is the identical $20,000 which 
was a part of the litigation between these 
same parties in the earlier foreclosure ac-
tion. It is difficult to imagine a claim that 
could more clearly or directly arise out of 
the same transaction than a dispute in an 
action on a note over the proper crediting 
of alleged payments on the note. 
Although appellant asserts other argu-
ments in support of his contention that 
K.S.A.1987 Supp. 60-213(a) does not apply, 
we find them to be equally without merit. 
We hold that the claims attempted to be 
asserted herein were compulsory counter-
claims which should have been asserted in 
the earlier foreclosure action and are now 
barred by K.S.A.1987 Supp. 60-213(a). In 
view of the decision reached on the first 
issue, it is not necessary to address other 
issues raised on appeal. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
MINERALS GROUP, LTD. Kan. 805 
•09 (Kan. I9S8) 
rectors, among others, to rescind purchase 
and recover purchase price based upon vio-
lations of registration and misrepresenta-
tions under Kansas Securities Act The 
Sedgwick District Court, Nicholas W. 
Klein, J., entered summary judgment in 
favor of directors, and buyers appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Six, J., held that strict 
liability would be imposed on directors, re-
gardless of whether they materially aided 
in sale, unless they proved that they could 
not reasonably have had knowledge of 
facts by reason of which liability was al-
leged to exist 
Reversed and remanded. 
244 Kan. 126 
W.W. TAYLOR, Mrs. W.W. Taylor or A. 
Genevieve Taylor, Michael C. Taylor, 
John S. Taylor, David J. Taylor, and 
Mark B. Taylor, A Partnership known 
as Taylor Family Real Estate Trust, 
Appellants, 
v. 
PERDITION MINERALS GROUP, LTD., 
Henry N. Mulvihlll, Marvin Echols, 
Jack Griggs, Charles Harris, Leo Meek-
er, and Robert E. Fondren, Appellees. 
No. 61573. 
Supreme Court of Kansas. 
Dec. 14, 1988. 
Buyers of corporation's securities 
brought action against corporation's di-
1. Securities Regulation *»256 
Pursuant to Kansas Securities Act 
strict liability is imposed on partners, offi-
cers, and directors to buyers of unregis-
tered securities sold in violation of statute, 
regardless of whether partner, officer, or 
director materially aided in sale, unless he 
or she proves that he or she could not 
reasonably have had knowledge of facta by 
reason of which liability is alleged to exist 
K.S.A. 17-1268(b). 
2. Securities Regulation *=»246 
"Blue Sky" provisions are to be liberal-
ly interpreted in favor of buyers of securi-
ties to prevent fraud. 
Syllabus by the Court 
1. K.S.A.1987 Supp. 17-1268(b) is 
substantially similar to § 410(b) of the Uni-
form Securities Act, 7B U.L.A. 648 (1958). 
Strict liability is imposed on partners, offi-
cers, and directors to purchasers of unreg-
istered securities sold in violation of the 
statute regardless of whether the partner, 
officer, or director materially aided in the 
sale unless he or she proves that he or she 
could not reasonably have had knowledge 
of the facts by reason of which liability is 
alleged to exist 
2. The changes in punctuation and 
phrasing effected by the legislature in 
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transforming $ 410(b) of the Uniform Secu-
rities Act, 7B U.L.A. 648 (1968), into K.S.A. 
1987 Supp. 17-1268(b) do not insulate di-
rectors from strict liability when unregis-
tered securities are sold unless the director 
proves the statutory defense. 
8. K.S.A.1987 Supp. 17-1268(b) does 
not require that a director materially aid in 
the illegal sale of securities in order to be 
held jointly and severally liable for the sale. 
4. The K.S.A.1987 Supp. 17-1268(b) 
critical phrase, "of such a seller who mate-
rially aids in the sale," which follows the 
word "employee," was intended to modify 
only "employee" and was not intended to 
reach back further into the language of the 
statute and also modify "every partner, 
officer, or director." 
Donald W. Bostwick, of Adams, Jones, 
Robinson & Malone, Chartered, Wichita, 
argued the cause, and Cynthia S. Dunne, ot 
the same firm, was with him on the brief 
for appellants. 
H.E. Jones, of Hershberger, Patterson, 
Jones & Roth, Wichita, argued the cause, 
and Kelly J. Rundell, of the same firm, was 
on the brief for appellee Harris. 
Tom R. Smith, of Smith & Miles, Char-
tered, Liberal, argued the cause and was 
on the brief for appellees Meeker and 
Echols. 
SIX, Justice: 
This first impression statutory construc-
tion case involves the interpretation of K.S. 
A. 1987 Supp. 17-1268(b) of the Kansas Se-
curities Act. Must a director have materi-
ally aided in the sale of unregistered secu-
rities to be liable for their illegal sale? 
The plaintiffs, W.W. Taylor, Mrs. W.W. 
Taylor or A. Genevieve Taylor, Michael C. 
Taylor, John S. Taylor, David J. Taylor, and 
Mark B. Taylor, a partnership known as 
Taylor Family Real Estate Trust, (Taylors) 
appeal from a summary judgment in favor 
of the director defendants Charles Harris, 
Leo L. Meeker, Marvin Echols, and Jack 
Griggs. 
The trial court round that, under K 8 A 
1907 Supp n-ll6«b>. a director oi a cor-
poration is not liable for the illegal sale of 
the corporation's securities unless the 
plaintiff can show that the director materi-
ally aided in the sale. The trial court ruled 
that the four director defendants did not 
materially aid in the securities sale to the 
Taylors. 
We disagree with the trial court's analy-
sis. 
The parties by agreement have charac-
terized Harris as a representative director 
defendant Rulings as to Harris apply 
equally to the other director defendants, 
Meeker, Echols, and Griggs. 
The questions to be decided are: 
(1) Does K.S.A.1987 ^ ^ 7 - 1 2 6 8 0 ) ) re-
quire that directors must Materially aid in 
the sale of a corporation's securities to be 
held liable for the sale? 
(2) Did the director defendants material-
ly aid in the securities sale to the plain-
tiffs? 
(8) Did the director defendants show that 
they did not know, and in the exercise of 
reasonable care could not have known, ot 
the existence of the facts by reason of 
which the liability is alleged to exist? 
We hold that K.S.A.1987 Supp. 17-
1268(b) is substantially similar to § 410(b) 
of the Uniform Securities Act, 7B U.L.A. 
643 (1968). Strict liability is imposed on 
partners, officers, and directors to purchas-
ers of unregistered securities sold in viola-
tion of the statute regardless of whether 
the partner, officer, or director materially 
aided in the sale unless he or she proves 
that he or she could not reasonably have 
had knowledge of the facts by reason of 
which liability is alleged to exist. 
1. The Facts of the Investment 
In early November of 1981, W.W. Taylor 
discussed an oil and gas exploration invest-
ment, Perdition Minerals Group, Ltd., (Per-
dition) with his neighbor, Donald Schrag. 
Taylor became interested and the two men 
placed a call to Bob Fondren, a securities 
broker, who had previously supplied 
Schrag with information on the corpora 
tfcm. Taylor spoke with Fondren who told 
TAYLOR v. PERDITION MINERALS GROUP, LTD. 
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him: (1) The stock was worth $1.84 a share 
and would be worth more soon; (2) the 
company had a lot of oil and gas in Mon-
tana; (8) the company was going to do an 
audit, and (4) the company was preparing 
to go public. Schrag indicated to Taylor 
that he was going to buy $200,000 worth of 
stock at $.50 a share. 
Soon after Taylor's discussions with 
Schrag and Fondren, Schrag arranged a 
meeting between Taylor and Henry Mulvi-
hill, who was Perdition's chief executive 
officer. Taylor was supplied with a finan-
cial statement and Mulvihill's personal re-
sume. Mulvihill also described the produc-
tion and value of the acreage held by Perdi-
tion in Montana. Taylor did not ask to see 
any drilling reports or geographical infor-
mation. Mulvihill told Taylor that several 
hundred thousand dollars was needed to 
meet current drilling and lease expenses. 
Mulvihill gave Taylor a list of references, 
several of whom Taylor knew, including 
defendant Charles Harris. Taylor did not 
contact any of the references. Taylor told 
Mulvihill that he would purchase 400,000 
shares of Perdition for $200,000; $100,000 
on behalf of himself and his wife, and 
$100,000 on behalf of his children. 
Taylor attended a Perdition shareholders' 
meeting on November 20, 1981. He met 
privately with Mulvihill prior to the meet-
ing. At this private meeting, Mulvihill re-
assured Taylor that the stock was worth 
more than $1.84 a share and that he was 
going to do an audit There is no evidence 
in the record indicating that any directors 
or shareholders of Perdition, other than 
Mulvihill, Schrag, and Fondren, made any 
representations to Taylor or were in any 
way involved with the sale of stock to him. 
At the November 20, 1981, shareholders' 
meeting, Mulvihill introduced Taylor as a 
potential Perdition investor. No one in-
quired as to the circumstances surrounding 
the issuance of the stock. Defendant Har-
ris was present at the meeting and moved 
to hire Elmer Fox to audit the company. 
Harris said that he made the motion based 
on a recommendation by Mulvihill. Taylor 
testified at his deposition that prior to the 
shareholders' meeting, Mulvihill had never 
given any indication that Harris was Perdi-
tion's attorney. 
Mulvihill, for tax purposes, had incorpo-
rated Perdition in Nevada. Mulvihill and 
Harris were close friends. In November of 
1981, Harris agreed to purchase 2,500 
shares of Perdition. Harris is a Wichita 
attorney. He testified at his deposition 
that the only legal work he had done on 
behalf of Perdition was to draw up an 
employment agreement between Perdition 
and Milan Ayers. Ayers managed the 
Montana properties. Mulvihill retained a 
Denver law firm which specializes in secu-
rities and oil and gas law to handle the 
corporation's other legal matters. 
At the time Harris bought his shares, 
Mulvihill was the sole director and the par-
ent of Perdition. In January 1981, a share-
holders' meeting was held at which defend-
ants Marvin Echols, Jack Griggs, Charles 
Harris, Leo Meeker, and Henry Mulvihill 
were elected directors. With the exception 
of Jack Griggs, all the director defendants 
invested money in Perdition and lost their 
investment when Perdition became insol-
vent. The shareholders voted to increase 
the authorized common stock from 500,000 
shares to 4,000,000 shares and to split the 
outstanding 500,000 shares four for one, 
into 2,000,000 shares. 
Early in 1982, when no audit was forth-
coming, Taylor became concerned about his 
investment. Mulvihill assured Taylor that 
the audit was being done. Taylor then 
spoke to a friend who did business with the 
Elmer Fox accounting firm and asked him 
to check into Perdition. His friend told 
him: (1) Fox had no business relationship 
with Perdition, (2) the SEC had been inves-
tigating the Montana properties, and (3) 
Perdition's current financial statements did 
not reflect Taylor's $200,000 investment. 
The 400,000 shares of stock of Perdition 
purchased by the Taylors were never reg-
istered in accordance with K.S.A. 17-1256, 
-1257, or -1258. The sale of these 400,000 
shares of stock of Perdition was not the 
sale of an exempt security under K.S.A. 
1987 Supp. 17-1261, nor was it an exempt 
transaction under K.S.A.1987 Supp. 17-
1262. 
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The Taylors filed the instant lawsuit 
against Perdition, Mulvihill, Fondren, and 
the director defendant* to rescind the pur-
chase and recover the purchase price based 
upon violations of registration and misrep-
resentations under the Kansas Securities 
Act The petition alleged that the Perdi-
tion stock was not registered pursuant to 
Kansas law and that Mulvihill and Fondren 
made misleading and false statements upon 
which Taylor relied in purchasing the 
stock. 
The trial court entered summary judg-
ment in favor of the director defendants 
Harris, Echols, Meeker, and Griggs, find-
ing that, under K.S.A.1987 Supp. 17-
1268(b), an innocent director must be 
shown to have materially aided in the sale 
of securities to be liable. The trial court 
further found that the facts of the case did 
not establish that the four directors materi-
ally aided in the sale to Taylor. 
2. The Statute, K.S.A.1987 
Supp. 17-1968 
K.S.A.1987 Supp. 17-1268(a) establishes 
the liability of any person who sells a se-
curity which is required to be registered 
under K.S.A. 17-1265 but is not registered, 
or any person who sells a security by 
means of untrue statements of material 
facts. Such a person may be liable to the 
person buying the security for the consid-
eration paid for the security plus interest, 
costs, and attorney fees. 
The alleged liability of the director de-
fendants is based on K.S.A.1987 Supp. 17-
1268(b), which provides: 
"Every person who directly or indirectly 
controls a seller liable under subsection 
(a), every partner, officer, or director 
(or person occupying a similar status 
or performing similar functions) or 
employee of such a seller who material-
ly aids in the sale, and every broker-
dealer or agent who materially aids in 
the sale is also liable jointly and severally 
with and to the same extent as the seller, 
unless the nonseller who is BO liable sus-
tains the burden of proof that such non-
seller did not know, and in the exercise 
of reasonable care could not have known, 
of the existence of the facts by reason of 
which the liability is alleged to exist 
There is contribution as in cases of con-
tract among the several persons so lia-
ble." (Emphasis added.) 
The Taylors contend that the Kansas 
statute is a "substantially verbatim" enact-
ment of $ 410(b) of the 1956 Uniform Secu-
rities Act as amended in 1958. A compari-
son of the two reveals minor differences in 
punctuation and phrasing. These differ-
ences, the director defendants assert, give 
the statute a different meaning from the 
corresponding section of the Uniform Secu-
rities Act Section 410(b) of the Uniform 
Act provides: 
"Every person who directly or indirectly 
controls a seller liable under subsection 
(a), every partner, officer, or director of 
such a seller, every person occupying a 
similar status or performing similar 
functions, every employee of such a 
seller who materially aids in the sale, 
and every broker-dealer or agent who 
materially aids in the sale are also liable 
jointly and severally with and to the 
same extent as the seller, unless the non-
seller who is so liable sustains the bur-
den of proof that he did not know, and in 
exercise of reasonable care could not 
have known, of the existence of the facts 
by reason of which the liability is alleged 
to exist There is contribution as in 
cases of contract among the several per-
sons so liable." (Emphasis added.) 
K.S.A.1987 Supp. 77-201 establishes 
rules for statutory construction and re-
quires that words and phrases be construed 
according to the context and approved us-
age of the language. 
The director defendants, in comparing 
K.S.A.1987 Supp. 17-1268(b) and ft 410(b) 
of the Uniform Act, reason as follows: The 
legislature by (1) removing the modifying 
phrase "of such a seller" after the word 
director; (2) placing the phrase "or person 
occupying a similar status or performing 
similar functions" in parenthesis, (3) and 
adding an "or" before the word employee 
intended the phrase "of such a seller who 
materially aids in the sale" to modify the 
entire clause "every partner, officer, or 
TAYLOR v. PERDITION 
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director (or person occupying a similar sta-
tus or performing similar functions) or em-
ployee." We do not agree. 
The National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State LAWS approved the 
Uniform Securities Act in 1956. In 1957, 
Kansas, using the Uniform Act as a model, 
enacted the Kansas Securities Act Lov-
itch, Securities Registration Under the 
Kansas Securities Act, 22 Kan.L.Rev. 565, 
666 (1974). 
The changes in punctuation and phrasing 
effected by the legislature in transforming 
I 410(b) of the Uniform Act into K.S.A. 
1987 Supp. 17-1268(b) do not insulate di-
rectors from strict liability when unregis-
tered securities are sold. 
The states that have passed $ 410(b) of 
the Uniform Securities Act have consistent 
ly interpreted the statute to impose strict 
liability on partners, officers, and directors 
unless the statutory defense of lack of 
knowledge is proven. See, e.g., Moerman 
v. Zipco, Inc., 302 F.Supp. 439, 450 (E.D.N. 
Y.1969), affd 422 F.2d 871 (2d Cir.1969); 
Mitchell v. Beard, 256 Ark. 926, 928, 513 
S.W.2d 905 (1974); Arnold v. Dirrim, 898 
N.E.2d 426, 433-34 (lnd.App.1979); Rzepka 
v. Farm Estates Inc., 83 Mich.App. 702, 
709, 269 N.W.2d 270 (1978). 
We question the trial court's reliance on 
Lanza v. Drexel A Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d 
Cir.1973). Lanza arose under federal, not 
state, securities laws. The plaintiffs in 
Lanza sought compensatory and punitive 
damages against former officers and di-
rectors of a corporation based on violations 
of federal securities acts and common-law 
fraud. The Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals was construing Rule 10b-5 of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 
C.F.R. $ 240.10b-6 (1988); and $ 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. $ 78Kb) (1982). The court in Lanza 
discussed state "blue sky laws" in a foot-
note. 
"State blue sky laws universally exempt 
directors from liability for fraud perpe-
trated by corporate officers unless the 
directors are in some meaningful sense 
culpable participants in the fraud." 479 
F.2d at 1308 n. 105. 
MINERALS GROUP, LTD. Kan. 809 
•09 (Kan. IMS) 
The Lanza court identified two types of 
state laws. The first are those modeled 
after $ 410(b) of the Uniform Act and the 
second are those in which a director is 
exempt from liability unless he or she par-
ticipates in the sale. The Lanza court in 
footnote 105 refers to fraud; nevertheless, 
the court correctly characterized the Kan-
sas statute as belonging to the first catego-
ry. 
[1,2] K.S.A.1987 Supp. 17-1268(b) does 
not require that a director materially aid in 
the illegal sale of securities in order to be 
held jointly and severally liable for the sale. 
Our analysis of legislative intent com-
mences with the observation that "Blue 
Sky" provisions are to be liberally inter-
preted in favor of purchasers to prevent 
fraud. Daniels v. Craiglow, 131 Kan. 500, 
292 Pac. 771 (1930). 
Kansas has required registration of secu-
rities since 1911. L.1911, ch. 133. 
The first securities statute with teeth 
was passed in Kansas. Loss, Fundamen-
tals of Securities Regulation 8 (2d ed. 
1988). According to Professor Ix>uis Loss, 
Kansas had been a "stronghold" of popu-
list philosophy. The resulting carryover 
today is to be found in the relative strict-
ness of Midwestern securities statutes. 
"Indeed, it was in Kansas, apparently, that 
the term 'blue sky law' first came into 
general use to describe legislation aimed at 
promoters who 'would sell building lots in 
the blue sky in fee simple.' " I/>BS, Funda-
mentals of Securities Regulation 8. 
The drafters comment to $ 410(b) of the 
Uniform Securities Act observes, "This sec-
tion is now in the Kansas act substantially 
verbatim, and Virginia has adopted it with 
modifications." Loss and Cowett, Blue 
Sky Law 393 (1958). 
We have in past cases identified rules to 
assist in statutory construction: 
(1) "The fundamental rule of statutory 
construction is that the purpose and intent 
of the legislature governs when the intent 
can be ascertained from the statute. In 
construing statutes, the legislative inten-
tion is to be determined from a general 
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consideration of the entire act. Effect 
must be given, if possible, to the entire act 
and every part thereof. To this end, it is 
the duty of the court, as far as practicable, 
to reconcile the different provisions so as 
to make them consistent, harmonious, and 
sensible." State v. Adee, 241 Kan. 825, 
829, 740 P.2d 611 (1987). 
(2) "Interpretation of a statute is a ques-
tion of law, and it is the function of the 
court to interpret a statute to give it the 
effect intended by the legislature. State, 
ex rei, v. Unified School District, 218 
Kan. 47, 49, 542 P.2d 664 (1975). It is a 
fundamental rule of statutory construction 
to which all other rules are subordinate 
that the intent of the legislature governs 
when that intent can be ascertained. State 
v. Sexton, 282 Kan. 589, 657 P.2d 48 
(1988)." Director of Taxation v. Kansas 
Krude Oil Reclaiming Co., 286 Kan. 450, 
455, 691 P.2d 1808 (1984). 
What did the legislature intend the 
phrase, "of such a seller who materially 
aids in the sale" following the word "em-
ployee" to modify? Was the phrase intend-
ed to modify only an "employee" of such 
seller, or was it intended to reach back 
further into the language of the statute 
and also modify "every partner, officer, or 
director"? We are persuaded the critical 
phrase modifies only "employee" of such 
seller. 
If the legislature had intended to make 
directors liable only in the event they had 
materially aided in the sale, the Kansas 
language could easily have read, "every 
partner, officer, or director of such a seller 
who materially aids in the sale.'* (Em-
phasis added.) 
In our K.S.A.1987 Supp. 17-1268(b) 
search for legislative intent we note 2A 
Sutherland Statutory Construction ft 47.38 
(4th ed. rev. 1984): 
"Referential and qualifying words and 
phrases, where no contrary intention ap-
pears, refer solely to the last antecedent 
The last antecedent is 'the last word, 
phrase, or clause that can be made an 
antecedent without impairing the mean-
ing of the sentence.' Thus a proviso 
usually is construed to apply to the provi-
sion of clause immediately preceding it. 
The rule is another aid to discovery of 
intent or meaning and is not inflexible 
and uniformly binding. Where the sense 
of the entire act requires that a qualify-
ing word or phrase apply to several pre-
ceding or even succeeding sections, the 
word or phrase will not be restricted to 
its immediate antecedent 
"Evidence that a qualifying phrase is 
supposed to apply to all antecedents in-
stead of only to the immediately preced-
ing one may be found in the fact that it 
is separated from the antecedents by a 
comma." 
No comma was inserted in K.S.A.1987 
Supp. 17-1268(b) teptAting the critical 
qualifying phrase, "whd Materially aids in 
the sale" from the antecedents partner, 
officer, or director or employee. 
The Kansas version of the Uniform Act 
was adopted in 1957. L.1957, ch. 145. The 
K.S.A.1987 Supp. 17-1268(b) equivalent 
section of the prior law, G.S.1949, 17-1240, 
was found in the securities section of the 
corporation code. G.S.1949, 17-1240 pro-
vided, in part 
"Every sale or contract for sale made in 
violation of any of the provisions of this 
act shall be voidable at the election of the 
purchasers; and the person making such 
sale or contract for sale and every di-
rector, officer or agent of or for such 
seller who shall have participated or 
aided in any way in making such sale 
shall be jointly and severally liable to 
such purchaser in an action at law in any 
court of competent jurisdiction " 
(Emphasis added.) 
Prior to the adoption of K.S.A.1987 Supp. 
17-1268(b), a director of a seller was liable 
only if he or she "participated or aided in 
any way in making such sale." 
Section 410(b) of the Uniform Act altered 
a director's liability status. Strict director 
liability was imposed by ft 410(b) unless the 
statutory defense of lack of knowledge was 
proven. If the Kansas Legislature in 1957 
had intended to continue to provide the 
"materially aids in the sale" shield to Kan-
sas directors it could easily have used the 
STATE v. WADE 
aum-rn r-ia an (KM. ittt) 
Kan. 811 
G.S.1949, 17-1240 concept that had been in 
place since 1929. L.1929, ch. 140. 
8. Did the Director Defendants Materi-
ally Aid in the Sale to the Plaintiffs* 
Our resolution of the K.S.A.1987 Supp. 
17-1268(b) statutory construction question 
disposes of the Taylors' second issue. 
The trial court found that facts constitut-
ing material aid by the director defendants 
were not present in the sale to the plain-
tiffs and granted the defendants summary 
judgment on this issue. 
Our construction of K.S.A.1987 Supp. 17-
1268(b) reverses the trial court's ruling on 
summary judgment and removes the neces-
sity for an analysis of this issue. 
We need not determine what constitutes 
"materia) aid" under K.S.A.1987 Supp. 17-
1268(b). 
4. The K.S.A.1987 Supp. 17-126S(b) 
Statutory Defense 
We have held that K.S.A.1987 Supp. 17-
1268(b) imposes strict liability on directors 
as nonselling parties unless the statutory 
defense of lack of knowledge is proven. 
The statute provides a defense to liability 
where the nonseller can show that he or 
she "did not know, and in the exercise of 
reasonable care could not have known, of 
the existence of the facts by reason of 
which the liability is alleged to exist"—the 
lack of knowledge defense. 
As their third issue, the Taylors contend 
that this defense is not available to the 
director defendants because they have not 
met the burden of proof required under 
this provision. We need not address this 
issue. 
In its journal entry granting the director 
defendants summary judgment, the trial 
court specifically found that there are con-
tested issues relating to the statutory de-
fense, but that these issues were immateri-
al since the Taylors had not established a 
prima facie case. The K.S.A.1987 Supp. 
17-1268(b) statutory defense issue was not 
determined by the trial court's summary 
judgment ruling which is the basis of this 
appeal. 
We remand the case for trial. The Tay-
lors have established a prima facie case. 
The statutory defense issue will be deter-
mined by the trier of fact. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
MY NtfNM I SttUM > 
244 Kan. 136 
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, 
v. 
Gary WADE, Appellant 
No. 61678. 
Supreme Court of Kansas. 
Jan. 3, 1989. 
Defendant was convicted in the Shaw-
nee District Court, Thomas W. Regan, J., 
of aggravated criminal sodomy, and he ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Six, J., held 
that: (1) failure of information to allege 
that child victim was not married to offend 
er was not fundamental defect rendering 
defendant's aggravated criminal sodomy 
conviction void by depriving trial court of 
jurisdiction; (2) it is legal impossibility for 
five-year-old to be married; and (3) lay 
testimony of child protection case worker 
who investigated alleged sexual abuse was 
properly admitted on redirect examination 
to describe what case worker looked for 
when required to make sexual abuse case 
determination judgment call, behavior of 
children who told her they had been sexual-
ly abused, and conclusion that behavior 
was consistent with behavior observed in 
child who was alleged victim. 
Affirmed. 
1. Sodomy «=»1 
That child victim is not married to of-
fender is one of the essential elements of 
crime of aggravated criminal sodomy, 
450 Utah 626 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
826, 827 (1932), "(T]he use by individual 
persons in common with the public general-
ly is regarded as permissive, and by such 
common use no individual person can ac-
quire a right by prescription as against the 
owner of the fee." See also Bertolina v. 
Frates, 89 Utah 238, 57 P.2d 346 (1936). 
[6] The record in the instant case shows 
that the use of the roadway by the individu-
al plaintiffs was not distinguishable from 
similar use by the public generally, but it 
was relevant to prove that the road was a 
public roadway. The determination that 
the road had become a public thoroughfare 
precluded a ruling in plaintiffs' favor on the 
issue of the establishment of a prescriptive 
easement 
The judgment of the lower court is af-
firmed as to the establishment of a public 
thoroughfare but reversed as to the acquisi-
tion by the plaintiffs of prescriptive rights 
therein. Costs to respondents. 
MAUGHAN, C. J., and HALL and 
STEWART, J J., concur. 
CROCKETT, J , heard the arguments, 
but retired before the opinion was filed. 
kO iKHNUMBtt SYSTEM 
WELLS FARGO ARMORED SERVICE 
CORPORATION, Plaintiff, 
v. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, Milly O. Bernard, Chairman, 
David R. Irvine and Kenneth Rigtrup, 
Commissioners of the Public Service 
Commission of Utah, and Brinks, Inc., 
Defendants. 
No. 16862. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 11, 1981. 
Review was sought from order of the 
Public Service Commission granting an ar-
mored car company an exemption from reg-
ulation by Commission The Supreme 
Court, Stewart, J., held that restriction in 
statute governing exemptions for certain 
motor vehicles from regulation by Commis-
sion limiting exemption of certain vehicles 
to those operating within a 15-mile radius 
of limits of any city or town did not apply 
to armored cars. 
Affirmed. 
Hall, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
1. Statutes *B»219<1) 
While it is always ultimate responsibili-
ty of Supreme Court to interpret terms of a 
statute to effectuate legislative intent, 
some deference is due interpretation of a 
statute placed on it by administrative agen-
cy which has responsibility for administer-
ing that statute. 
2. Automobiles e=>78 
Restriction in statute governing ex-
emptions of certain motor vehicles from 
regulation by Public Service Commission 
limiting exemption of certain vehicles to 
those operating within a 15-mile radius of 
limits of any city or town did not apply to 
armored cars. U.C.A.1958, 54~e~12(f). 
Mark K. Boyle, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff. 
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Arthur A. 
Allen, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Calvin L. Ramp-
ton, Salt Lake City, for Brinks. 
James S. Lowrie, Gregg I. Alvord, Salt 
Lake City, for defendants. 
STEWART, Justice: 
This is a review of the Public Service 
Commission's order granting Brink's, Inc., 
an exemption from regulation by the Com-
mission. The exemption is claimed pursu-
ant to § 54^-12(f), Utah Code Ann. (1958), 
as amended, which provides that the re-
quirements of Chapter 6, Title 54, U.C.A. 
1953, do not apply: 
WELLS FARGO ARMORED SERVICE v. PUBLIC SERVICE 
Ckc at. Utah. f2f P 2d 4St 
To motor vehicles when especially con- effectuate legislative intent 
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gtructed for towing, wrecking, mainte-
nance, or repair purposes, and not other-
wise used in transporting goods and mer-
chandise for compensation; or when con-
structed as armored cars and used for the 
safe conveyance or delivery of money or 
other valuables, or when used as hearses, 
ambulances, or licensed taxicabs, operat-
ing within a fifteen mile radius of the 
limits of any city or town; or to motor 
vehicles used as ambulances or hearses by 
any person, firm or corporation duly li-
censed in the state as an embalmer, fu-
neral director, or as a mortuary establish-
ment, provided that use of such motor 
vehicles as an ambulance shall be inciden-
tal to the use of embalming or funeral 
directing. 
Brinks, an armored car company, argues 
that the subsection is unclear as to the 
types of motor vehicles included within the 
fifteen mile restriction, but proposes that 
rules of statutory and grammatical con-
struction limit the fifteen mile provision to 
hearses, ambulances and taxicabs. Plain-
tiff Wells Fargo Armored Service Corpora-
tion, which filed with the Commission a 
motion to disssiss the application for ex-
emption* argues that the statute is clear 
and t^at the restriction applies to armored 
cars s * flfell.,, It) -is noteworthy, however, 
that W M V t e j had, in an earlier appear-
ance MEM t i t Admission, contended that 
the f t * * * * * , unclear. 
The Commission in this case reached the 
conclusion that the meaning of subsection 
(0 was ambiguous. To resolve the ambigu-
ity, the Commission applied the "last ante-
cedent" rule and determined that the fif-
teen mile restriction applied only to hearses, 
ambulances, and taxicabs. Accordingly, 
Brinks was granted a statewide exemption. 
[1] We certainly do not dispute the 
Commission's conclusion that subsection (f) 
is ambiguous. The use of the comma di-
rectly following the word "valuables" re-
sults in a less than clear meaning as to the 
restriction under review. Of course it is 
always the ultimate responsibility of this 
Court to interpret the terms of a statute to 
Nevertheless, 
some deference is due interpretation of a 
statute placed on it by the administrative 
agency which has the responsibility for ad-
ministering that statute. In Colman v. 
Utah State Land Board, 17 Utah 2d 14, 19, 
403 P.2d 781, 784 (1965), this Court stated: 
[B]ecause of its experience and presumed 
expert knowledge in its field, an adminis-
trative interpretation and application of a 
statute, although not necessarily control-
ling, is generally regarded as prima facie 
correct and not to be overturned so long 
as it is in conformity with the general 
objectives the agency is charged with 
carrying out, and there is a rational basis 
for it in the provisions of law. [Footnote 
omitted ] 
See also Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Ander-
son, 90 Utah 2d 102, 514 P.2d 217 (1973); 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 396 U.S. 
867, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969). 
This is not to say that this Court will 
automatically approve administrative con-
structions, Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, 
Inc. v. Welling, 9 Utah 2d 114, 117, 839 P.2d 
1011, 1018 (1959). The Court stated in 
McPhie v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 567 
P.2d 158, 155 (1977): 
The time honored rule of law is that 
the construction of statutes by govern-
mental agencies charged with their ad-
ministration should be given considerable 
weight—however, if it is made clearly to 
appear that a statute has been miscon-
strued or misapplied it is the duty of the 
court to correct the same. [Footnote 
omitted.] 
* 
[2] The words of the statutory provision 
and the statutory policy embodied therein 
assist in ascertaining that meaning. Resort 
to principles of statutory construction pro-
vide some guidance in the endeavor. In 
reaching its conclusion, the Commission re-
lied on the "last antecedent" rule of statu-
tory construction. The rule provides in 
general terms that when there is a modifier 
following a series of nouns, the modifier 
will apply only to the immediately prior 
antecedent, which in this case has the effect 
of excluding armored vehicles from regula-
tion. In addition, the Commission conclud-
ed that armored cars were not subject to 
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regulation because: (1) the operation of an 
armored car service is of a fundamentally 
different character than that of hearses, 
ambulances or taxicabs; (2) the potential 
customers of armored car services are in a 
strong bargaining position vis-a-vis those 
services; and (8) the fifteen mile radius 
limitation makes more sense in the case of 
hearses, ambulances and taxicabs, as those 
carriers are frequently the subject of regu-
lation by local jurisdictions. The result 
reached by the Commission is not erroneous. 
The order of the Public Service Commis-
sion is affirmed. 
No costs awarded. 
CROCKETT, J.,* and R. L. TUCKETT, 
Retired Justice, concur. 
MAUGHAN, C. J , does not participate 
herein; R. L. TUCKETT, Retired Justice, 
sat 
WILKINS, J , heard the arguments but 
resigned before the opinion was filed. 
HALL, Justice: (dissenting). 
The statute in question * exempts from 
regulation 
. . . motor vehicles when specially con-
structed . . .; or when constructed as ar-
mored cars and used for the safe convey-
ance or delivery of money or other valua-
bles, or when used as hearses, ambulanc-
es, or licensed taxicabs, operating within 
a fifteen mile radius of any city or town; 
I am of the opinion that application of 
the so-called "last antecedent" rule to the 
foregoing statutory phrase serves to sub-
vert rather than to clarify the Legislature's 
intent in its enactment.1 
Notwithstanding any distinction the 
Commission or this Court might draw be-
• CROCKETT, J., concurred in this case before 
his retirement. 
1. U.C.A.I953, 54 & 12(f) 
2. The rule has apparently never been applied in 
this jurisdiction, but its applicability, under ap-
propriate circumstances, was discussed in Salt 
Lake City v. Salt Lake County. Utah. 568 P 2d 
738 (1977). 
tween armored cars, hearses, ambulances 
and taxicabs, the unalterable fact remains 
that the Legislature, whose prerogative it 
is, has not seen fit to do so. On the con-
trary, the statute sets forth the vehicles in 
a single phrase, in series, separated only by 
commas, and thus categorizes them as a 
single class. Had it been the intention of 
the Legislature to separately categorize ar-
mored cars, its insertion of a semicolon, 
rather than a comma, following the recita-
tion thereof would then have conveyed such 
an intent 
It is not the prerogative of this Court to 
presume error in legislative enactments, nor 
to distort or defeat the intent of legislation 
by altering the punctuation contained 
therein. Particularly is this so when, as 
here, a reasonable basis exists to interpret 
the act as drafted. Yet, the main opinion 
presumes such error, and imposes its own 
punctuation in order to sustain the Commis-
sion's order.1 
In addition, it is to be observed that the 
Commission is charged with the duty of 
regulating all common carriers.4 Conse-
quently, any ambiguity found to exist in 
any exempting provisions • are to be recon-
ciled in favor of the general policy it is to 
regulate. In the face of ambiguity as to 
exemption, it appears the better judicial 
course would be to decide in favor of the 
expressed mandate of regulation rather 
than an unclear exemption. 
I would vacate the order of the Commis-
sion which grants a statewide exemption to 
Brinks, Inc. 
( o | KEY NUMNR SYSTEM) 
S. It is of note that such order represents a 
complete departure from prior statutory inter-
pretation since at all times prior hereto the 
Commission has required the regulation of ar-
mored cars, and plaintiff herein is presently so 
regulated. 
4. U.C.A.1953. 54 fr 2 and 54-6-4. 
8. Supra, footnote 1. 
MEL TRIMBLE REAL ESTATE v. FITZGERALD 
Cite as, Utah, S2S F.24 453 
3. Brokers *=>88(7) 
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MEL TRIMBLE REAL ESTATE, and 
Cal Florence, Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
v. 
Lebnd A. FITZGERALD, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 16746. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 13, 1981. 
Broker and sales agent brought action 
against purchaser for real estate sales com-
mission. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Bryant H. Croft, J., entered 
judgment in favor of purchaser, and plain-
tiffs appealed. The Supreme Court, Har-
ding, District Judge, held that: (1) in case 
in which earnest money agreement between 
vendor and purchaser provided "Buyer to 
be responsible for all real estate commis-
sions/' instruction given by the court fairly 
and adequately covered the contentions of 
the parties as they were presented to the 
court, and there was no error in refusing to 
gjve requested instruction on theory that 
broker was a third-party beneficiary in ear-
nest money agreement, and (2) issues as to 
salsa eommMon claimed by broker and 
whether Uiete should have been any sales 
coroiaiajupjiial all were for the jury. 
Affirmed. 
1. Contract! *~ 187(1) 
It is essential for a third-party benefi-
ciary claimant to prove that contract was 
intended to benefit him directly; one inci-
dentally benefited by performance of a 
promise to a third person may not maintain 
an action against the promissor. 
2. Contracts •=» 187(1) 
Terms of agreement and facts circum-
stances that surround its making can be 
examined to determine whether supposed 
third-party beneficiary of contract was in 
fact intended to be such. 
In action against purchaser for r 
estate sales commission in case in wh 
earnest money agreement between vem 
and purchaser provided "Buyer to be 
sponsible for all real estate com miss ior 
instruction given by the court fairly \ 
adequately covered the contentions of 
parties as they were presented to the coi 
and there was no error in refusing to g 
requested instruction on theory that bro 
was a third-party beneficiary in earr 
money agreement. 
4. Brokers «=»88(1) 
In action by broker and sales ag 
against purchaser for real estate sales o 
mission, issues as to sales commisi 
claimed by broker and whether there she 
be any sales commission at all were for 
jury. 
Robert J. DeBry and Dale F. Gardi 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and ap 
lants. 
Lawrence E. Corbridge, Salt Lake C 
for defendant and respondent. 
HARDING, District Judge: 
This appeal is from an adverse judgn 
on a claim for a real estate sales com 
s ion. 
Appellants were in the business of sel 
real estate. Mel Trimble was a licei 
real estate broker, and Cal Florence 
employed by Trimble as a sales agent, 
appellants will be referred to herein joi 
as Florence. 
The ranch property involved in this ac 
is located in Cedar Valley, Utah, and 
under the management and control of } 
lace Ohran. Respondent Leland A. Fitz 
aid was a rancher. 
Two or three years prior to Decern 
1977, Florence allegedly obtained an 
listing from Ohran to sell the ranch pre 
ty. The terms of the oral listing alio 
Florence to seek offers, and if any c 
was accepted by Ohran, a six percent < 
mission would be paid on the sale. 
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ter statute because the killing proscribed 
under that provision must be "intention-
al." /</. at 94 (emphasis added). We again 
noted that "one cannot be guilty of an 
attempt to commit a crime unless the nec-
essary mens rea of the completed crime is 
intentional conduct." Id. at 94 n. 1 (em-
phasis added).6 
At bottom, the State seeks to replace the 
word "intent" in paragraph (2) of the at-
tempt statute with, as it says, "intent or a 
mental state that is equivalent thereto" and 
to modify or reject the holdings of Bell, 
Norman, and Howell. Although it may 
make sense to allow attempt for homicide 
offenses that are presumably equal in cul-
pability to intentional murder, we believe 
that the most reasonable approach, in light 
of the statutory language and our cases, is 
to read the word "intent" in paragraph (2) 
of the attempt statute as that word is de-
fined in section 76-2-103(1). 
Clarity is crucial to a just criminal law 
system. Jurors are instructed to apply the 
language set forth in our penal statutes to 
determine criminal liability. Articulating 
the various mental states required for the 
various crimes in the Code is difficult 
enough without giving multiple meanings 
to the word "intent." 
We hold that to convict a defendant of 
attempted second degree murder, the pros-
ecution must prove that the defendant had 
a conscious objective or desire to cause the 
death of another. Because the mental 
state required for depraved indifference 
homicide falls short of that intent, the 
crime of attempted depraved indifference 
homicide does not exist in Utah. 
5. In State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (1982), we 
rejected an argument that the Utah attempt stat-
ute required a higher level of "intent" than that 
required for first degree murder. In so holding, 
we interpreted paragraph (1) of the Utah at-
tempt statute as making "clear that regardless of 
any requirements which the common law may 
impose concerning 'attempt' crimes, Utah law 
requires only 'the kind of culpability otherwise 
required for the commission of the (completed] 
offense.'" Id. at 904 (brackets in original) 
(quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1) (1953)). 
Alternatively, we wrote that even if the Utah 
attempt statute incorporated the common law 
requirement of intent, the mental state required 
The order of the trial court denying Vig-
il's motion to dismiss and amend is re-
versed. 
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J., and 
STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
(o f l(VNUMIt«mTIH> 
Larry J. ZIS8I, Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION 
No. wmxn.u, 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct 27, 1902. 
Taxpayer sought writ of review of de-
cision of State Tax Commission assessing 
$44,000 in penalties and taxes under Illegal 
Drug Stamp Tax Act. The Supreme Court, 
Zimmerman, J., held that: (1) "dosage 
unit," within meaning of Act, means one 
tablet or pill, not the dose actually taken by 
each different drug user; (2) Act did not 
violate Utah's constitutional provision re-
quiring uniform operation of the laws; (3) 
to conform to Fifth Amendment's privilege 
against self-incrimination, Act must be 
read to preclude prosecutors from using 
any information gained as result of stamp 
purchaser's compliance with Act to estab-
lish link in chain of evidence in subsequent 
for first degree murder was sufficient to meet 
that requirement. Id. at 905. 
The first alternative rationale relied on in 
Maestas is clearly inconsistent with our cases in 
Bell, Howell, and Norman and with our holding 
in the instant case. Thus, that portion of Maes-
tas that conflicts with these cases and today's 
holding is incorrect. However, we note thai 
Maestas is still good law insofar as it authorizes 
prosecution for attempted aggravated murder 
under the intentional or knowing formulation 
of section 76-5-202(1) or attempted murder un 
der the intentional or knowing formulation of 
section 76-5-203(1 )(a). 
ZISSI V. STATU • A 
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drug prosecution; (4) Act did not inflict 
excessive fine or forfeiture in violation of 
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel 
and unusual punishment; and (5) amphet-
amines seized from taxpayer's truck fol-
lowing unconstitutional roadblock stop 
were inadmissible. 
Reversed. 
Howe, Associate C.J., filed opinion con-
curring in part and dissenting in part in 
which Hall, CJ., concurred. 
1. Administrative Law and Procedure 
*=»749 
Party appealing from order of adminis-
trative agency bears burden of demonstrat-
ing that agency's factual determinations 
are not supported by substantial evidence, 
and thus Supreme Court states facts and 
all legitimate inferences drawn therefrom 
in light most favorable to agency's find-
ings. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4Xg). 
2. Administrative Law and Procedure 
*=»791 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
(UAPA) requires Supreme Court to uphold 
agency's factual findings if they are sup-
ported by substantial evidence based upon 
record as a whole. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-
16<4Xg). 
3. Administrative Law and Procedure 
«=»796 
On appeal from determination of ad-
ministrative agency, issues of law are re-
viewed by Supreme Court for correctness 
under Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
(UAPA). U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4)(d). 
4. Taxation *=1319 
On review of State Tax Commission's 
assessment of $44,000 in penalties and tax-
es under Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act, Su-
preme Court would not apply standard of 
intermediate deference to legal issues, 
where there was no explicit delegation of 
discretion, and issues were questions of 
constitutional law and statutory construc-
tion on which Commission's experience and 
expertise would be of no real assistance. 
U.C.A.1953, 59-19-101 to 59-19-107. 
MS (Utah 1992) 
5. Taxation *»1317 
State Tax Commission's factual finding 
that amphetamine tablets were sold by the 
pill and not by weight was not contrary to 
substantial weight of evidence, for purpose 
of Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act, which es-
tablishes different tax rates for drugs sold 
by weight and drugs sold by dosage unit. 
U.C.A.1953, 59-19-103. 
6. Statutes «=»205 
General rule of statutory construction 
is that statute should be construed as com-
prehensive whole. 
7. Statutes «=>212.6 
In construing legislative enactments, 
Supreme Court assumes that legislature 
used each term in statute advisedly and, 
thus, that Court should read statutory 
words literally and in accordance with their 
usually accepted meanings. 
8. Taxation «=»1291 
"Dosage unit," within meaning of Ille-
gal Drug Stamp Tax Act, which imposes 
$2,000 tax on each 50 "dosage unite" of 
controlled substance that is not sold by 
weight or portion thereof, means one tablet 
or pill, not the dose actually taken by each 
different drug user. U.C.A.1953, 59-19-
103. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
9. Statutes *=*47 
Statute will be found to be unconstitu-
tionally vague on its face only when it is 
insufficiently explicit and clear to inform 
the ordinary reader of common intelligence 
what conduct is proscribed. 
10. Statutes *=»47 
Test for determining whether statute 
is unconstitutionally vague is applied in 
light of fact that exactitude of language is 
seldom possible. 
11. Statutes *=>47 
Statute will not be invalidated for 
vagueness if any sensible, practical effect 
can be given to contested statutory terms. 
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12. Taxation «=>!29J 
Term "dosage unit," within meaning of 
Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act, which imposes 
$2,000 tax on each 50 "dosage units" of 
controlled substance that is not sold by 
weight or portion thereof, was not uncon-
stitutionally vague on its face, despite lack 
of statutory definition. U.C.A.1953, 59-19-
103; U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14. 
13. Constitutional l>aw *=»48(1) 
Party challenging constitutionality of 
statute bears burden of demonstrating its 
invalidity. 
14. Taxation *=>42<l) 
In tax, as in other areas of purely 
economic regulation, Supreme Court grants 
broad deference to legislature when scruti-
nizing reasonableness of legislative classifi-
cations and their relationship to legitimate 
legislative purposes. 
15. Taxation *»1213 
Distinctions in Illegal Drug Stamp Tax 
Act's definition of "dealer" as anyone who 
manufactures, produces, ships, transports, 
or imports into Utah or in any manner 
acquires or possesses more than 42'/2 
grams of marijuana, or seven or more 
grams of any controlled substance, or ten 
or more dosage units of any controlled 
substance which is not sold by weight, 
were not patently unreasonable, for pur-
pose of determining whether Act violated 
Utah constitutional provision requiring uni-
form operation of the laws. Const. Art. 1, 
ft 24; U.C.A.1953, 59-19-102(2). 
16. Taxation *=>1213 
Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act's classifi-
cation of dealers depending on types of 
drugs they possess was reasonable, for 
purpose of determining whether Act violat-
ed Utah's constitutional provision requiring 
uniform operation of the laws. Const. Art. 
1, § 24; U.C.A.1953, 59-19-101 to 59-19-
107. 
17. Taxation •=-1213 
Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act reason-
ably taxed tablet amphetamines based 
upon dosage unit, while taxing tablets 
ground into |>owder form at lower rate for 
drugs sold by weight, for purpose of deter-
mining whether Act violated Utah's consti-
tutional provision requiring uniform opera-
tion of the laws. Const. Art. 1, § 24; 
U.C.A.1953, 59-19-101 to 69-19-107. 
18. Taxation <*=»1213 
Raising revenue and discouraging ille-
gal drug trafficking were legitimate legis-
lative purposes, for purpose of determining 
whether Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act violat-
ed Utah's constitutional provision requiring 
uniform operation of the laws. Const. Art. 
1, ft 24; U.C.A.1953, 69-19-101 to 59-19-
107. 
19. Constitutional Law *=>209 
Under Utah's constitutional provision 
requiring uniform opera^pn of the laws, if 
relationship of clasaijfifeajion \Q statutory 
objectives is unreasonable, the discrimina-
tion is unreasonable. Copflt Art. 1, ft 24. 
20. Constitutional Law *-228.5 
Taxation «=»1213 
Imposing heavy tax on controlled sub-
stances was not unreasonable means of 
achieving ends of raising revenue and in-
hibiting drug trafficking, and therefore Il-
legal Drug Stamp Tax Act did not violate 
Utah's constitutional provision requiring 
uniform operation of the laws. Const. Art. 
1, ft 24; U.C.A.1953, 59-19-101 to 69-19-
107. 
21. Constitutional Law «=*228.5 
Taxation *=»1213 
Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act did not 
violate Fourteenth Amendment's equal pro-
tection clause, despite its distinctions based 
upon quantity of drugs possessed by deal-
ers, form of drugs possessed by dealers, 
and manner in which those drugs were 
sold. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14; U.C.A. 
1953, 59-19-101 to 59-19-107. 
22. Taxation *»1319 
Supreme Court would not address 
whether Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act violat-
ed privileges against self-incrimination 
granted in Utah Constitution, where tax-
payer failed to argue issue under Utah 
Constitution, mentioning it only off-handed-
ly in his brief. Const. Art. 1, § 12; U.C.A. 
1953, 59-19-101 to 59-19-107. 
23. Witnesses *=297(8) 
Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act's provi-
sions violated Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination, since purchaser 
would reasonably suppose that compliance 
would make information available to prose-
cuting authorities and that information 
would provide "link in a chain" of evidence 
that would tend to establish purchaser's 
guilt of drug-related offenses. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 5; U.C.A.1953, 59-19-101 to 
69-19-107. 
24. Constitutional Law <*=48(3) 
Supreme Court has power to uphold an 
otherwise questionable statute by tailoring 
it to conform to Constitution. 
25. Constitutional Law «=>48(4) 
Taxation «=»1212 
To conform to Fifth Amendment's priv-
ilege against self-incrimination, Illegal 
Drug Stamp Tax Act had to be read to 
preclude prosecutors from using any infor-
mation gained as result of stamp purchas-
er's compliance with Act to establish link in 
chain of evidence in subsequent drug pros-
ecution. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 5; U.C.A. 
1953, 59-19-101 to 59-19-107. 
26. Criminal Law *=>1214 
Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act did not 
inflict excessive fine or forfeiture in viola-
tion of Eighth Amendment's prohibition of 
cruel and unusual punishment, where tax-
payer failed to demonstrate that penalty is 
not commensurate with the social and eco-
nomic harm caused by illegal drug use, 
statute's 100% penalty is not unique in 
Utah law, and same taxes and penalties 
were imposed in other states. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 8; U.C.A.1953, 69-19-101 to 
59-19-107. 
27. Taxation «=»1319 
Supreme Court would only address 
whether Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act violat-
ed Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cru-
el and unusual punishment, and would not 
address whether fine or forfeiture imposed 
under Act violated State Constitution, 
where taxpayer cited no authority and 
made no separate cruel and unusual pun-
ishment argument under State Constitu-
tion. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 8; U.C.A. 
1953, 59-19-101 to 59 19-107. 
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28. Taxation «=*1319 
State had burden to justify roadblock 
stop once taxpayer challenged its constitu-
tionality in proceeding before State Tax 
Commission regarding imposition of penal-
ties and taxes under Illegal Drug Stamp 
Tax Act, and therefore State's failure to 
justify stop waived State's right to argue 
legality of stop, and Supreme Court had to 
accept for purposes of appeal that stop was 
an unconstitutional seizure that invalidated 
subsequent search of taxpayer's vehicle. 
U.C.A.1953, 59-19-101 to 59-19-107. 
29. Taxation <£=>1315 
In determining penalties and taxes un 
der Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act, State Tax 
Commission improperly admitted into evi-
dence amphetamines that were seized from 
taxpayer's truck as result of search follow-
ing unconstitutional roadblock stop. 
U.C.A.1953, 59-19-101 to 59-19-107. 
30. Taxation e=>1319 
State Tax Commission's error in admit-
ting into evidence amphetamines seized 
from taxpayer's truck in search following 
unconstitutional roadblock stop was clearly 
harmful, since Commission premised tax 
and penalties under Illegal Drug Stamp 
Tax Act on the drugs themselves. U.C.A. 
1953, 59-19-101 to 59-19-107. 
David J. Bird, Salt I*ake City, for Zissi. 
R. Paul Van Dam, I>eon A. Dever, Salt 
Lake City, for Tax Com'n. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Petitioner Larry J. Zissi seeks a writ of 
review of a decision of the State Tax Com-
mission. The Commission assessed $44,000 
in penalties and taxes against Zissi, finding 
that he had failed to pay the taxes that 
Utah's Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act ("the 
Stamp Act") imposes on the purchase, ac-
quisition, transportation, or importation of 
controlled substances. See Utah Code 
Ann. ft§ 59-19-101 to -107. Before this 
court, Zissi challenges the Commission's 
fact finding and its construction of the 
Stamp Act, the constitutionality of the 
Stamp Act, and the constitutionality of the 
C M S * * " - " * » v - ••»- • • « • 
roadblock at which sheriffs deputies found 
the controlled substances giving rise to the 
taxes and penalties Zissi argues that be 
cause the roadblock stop amounted to an 
unconstitutional seizure, the exclusionary 
rule should have prevented the Commission 
from admitting in evidence the approxi 
mately 550 amphetamine tablets the depu 
ties had seized from his truck 
We hold as follows first, that Zissi has 
not shown that the Commission's fact find 
ing was against the substantial weight of 
the evidence, second, that the Commission 
properly construed the Stamp Act, third, 
that the Stamp Act survives Zissi's consti 
tutional challenges, fourth, that the road 
block stop and subsequent search of Zissi's 
truck violated the Utah Constitution, and 
fifth, that the exclusionary rule barred the 
admission of the amphetamine tablets at 
the Commission hearing Because the 
Commission should not have admitted the 
illegally seized amphetamine tablets in evi 
dence, we reverse its decision 
[11 We first state the facts Because a 
party appealing from an order of an admin 
istrative agency bears the burden of dem 
onstrating that the agency's factual deter 
ruinations are not supported by substantial 
evidence, see id § 63-46b-16(4)(g), we 
state the facts and all legitimate inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favor 
able to the agency's findings Cf First 
Nat'I Bank of Boston v County Bd of 
Equalization of Salt Lake County, 799 
P 2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990) We state the 
facts in this case accordingly 
On June 4, 1988, Zissi's pickup truck was 
stopped at a roadblock set up by the Utah 
County Sheriff on State Road 73 outside 
Fairfield, Utah While Zissi was at the 
roadblock, one of the officers detected a 
strong odor of marijuana coming from the 
truck The officers directed Zissi to pull 
over to the side of the road They then 
inquired whether he had any marijuana in 
his vehicle After initially denying that he 
did, Zissi produced a small plastic bag of 
marijuana and a marijuana cigarette he had 
I Amphetamines are included within the statu 
lory definition of controlled substances See 
been smoking The officers then searched 
his truck and found a shaving bag and a 
briefcase behind the seat The shaving 
bag contained approximately 550 amphet 
amine tablets, and the briefcase contained 
$24 440 Zissi pleaded no contest to cnmi 
nal charges brought against him as a result 
of the roadblock and subsequent search 
After the Utah County Sheriffs office 
advised the Commission of the arrest, the 
Commission began proceedings against Zis 
si for taxes and penalties due under the 
Stamp Act The Stamp Act taxes con 
trolled substances and requires dealers to 
affix official stamps on the controlled sub-
stances as evidence of taxes paid ' See 
Utah Code Ann § 59-19-104(2) Zissi's 
amphetamines did not bear the official 
stamp At a hearing before the Commis 
sion, Zissi argued that the search of his 
truck was unconstitutional and that the 
evidence of his amphetamines should be 
suppressed Stating that it did not have 
the authority to determine the constitution 
ahty of the search, the Commission admit 
ted the amphetamines in evidence and as 
sessed a tax of $22,000 on the drugs and a 
penalty of $22,000 for Zissi's failure to pay 
the drug taxes and affix the official stamps 
to the amphetamines 
[2-4] Before discussing Zissi's chal 
lenges to the Commission's ruling, we note 
the appropriate standard of review The 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
("UAPA"), id §§ 63-46b-l through -22, 
governs our review of Commission deci 
sions See id § 63-46b-l(l), Savage In 
dus, Inc v Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 
P2d 664, 668-69 (Utah 1991) Zissi chal 
lenges one of the Commission's factual de-
terminations The UAPA requires us to 
uphold an agency's factual findings if such 
findings are supported by substantial evi 
dence based upon the record as a whole 
See Utah Code Ann § 63-46b-16(4Mg) 
Zissi's remaining claims raise issues of law, 
which we review for correctness under the 
Utah Code Ann §§ 58-37 2(4) -4(2) 
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UAPA * See id § 63-46b-16(4Kd), Savage 
Indus, Inc, 811 P 2d at 66^-70 We now 
turn to the menta 
[5J We begin with Zissi's argument that 
the Commission erred in making a factual 
finding that amphetamine tablets are drugs 
that are sold by the pill and not by weight 
This finding is significant because the 
Stamp Act prescribes different tax rates 
for drugs sold by weight and drugs sold by 
"dosage unit" s Utah Code Ann § 59-19-
103 
In finding that the drugs in Zissi's pos 
session are sold by the pill and not by 
weight, the Commission relied on the fol 
lowing evidence The Commission heard 
testimony by Detective Kendra Hurhn of 
the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department 
that amphetamines in pill form are sold by 
the pill Loni Deland, a defense witness 
and a former narcotics agent for the State 
of Utah, testified that amphetamines gen 
erally are sold as a powder, by weight 
However, Deland also testified that he had 
not seen amphetamines in pill form sold by 
weight After reviewing this testimony, 
we cannot say that the Commission's find 
ing that amphetamine tablets are sold by 
the pill was contrary to the substantial 
weight of the evidence, which we have de 
2. Our recent decisions recognize that we should 
grant intermediate deference to an agency s in 
terpretation or application of specific laws 
when the legislature has explicitly or implicitly 
delegated discretion to the agency to interpret 
or apply that law See, eg, Morton Intl, Inc v 
Auditing Dtv of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 
P2d 581 589 (Utah 1991), Savage Indus, Inc, 
811 P 2d at 668 In the instant case, there is no 
explicit delegation of discretion, and the issues 
are questions of constitutional law and statutory 
construction on which the Commission s expert 
ence and expertise will be of no real assistance 
See Sandy City v Salt Lake County, 827 P 2d 
212, 218 (Utah 1992), Stiver v Auditing Dtv of 
State Tax Comm'n, 820 P 2d 912, 914 (Utah 
1991) Therefore we do not apply the standard 
of intermediate deference to the legal issues in 
this case See Stiver, 820 P 2d at 914 
3 The Stamp Act states in relevant part 
(1) A tax is imposed on marihuana and 
controlled substances as defined in this chap 
ter at the following rates 
§4* (Utah 1992) 
fined as that quantum of relevant evidence 
that would tend to convince a reasonable 
person of a conclusion First Nat'l Bank 
of Boston, 799 P 2d at 1165, Grace Drill 
ing Co v Board of Review, 776 P 2d 63, 68 
(Utah Ct App 1989) Consequently, we af 
firm the Commission s factual conclusion 
We next examine Zissi s argument that 
the Commission misconstrued the meaning 
of the term "dosage unit, ' as used in the 
Stamp Act The Stamp Act itself does not 
define this term4 The Commission con 
strued it to mean one tablet or pill, basing 
its determination on expert testimony by J 
Craig Johnson, director of Pharmacy Ser 
vices at LDS Hospital Johnson testified 
that "dosage unit" has a distinct meaning 
in medical circles, a meaning that differs 
from the meaning of the term "dosage " 
He said that "dosage unit" means the 
amount of a medicine or prescription that is 
sold as a unit and relates to how the medi 
cine is packaged This differs from, the 
dosage a patient takes, which may be one 
dosage unit or more than one dosage unit, 
depending on the strength of the patient s 
prescription 
(6,71 Zissi argues that because the ac 
tual dosage taken by users of amphet 
amines is generally greater than one pill, 
(c) on each 50 dosage units of a controlled 
substance that is not sold by weight or por 
lion thereof $2000 
(2) For the purpose of calculating the tax 
under this chapter a quantity of marihuana 
or other controlled substance is measured by 
the weight of the substance whether pure or 
impure or dilute or by dosage units when the 
substance is not sold by weight in the dealer s 
possession 
Utah Code Ann § 59 19 103 
4 Although the statute contains no definition of 
the term dosage unit it does authorize the 
Commission to adopt the rules necessaiy to en 
force the Stamp Act See Utah Code Ann § 59 
19-107(1) However the Commission has never 
exercised this rule making power 
(b) on each gram of a controlled substance 
or each portion of a gram $200 and 
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the Commission's determination that a dos-
age unit equals one pill is erroneous. Es-
sentially, Zissi would have this court 
equate "dosage" with "dosage unit." This 
argument ignores the word "unit" in the 
term. A general rule of statutory con-
struction is that a statute should be con-
strued as a comprehensive whole. See Clo-
ver v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 
1045 (Utah 1991); Peay v. Board of Ed. of 
Provo City School Dist, 14 Utah 2d 63, 66, 
377 P.2d 490, 492 (Utah 1962). In constru-
ing legislative enactments, we assume that 
the legislature used each term in the stat-
ute advisedly and, thus, that we should 
read the statutory words literally and in 
accordance with their usually accepted 
meanings. See Pate v. Marathon Steel 
Co., 777 P.2d 428, 430 (Utah 1989); Hector, 
Inc. v. United Sav. & Loan Ass% 741 P.2d 
542, 546 (Utah 1987); Grant v. Utah State 
Land Bd., 26 Utah 2d 100, 102, 485 P.2d 
1035, 1036 (1971). 
While Zissi correctly points out that the 
term "dosage" is generally understood to 
be the amount of drug a person would 
take, he does not address the meaning of 
the word "unit" in the term "dosage unit." 
"Unit," as defined by WebBter's Dictionary, 
means 
the first natural number: a number that 
is the least whole number and is ex-
pressed by the numeral 1: a single thing 
(as a magnitude or number) that consti-
tutes an undivided whole . . . : a determi-
nate quantity (as of length, time, heat, 
value or housing) adopted as a standard 
of measurement for other quantities of 
the same kind . . . : a single thing or 
person or group that is a constituent 
and isolable member of some more in-
clusive whole: a member of an aggre-
gate that is the least part to have clear-
ly definable separate existence and that 
normally forms a basic element of orga-
nization within the aggregate 
Webster's Third New International Dic-
tionary 2500 (1961) (emphasis added). 
181 When read in conjunction with "dos-
age," it is apparent that the word "unit" in 
"dosage unit" relates to a single item or 
measurement used to determine the pa-
tient's actual dosage. The Commission's 
construction of the term "dosage unit" 
takes this definition of unit into account in 
determining that a dosage unit is one pill. 
The language of the statute and the evi-
dence that "dosage unit" has a distinct 
meaning in the medical community amply 
support the Commission's definition of 
"dosage unit" as a unit of the drug. In 
this case, that unit is one pill. We there-
fore affirm the Commission's interpretation 
of "dosage unit." 
Having rejected Zissi's challenges to the 
Commission's fact-finding and statutory 
construction, we next turn to his attacks on 
the constitutionality of the Stamp Act. 
First, Zissi argues that the Sta,mp Act vio-
lates Fourteenth Arnendf^e^t due process 
guarantees because it ^ uncoiM|titutionally 
vague on its face. Specifically, he argues 
that the term "dosage unit" in tfye statute 
is vague and indefinite and subject to arbi-
trary enforcement by the Commission and 
the prosecuting authorities charged with 
enforcing the Stamp Act because the term 
does not provide fair notice of what is 
required or prohibited and does not protect 
against unfettered discretion in enforce-
ment. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 
352, 357, 103 S.Ct 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 
903 (1983); State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 
1042, 1049 (Utah 1984); Greaves v. State, 
528 P.2d 805, 807 (Utah 1974); State v. 
Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561, 564 
(1962). 
19-111 We will find a statute to be un-
constitutionally vague on its face only 
when it is insufficiently explicit and clear 
to inform the ordinary reader of common 
intelligence what conduct is proscribed. 
See Greenwood v. City of North Salt 
Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991); Chris 
& Dicks Lumber v. Tax Comm'n, 791 
P.2d 511, 516 (Utah 1990); Packard, 250 
P.2d at 563. We apply this test in light of 
the fact that exactitude of language is sel-
dom possible. Consequently, we will not 
invalidate a statute for vagueness if any 
sensible, practical effect can be given U> 
the contested statutory terms. Packard, 
250 P.2d at 563; see State v. Musser, 118 
Utah 537, 223 P.2d 193, 194 (1950). 
ZISSI v. STATE TAX COM'N OF UTAH 
Cite M M2 P Jd 84ft (Utah 1992) 
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(12] With this standard in mind, we ex-
amine Zissi's interpretation of the statute. 
He argues that the term "dosage unit" 
means the number of pills or units of a 
drug that a user purchases and uses at one 
time and that therefore the statute is 
vague and not readily susceptible of equal 
enforcement and operation. He claims that 
dealers who desire to comply with the stat-
ute's mandate that they pay tax on and 
purchase stamps for all drugs in their pos-
session are required to make a prior assess-
ment of what the Commission later will 
determine makes up a dosage unit. 
Zissi's argument cannot survive our hold-
ing that "dosage unit" means one tablet or 
pill, not the dose actually taken by each 
different drug user. Thus interpreted, the 
term "dosage unit" within the statute 
meets the requirements for specificity and 
notice of the required conduct. Dealers 
are made aware that they will be required 
to buy stamps based upon each pill in their 
possession. We reject Zissi's argument 
that the Stamp Act is unconstitutionally 
vague on its face. 
We next address Zissi's contention that 
the Stamp Act violates both federal and 
state guarantees of equal protection. The 
Utah Constitution states, "All laws of a 
general nature shall have uniform opera-
tion." Utah Const, art. I, § 24. We have 
previously determined that article I, section 
24 imposes an analysis of the reasonable-
ness of economic legislation that is at least 
as rigorous as the analysis required by the 
federal equal protection clause and may 
require even stricter scrutiny than does the 
federal Constitution. See Blue Cross & 
Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 
637 (Utah 1989); Mountain Fuel Supply 
Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 
889 (Utah 1988); see also Malan v. Lewis, 
693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984). Therefore, 
our analysis begins with Utah's constitu-
tional provision requiring uniform opera-
tion of the laws. If the tax statute at issue 
withstands scrutiny under the Utah Consti-
tution, we need not examine the federal 
equal protection question. See Blue Cross, 
779 F.2d at 637. 
[13,14] As a threshold matter, we note 
that our analysis is guided by the well-
settled proposition that the party challeng-
ing a statute bears the burden of demon-
strating its invalidity. See, e.g., Blue 
Cross, 779 P.2d at 637; City of West Jor-
dan v. Utah State Retirement Bd, 767 
P.2d 530, 537 (Utah 1988); Baker v. Mathe-
son, 607 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1979). In tax, 
as in other areas of purely economic regu-
lation, we grant broad deference to the 
legislature when scrutinizing the reason-
ableness of legislative classifications and 
their relationship to legitimate legislative 
purposes. See Blue Cross, 779 P.2d at 637; 
City of West Jordan, 767 P.2d at 537. 
"That broad deference leads us to sustain a 
classification if 'facts can reasonably be 
conceived which would justify the distinc-
tions or differences in state policy [ex-
pressed by the challenged legislation] as 
between different persons.' " Blue Cross, 
779 P.2d at 637 (quoting Baker, 607 P.2d at 
244). 
Bearing in mind this broad deference, we 
analyze the Stamp Act to see whether it 
violates article I, section 24. "In scrutiniz-
ing a legislative measure under article I, 
§ 24, we must determine whether the clas-
sification is reasonable, whether the objec-
tives of the legislative action are legiti-
mate, and whether there is a reasonable 
relationship between the classification and 
the legislative purposes." Id. Before 
turning to these issues, we must identify 
what classifications the legislature has 
made in imposing the Drug Stamp Tax. 
First, the Stamp Act imposes a tax on 
those who deal in illegal drugs. The defini-
tion of "dealers" in the Stamp Act is based 
upon the quantity of drugs possessed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-102(2). Second, 
the Stamp Act breaks "dealers" into sub-
groups that are taxed at different rates, 
depending on the form of the drugs pos-
sessed by the dealer and the manner in 
which these drugs are sold. See id. § 59-
19-103. Hence, the statute distinguishes 
between dealers possessing drugs sold by 
weight and those possessing drugs not sold 
by weight. 
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(151 Now that we have identified the 
statute's classifications, we analyze their 
legitimacy The first question is whether 
there is anything inherently unreasonable 
in the legislature's classifications of drug 
dealers See Blue Cros% 779 P 2d at 640 
The statute defines a dealer as anyone who 
"manufactures, produces, ships, trans 
ports, or imports into Utah or in any man 
ner acquires or possesses more than 42'/^  
grams of marihuana, or seven or more 
grams of any controlled substance, or ten 
or more dosage units of any controlled 
substance which is not sold by weight" 
Utah Code Ann § 59-1^-102(2) On their 
face, these distinctions are not patently un 
reasonable Indeed, it makes perfect sense 
that the legislature would impose the tax 
on only those persons who possess a signif 
icant quantity of a controlled substance 
Unlike casual users, who possess only 
small quantities of drugs, such persons are 
more likely to be major participants in the 
drug trafficking that creates such a drain 
on government resources 
1161 Moreover, the classification of 
dealers depending on the types of drugs 
they posse** is also reasonable Controlled 
substances are sold in different forms 
The classifications are a necessary conces 
sion to this fact and do not single out any 
member of a particular class for disparate 
treatment All drugs sold by weight are 
taxed at the same rate Likewise, all 
5 Senator Ivan Matheson who presented the 
Stamp Act ( S B 209) to the Senate explained 
the bill as follows 
Mr President this is an interesting concept 
It s a tax on the sale of illegal drugs Now 
Minnesota put this particular mechanism on 
and a year ago picked up $6 million in reve 
nue What it does is (require) the Public 
Safety Commission f to] prescribcl } stamps 
and seals that must be on those drugs if 
they re sold If they come in to get the 
stamps and seals they re illegal to start with 
and if they don t put them on we can prose 
cute them for the tax that they didn t pay 
And we also prosecute them by increasing 
amounts We can get them for tax evasion on 
account that theyve made money on that 
they ve never reported There s a number of 
processes set forth in this bill that make it 
so if you pick anybody up with this drug 
you ve got them one way or another and it s 
drugs sold in units are taxed at the same 
rate See id § 59 19-103(lKc) 
(17| Zissi maintains that because the 
tablet amphetamines might well have been 
ground into powder form and thus taxed at 
the lower rate for drugs sold by weight, he 
is being discriminated against unreason 
ably However, he fails to address the fact 
that an amphetamine sold in powder form 
is a distinctly different substance than an 
amphetamine sold in tablet form The evi 
dence before the Commission distinguished 
between amphetamine tablets, which char 
actenstically are of an off white, brownish 
color, and crystal amphetamine, commonly 
called "crystal" or "crank," which is a very 
fine white powder Further, the evidence 
indicated that amphetamine tablets are sold 
not by weight but by number On the 
other hand, "crystal," or "crank," is in fact 
sold by weight but is much more expensive 
Because of these distinctions, we hold that 
the classification is reasonable 
1181 The second question under our an 
alytical model is the legitimacy of the ob-
jectives pursued by the legislation See 
Blue Cross, 779 P 2d at 640 The legisla 
tive history of the Stamp Act reveals two 
objectives, namely, to raise revenue and to 
discourage illegal drug trafficking s Both 
are legitimate legislative purposes 
(19,201 The third and final question is 
whether the legislature chose a permissible 
means to achieve its legitimate ends Id 
going to lead to some pretty stiff enforcement 
on it 
1 ike I mentioned Minnesota picked up $6 
million I don t have any idea and the fiscal 
note says they don t on this but it will be a 
revenue producer It will be a mechanism to 
tie down these drug pushers and what not and 
nail them to the wall when they sometimes 
get away from us The Public Safety Com 
missioner thinks it s an idea that II work I 
don t know how many of you remember back 
to the time when Al Capone was finally con 
victed He was convicted on this very pro 
cess This is a mechanism I think we can 
reach out and get some of those people If 
there s any questions I d be happy to answer 
Utah State Senate Record of Third Reading of 
S B 209 Feb 23 1988 (recording on file with 
the Utah Senate 47th l^g Senate day 44 disk 
91 side 1) 
£j |£KM V O i n i » ^ arm 
Cite a* 842 P2d 
at 641 If the relationship of the classifica 
tion to the statutory objectives is unreason 
able, the discrimination is unreasonable 
See Malan, 693 P 2d at 671, tee also Hul 
bert v State, 607 P 2d 1217, 1224 (Utah 
1980) Here, a heavy tax on controlled 
substances undeniably will have the effects 
of raising revenue and inhibiting drug traf 
fickmg We cannot say that imposing a 
drug tax is an unreasonable means of 
achieving these ends 
121) For these reasons, we reject Zissi's 
contention that the Stamp Act violates arti 
cle I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution 
Because of this holding, we also reject Zis 
si's contention that the Stamp Act violates 
the Fourteenth Amendment See Blue 
Cross, 779 P 2d at 645 
Third, Zissi contends that compliance 
with the Stamp Act would require him to 
provide evidence against himself in viola 
tion of the privilege against self incrimina 
tion granted in the Fifth Amendment to the 
federal Constitution and article I, section 
12 of the Utah Constitution Zissi argues 
that the Stamp Act requires self incrimina 
tion in two ways first, by requiring a 
dealer who complies with its terms to pro-
vide incriminating information that may be 
turned over to the state or local prosecutor, 
and second, by providing vital evidence in a 
prosecutor's case against a dealer who 
complies with the Act and affixes the 
stamps to illicit drugs because such acts 
show knowledge that the items are con 
trolled substances 
[22] As a preliminary matter, we note 
that Zissi alleges violations of both the 
state and federal constitutions However, 
because Zissi failed to argue the issue un-
der the state constitution, mentioning it 
only off handedly in his brief, we will not 
address the state constitutional question 
See State v Webb, 779 P 2d 1108, 1111 n 4 
(Utah 1989), State v Lafferty, 749 P 2d 
1239, 1247 n 5 (Utah 1988) 
[23] Turning to the merits of Zissi's 
federal constitutional argument, we agree 
that under Marchettx v United States, 390 
U S 39, 88 S Ct 697, 19 h Ed 2d 889 (1968), 
Grosso v Unxted States, 390 U S 62, 88 
848 (HUh 1992) 
SCt 709 19 I Rd2d W6 (1968), and their 
progeny the Stamp Act s provisions violate 
the federal Constitution because the pur 
chaser would reasonably suppose that com 
pliance would make information available 
to prosecuting authorities and that the in 
formation would provide a ' link in a chain 
of evidence that would tend to establish the 
individual s guilt of drug related offenses 
See Marchettx, 390 U S at 48, 88 S Ct at 
703 
(24,25) However, although the Stamp 
Act is facially unconstitutional, we are 
mindful of our power to save a statute 
from unconstitutionality by imposing on it 
a limiting construction This power per 
nuts us to uphold an otherwise questiona 
ble statute by tailoring it to conform to the 
Constitution, which is what we must pre 
sume the legislature intended See In re 
Criminal Investigation, 754 P 2d 633, 
640-41 (Utah 1988), tee also Greaves, 528 
P 2d at 807 The Utah Court of Appeals 
suggested such a course for the Stamp Act 
in State v Dains, 787 P 2d 517 (Utah Ct 
App 1990) We follow the course suggest 
ed in Dams, and we hold that the statute 
must be read to preclude prosecutors from 
using any information gamed as a result of 
a stamp purchaser's compliance with the 
tax statute to establish a link in the chain 
of evidence in a subsequent drug prosecu 
tion See xd at 522-23 With such a read 
ing, the scope of the resulting immunity is 
broad enough to satisfy the requirements 
of the Fifth Amendment 
[26] Zissi's final challenge to the consti 
tutionahty of the Stamp Act is his conten 
tion that it violates the Eighth Amend 
ment's prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishment because it inflicts an excessive 
fine or forfeiture The State responds by 
arguing that the United States Supreme 
Court has held that the provisions of the 
Eighth Amendment apply only to criminal 
fines and forfeitures, not to civil punish 
ments or penalties See Ingraham v 
Wright, 430 US f>51, 664, 97SCt 1401 
1408-09, 51 LEd2d 711 (1977) The 
State's argument founders on the fact that 
we have already determined Commission 
hearings under the Stamp Act to be quasi 
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criminal in nature. See Sims v. Collection 
Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 841 
P.2d 6, 14 (Utah 1992). Consequently, we 
must examine the merits of Zissi's Eighth 
Amendment claim. 
(27) As a threshold matter, we note 
that because Zissi has cited no authority 
and made no separate cruel and unusual 
argument under the state constitution, we 
will address this issue only in the context 
of the federal Constitution. This analysis 
begins with the Supreme Court's opinion in 
Solem v. Helm, 468 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct 
3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). In Solem, the 
Supreme Court emphasized that the Eighth 
Amendment requires that the punishment 
imposed on a criminal be proportionate to 
the crime he or she committed. Id. at 286-
88, 103 S.Ct. at 3007-09. The Court held 
that to determine the proportionality of the 
punishment, a court should rely on "objec-
tive criteria, including (i) the gravity of the 
offense and the harshness of the penalty; 
(ii) the sentences imposed on other crimi-
nals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the 
sentences imposed for commission of the 
same crime in other jurisdictions." Id. at 
292, 103 S.Ct. at 3011. See generally State 
v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 269-72 (Utah 
1986). Applying these criteria to the case 
before us, we find that the Stamp Act does 
not violate the Eighth Amendment. 
We begin with the gravity of the offense 
and the harshness of the penalty. Zissi 
does not seriously contend that his evasion 
of the drug tax is a harmless or frivolous 
offense. Nor could he. Illegal drug traf-
ficking and abuse are significant problems 
in our society. They create an enormous 
economic drain on our public funds. We 
devote substantial resources to educating 
our citizens against drug abuse and appre-
hending, convicting, and treating or incar-
cerating those who violate our drug laws. 
The legislature has attempted to recoup 
some nominal portion of the costs incurred 
in fighting drug abuse by imposing a tax 
on the very people—the drug dealers—who 
benefit so greatly from this usage. Sixty 
percent of all monies collected under the 
Sump Act am distributed "to the law en 
forotm«nt af*ocy coodacimg th* coo-
trolled substance investigation, to be used 
and applied by the agency in the continued 
enforcement of controlled substance laws." 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-l06<6KaKii). This 
tax not only provides the state with crucial 
resources to combat the ills of drug traf-
ficking, but it may have the additional salu-
tary effect of making drug dealing less 
lucrative, thereby lessening the incentive to 
purchase and peddle illicit drugs. 
By evading the drug tax, Zissi thwarted 
these legitimate governmental efforts to 
suppress drug use. This grave offense is 
in no way disproportionate to the fines the 
Commission imposed on Zissi under the 
Stamp Act. A monetary fine is the lightest 
criminal sanction {ha ajtatje can impose. 
See Bishop, 717 p 2 & # J j i ^ Though Zissi 
argues that the U O d o penalty greatly 
exceeded the actdll street value of the 
drug, he makes no attempt id convince us 
that the penalty is not commensurate with 
the social and economic harm inflicted on 
the State of Utah. We hold that under 
Solem, the severity of the sanction imposed 
on Zissi is not unconstitutionally dispropor-
tionate to the gravity of his offense. 
Turning to the second element of the 
Solem analysis, we examine the compara-
bility of other penalties imposed for similar 
offenses. See Bishop, 717 P.2d at 270. 
Utah prescribes heavy penalties for tax 
evasion. Although the Stamp Act's penal-
ty of 100 percent of the unpaid tax is 
among the most severe in Utah law, it is by 
no means unique. For instance, Utah im-
poses a penalty of 100 percent of underpaid 
tax when that underpayment is due to 
fraud with intent to evade the tax. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-401 (8Kd). Conse-
quently, we are unable to say that the 
Stamp Act's penalties run afoul of the sec-
ond element of the Solem test. 
Finally, Solem requires us to compare 
the penalties imposed under the Stamp Act 
with penalties imposed by similar statutes 
in other jurisdictions. See Solem, 463 U.S. 
at 292, 103 S.Ct. at 3010. Although we 
have not undertaken a comprehensive in-
vestigation into the drug tax statutes in 
other states, our research shows that the 
penaitMMi possible under the Utah Act do 
ZISSI v. STATE TAX COM'N OF UTAH 
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not markedly exceed the penalties possible 
nationwide. In fact, Alabama, Idaho, Kan 
sas, and Minnesota all impose the same 
taxes on illegal drugs and penalties for 
evasion of those taxes as does Utah. See 
Ala.Code §§ 40-17A-8, -9(a) (Supp.1991); 
Idaho Code §§ 63-4203, -4207(1) (Supp. 
1992); Kan.Stat.Ann. §§ 79-5202(a), -5208 
(1989 & Supp.1991); Minn.Stat.Ann. 
§§ 297D.08, 297D.09 subd. 1 (1990 & Supp. 
1991). Thus, this situation is unlike that in 
Solem, where it appeared that the defen-
dant had been treated more severely than 
he would have been in any other state. 463 
U.S. at 299-300, 103 S.Ct. at 3014-3015. 
Because Zissi could have received similar 
penalties in these jurisdictions, we cannot 
say that the Utah penalty is disproportion-
ate. We reject Zissi's contention that the 
Stamp Act violates the Eighth Amendment. 
Notwithstanding our rejection of all four 
of Zissi's challenges to the constitutionality 
of the Stamp Act, our holding that the 
Stamp Act survives Zissi's constitutional 
challenges does not dispose of this case. 
Zissi also attacks the constitutionality of 
the search of his truck and the seizure of 
his amphetamine tablets and argues that 
the exclusionary rule should have prevent-
ed the admission of the drugs in evidence 
at the Commission's hearing. We agree. 
[28J We begin with the constitutionality 
of the roadblock and subsequent search. 
Before the Commission, both parties 
briefed the question of the constitutionality 
of the roadblock stop. The Commission 
took the position that it had no authority to 
rule on that question but did so nonethe-
less, declaring that the roadblock was not 
unconstitutional and admitting the seized 
drugs in evidence against Zissi. Before 
this court, Zissi raised and briefed the issue 
of the roadblock's constitutionality. The 
State, in contrast, chose not to address the 
constitutionality question in its brief, rely-
ing instead on the argument that the exclu-
sionary rule should not apply to a tax pro-
ceeding. The State's reliance on the exclu-
sionary rule argument implicitly accepted 
the preliminary assumption that the road 
block was illegal. At oral argument, nei-
ther party addressed the legality of the 
roadblock; both parties assumed that the 
roadblock was illegal and argued instead 
only about the application of the exclusion-
ary rule. There is no question that the 
State had the burden to justify the stop 
once Zissi challenged its constitutionality. 
Because it failed to do so, we hold that the 
State has waived its right to argue the 
legality of the roadblock stop and accept 
for the purposes of this appeal that the 
roadblock stop constituted an unconstitu-
tional seizure that invalidated the subse-
quent search. 
(29,30) This brings us to Zissi's final 
contention. He argues that because the 
roadblock stop was unconstitutional, the 
evidence resulting from the stop should, 
under the state exclusionary rule, be ex-
cluded from the tax proceeding. Our re-
cent opinion in Sims v. Collection Diinsion 
of the Utah State Tax Commission, 841 
P.2d 6 (Utah 1992), governs this issue. In 
Sims, which addressed a similar factual 
situation, a plurality of this court held that 
the Utah Constitution's exclusionary rule 
prevented the Commission from admitting 
in evidence the drugs taken from Sims' car. 
Id. at 14 (Durham, J , joined by Zimmer-
man, J). In a separate opinion, Justice 
Stewart reached the same conclusion under 
the federal exclusionary rule. Id. at 14 
(Stewart, J., concurring in the result). 
Thus, Sims compels us to conclude that the 
Commission likewise erred in admitting in 
evidence the amphetamines seized from 
Zissi's truck. This error was clearly harm 
ful, as the Commission premised the tax 
and penalties on the drugs themselves. 
Consequently, we reverse the Commis-
sion's decision. 
STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice 
(concurring and dissenting): 
I concur in that part of the majority 
opinion which rejects all four of Zissi's 
challenges to the constitutionality of the 
Stamp Act. 
1 dissent from that part which holds thai 
the roadblock was illegal. I would nol 
reach that issue because it is unnecessar) 
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to do so. I would follow the reasoning of 
my dissenting opinion in Sims v. Collection 
Division of Utah State Tax Commission, 
841 P.2d 6 (Utah 1992), and hold that, as-
suming the roadblock was illegal and the 
search of the truck and seizure of the tab-
lets was unconstitutional, the exclusionary 
rule should not be applied to bar admission 
of the drugs in evidence before the Com 
mission. My reasoning was that proceed 
ings before the Commission to enforce the 
Stamp Act are civil in nature and that the 
exclusionary rule should only be applied in 
criminal proceedings. Also, I pointed out 
that imposition of the exclusionary rule 
would serve no useful purpose because the 
Commission played no part in either setting 
up the roadblock or the search and seizure 
that followed. The police officers have al-
ready been punished by the suppression of 
the seized evidence in Sims' criminal prose-
cution. The same reasons apply in the 
instant case. 
The majority opinion in Sims, in holding 
that proceedings before the Commission 
are quasi-criminal in nature, relied heavily 
on the fact that a KM) percent penalty is 
imposed by the Stamp Act. In my dissent-
ing opinion, I observed that the penalty 
was no heavier than is imposed in both 
federal and civil tax proceedings on erring 
taxpayers. It is interesting that now, in 
the instant case, the majority agrees that 
the penalty is no heavier than is found in 
our income tax code, which admittedly is a 
civil, not a quasi-criminal, penalty. States 
the majority: 
Utah prescribes heavy penalties for [in-
come] tax evasion. Although the Stamp 
Act's penalty of 100 percent is among the 
most severe in Utah law, it is by no 
means unique. For instance, Utah im-
poses a penalty of 100 percent of under-
paid tax when that underpayment is due 
to fraud with intent to evade the tax. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-401(3)(d). 
The above statement from the majority 
opinion in this case effectively undercuts 
one of the chief bases for the majority 
opinion in Sims. 
I would affirm the Commission. 
HALL, C.J., concurs in the concurring 
and dissenting opinion of HOWE, Associate 
(o |(fVNUMMIlVlUM> 
Duane WILLETT, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Eldon BARNES. Warden, Utah State 
Prison, Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 900344. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct. 28, 1992. 
Petitioner who pled guilty to charge of 
first-degree murder sought writ of habeas 
corpus and leave to withdraw his guilty 
plea. The Fourth District Court, Utah 
County, Cullen Y. Christensen, J., denied 
petitions, and petitioner appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Durham, J., held that guilty 
plea court had failed to establish factual 
basis for petitioner's plea. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Habeas Corpus <fc=>475 
Petitioner was entitled to habeas cor-
pus relief from plea of guilty to first-de-
gree murder where plea colloquy contained 
no recitation of any facts surrounding vic-
tim's death, and nothing in record indicated 
that adequate factual basis for conviction 
existed at time petitioner entered his plea. 
2. Habeas Corpus *M75 
Habeas petitioner's plea of guilty to 
first-degree murder could not be upheld on 
basis that petitioner pled guilty pursuant to 
plea agreement in which prosecution 
agreed not to seek death penalty against 
petitioner's son, who allegedly aided peti-
tioner in committing murder in question; 
although guilty plea may be held valid 
where record of facts shows that defendant 
WILLETT 
Cite M 842 P.2d 
has, for some other legitimate reason, intel-
ligently and voluntarily entered plea, facts 
must substantiate prosecution of charge at 
trial, rather than merely establish motiva-
tion for entering plea. 
3. Criminal Law «&=»273.1<4) 
Court cannot be satisfied that guilty 
plea is knowing and voluntary unless rec-
ord establishes facts that would place de-
fendant at risk of conviction should matter 
proceed to trial. 
J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Salt take City, for 
Willett. 
R. Paul Van Dam, David F Bryant, Salt 
Lake City, for Barnes. 
DURHAM, Justice. 
Plaintiff Duane Willett sought a writ of 
habeas corpus in the Fourth District Court 
in Utah County and also sought leave to 
withdraw his 1983 guilty plea to a charge 
of first degree murder. After an evidentia-
ry hearing, the district court denied Wil-
lett's petitions. This appeal followed. We 
vacate the district court's ruling and re-
mand for further proceedings. 
Ml In 1983, the State charged plaintiff 
and his son, Harley Willett, with first de-
gree murder. Following plea negotiations, 
the State agreed to charge Harley Willett 
with second degree murder in exchange for 
Duane Willett's guilty plea on a first de-
gree murder charge. Duane Willett now 
challenges the plea proceeding, contending 
among other things that the trial court 
failed to establish a factual basis for the 
plea. Because we grant plaintiff's request-
ed relief on this ground, we do not address 
his other claims. 
This court's decision in State v. Breclcen-
ridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983), established 
that before accepting a guilty plea, a trial 
court must develop a factual basis upon 
which to base a conviction of the charged 
crime.1 Id. at 443. In Brecken ridge, we 
concluded that even though the plea collo 
I. The rules of practice in effect in the Utah 
district courts at the time of Willett's plea also 
required the court to determine "that there is 
factual basis for the plea." Rules of Practice, 
v. BARNES Utah 861 
(MO (Utah 1992) 
quy did include a recitation of the sur 
rounding facts, as a matter of law those 
facts were insufficient to support the 
charge. Id. at 442-44. In this case, the 
colloquy contains no recitation of any facts 
surrounding the death of the victim. We 
therefore conclude that the plea colloquy 
failed to develop the factual basis neces-
sary for the court to properly accept Wil-
lett's plea. 
On appeal, the State contends, however, 
as the district court concluded, that the 
"record as a whole" established a sufficient 
factual basis to accept the guilty plea, even 
if the plea hearing did not. Willett's plea 
occurred before our decision in State v. 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), and 
the fire-Gibbons rule required reviewing 
courts to uphold guilty pleas as long as the 
record as a whole demonstrated "substan-
tial compliance" with constitutional and 
procedural requirements. State v. Hoff, 
814 P.2d 1119, 1123-24 (Utah 1991). 
Applying the substantial compliance test, 
we conclude that the court below erred. In 
the entire record, nothing supports a find-
ing that an adequate factual basis existed 
at the time Willett entered his plea. The 
State has not adverted to any facts regard-
ing the events themselves that could form 
the basis of a conviction. The closest any 
thing in the record comes to establishing a 
factual basis is a brief colloquy, prompted 
by Mr. Watson, a deputy county attorney, 
during the entry of Harley Willett's guilty 
plea on the second degree murder charge: 
MR. WATSON: Perhaps the court would 
want to inquire whether or not there is a 
factual basis from this particular defen-
dant with regard to the entry of this plea 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Suppose you state for the 
court briefly Mr. Willett how exactly it 
happened on the 20th of November? 
MR. HARLEY WILLETT: Well, I aided 
and abetted my father. 
THE COURT: In doing what? 
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Senator 
Sandberg I acknowledged that the bill includes new industry coming 
into the state as well as expansion of existing in state 
businesses and I suggest to you that this bill is on the 
track of encouraging outside business to come into Utah 
and not giving existing business a fair shake with it. 
The businesses that now exist in Utah have paid the full 
load on taxes and you're gonna prevent them to get this 
break on any expansion which by the minimal or not at all 
and I view this as showing favoritism to bring outside 





Mr. Adams, I believe this is really a good bill, but 
we've had three similar bills. We've had the bill that 
we've passed in this body that's gone to the house to get 
tax exemption on air pollution equipment. I understand 
that bill has been killed by the House. Now that leaves 
only two bills left. This bill here, which is an 
industrial development bill, then I understand that House 
Bill 283 which passed the House practically 
overwhelmingly which now deals with industries of 
procurement the rate that we are, that there are over 
$3 billion of supplies that are ordered or contracted by 
federal agencies in the State of Utah and if we really 
got our, the national average, we only get around 
4 percent, and the national average is 70, and therefore 
that bill would pass the legislature to set up 
appropriation about 1.5 or 6 million. But what I'm 
wondering is we only have two bills left to consider. 
This is one and then the other bill which incidently is 
on our calendar and we just got through taking $7.3 
million away from our total appropriations by lowering 
the mill levy on this school bill. So until we know 
exactly how much money is available, do you have any 
suggestions? I understand you are for both remaining 
bills, is that right? 
Well I can only speak at this time to the bill that's 
here on the floor. The other matters are, I think, you 
know you're talking about Representative Holt's bill. I 
would like to just address this one at this point, if we 
could. And I am in favor of this particular bill and I 
do feel that Senator Sandberg has brought up some very 
good points but I think that all of existing businesses 
in the state would greatly benefit by having additional 
133569 
out of the state or within the state. And that although 
new businesses that are originated in Utah or existing 
businesses that expand, may not have the same benefits, 
exactly. They would have the benefit on their new 
equipment, sales tax exemption, plus they'd have the 
benefit of a stronger economic base in which to compete 
in and I think that this is a important part of this bill 
that needs to be understood. I think the existing 
business people of Utah will greatly benefit from the 
passage of this particular provision. 
